Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (Special Mention) (Preamble)

Mushroom cloud above Nagasaki after atomic bombing on August 9, 1945. Taken from the north west – photograph by Charles Levy, US National Archives and Records Administration, public domain image

 

 

I’ve ranked my Top 10 Wars of history, but it doesn’t end there – nor does it end with my Top 10 Types of War, because there is almost an infinite variety of types by or into which one can classify wars.

There’s certainly enough for my usual twenty special mentions per top ten, including my usual weird and wild special mentions towards the end.

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Wars (Special Mention: Revised) (Preamble)

Raising the flag on Iwo Jima as memorialized by the west side of the Marine Corps War Memorial, Arlington Ridge Park, Virigina

 

I’ve always found wars a fascinating subject of history, from the comfortable armchair of hindsight and the fortunate perspective of being well removed from any firsthand experience of them. History, particularly military history, has always been something of a hobby of mine. So of course I have ranked my Top 10 Wars.

But I don’t just have a top ten. As usual for my top tens, I have a whole host of special mentions. My usual rule is twenty special mentions – where the subject matter is prolific enough, as it is here – which I suppose would usually make each top ten a top thirty. My special mentions are also where I tend to have some fun with the subject category and splash out with some wilder entries.

Top Tens – History: Top 10 WW2 Combatant Art of War Rankings

iconic poster image of the 1970 film Patton, starring George C. Scott as the titular US general

 

 

TOP 10 WW2 COMBATANT ART OF WAR RANKINGS

 

I’ve ranked my Top 10 Wars by art of war so now it’s time to rank the major combatants in WW2 by their art of war, drawing from my occasionally idiosyncratic application of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War

Just a reminder – I ranked WW2, the top entry when ranking my Top 10 Wars in general, in tenth place for art of war, albeit in wild tier as something of a paradox.

Part of that paradox is that despite being one of most complete victories in military history (and anomalous as such in the modern history), winning the war took a lot of fighting – seemingly contrary to Sun Tzu’s maxim of winning without fighting.

That paradox is deepened in that the major combatants all demonstrated military proficiency at different points or in different ways – hence this ranking of WW2 combatants by art of war.

 

S-TIER (GOD TIER – OR IS THAT SUN TZU TIER?)

 

(1) CHINA

 

On the one hand, it seems apt that China, the homeland of Sun Tzu, should rank in top spot for art of war in WW2, particularly given the irony that, despite its claim to The Art of War, China is one of the most defeated nations in modern history.

On the other hand – what the hell? China as exemplar of art of war? In WW2?!

China – the nation that spent the war wallowing in its persistent defeat by Japan and only avoiding complete defeat because it was simply too big and because Japan was defeated in the Pacific by the United States?

Yes, because there was more than one China in WW2. I’m not talking the primary combatant – Nationalist China, the Kuomintang China under Chiang Kai-shek that is and was usually recognized as the China of WW2.

Yes, that China spent the war being relentlessly pounded into defeat and through no real fault of its own other than being in the wrong place at the wrong time – next to Imperial Japan in the 1930s and 1940s.

No, I’m talking the other major China in WW2 – Communist China under Mao Zedong.

That China went from the verge of complete defeat by Nationalist China – a defeat from which the famed Long March was a desperate retreat – to being a viable contender and ultimately victor in the postwar resumption of the civil war between them.

And it did that by one of the best ways of winning without fighting – having others do the fighting for you, with both its enemies fighting each other and Imperial Japan effectively defeating Nationalist China for it.

Yes, that was more by stroke of good fortune than strategy, but they certainly exploited that good fortune to the fullest once it presented itself.

 

(2) USA

 

USA! USA! USA!

But seriously, you must have been expecting this.

The USA was the supreme victor of WW2, emerging as the greater of the two global superpowers after the war with the fewest casualties of any major combatant (at least relative to population, and depending on estimation or through civilian casualties, in absolute numbers).

And it did that through supreme art of war – indeed, WW2 was arguably peak American art of war.

Given that the American art of war in WW2 did involve actively fighting and strategy on its part while the Chinese Communist art of war was essentially fortuitous, I might have ranked the United States in the top spot. The only reason I didn’t was to finally give China some much needed Sun Tzu street cred otherwise missing in its military history – and that where the US ended the war as it started in a position of strength, the communist Chinese were able to reverse a position of weakness to one of strength.

The United States has proved itself in the art of war (at least until recently) by being Batman – fighting wars using money and allies. In the Second World War, the United States was the goddamn Batman of the world, winning through the sheer power of its money or economic production, not to mention its Soviet ally doing most of the actual fighting against Germany. Saving Private Ryan? More like Saving Private Ivan, amirite?

As Stalin is reputed to have said of the victory in the Second World War (and if he didn’t, he should have) – England provided the time, Russia provided the blood and America provided the money. That’s how you win without fighting.

Another classic way of winning without fighting is picking curb stomp battles. Such was the economic strength and resources of the United States in both world wars, that they were really a foregone conclusion after its entry, especially when you throw in the other allies. As the United States swamped Japan with its ships and planes in the Second World War, it did indeed have some actual curb stomp battles, such as the ‘Great Marianas Turkey Shoot’ in June 1944, labelled by American naval aviators for the ease with which they shot down the remnants of Japanese carrier aviation (prompting Japan to resort to kamikaze attacks).

There was also American isolationism – the worst place to be in war is at the front line and the best place to be in war is sitting it out at the sidelines, ideally playing the balance of power and making money through financing or supplying your favored side and entering to tilt the balance of power in your direction (and you know, for your allies to pay you back).

On the other hand, but for American isolationism, the United States might well have preempted the war before it even began, arguably the model way of winning without fighting – or at least emboldened Britain and France to do so.

 

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

(3) USSR

 

Wait, what?

Sure, the USSR won – and won big, the other of the two global superpowers after the war and occupying the other half of Europe to that by the United States.

But it also lost big – with the highest casualties of any combatant – and won hard as opposed to the nearly flawless victory of the United States, doing most of the fighting contrary to Sun Tzu’s maxim of winning without fighting.

As Stalin supposedly said, Russia provided the blood and America provided the money – and I know which I’d prefer to provide.

Still, the Allied victory in general and the Soviet victory in particular demonstrates the limitations of Sun Tzu’s pre-modern art of war, which did not anticipate modern firepower or industrial production – with WW historian H.P. Willmot observing for the latter that a modern industrial state can only be defeated by attrition. Not to mention the improvement of defensive firepower during the war – from about 1942-1943 – that goes to explain the endurance and strength of German resistance when the tide turned.

Despite Sun Tzu’s airy-fairy pseudo-pacifist poetry of winning without fighting, sometimes you can’t avoid fighting – and one of those times is when you’re on the other end of the largest invasion in history. That’s when you’d better know how to win with fighting or at least learn quickly.

It is easy to point out Soviet deficiencies in 1941 but seemingly less easy to give the Soviet Union credit for its resilience in avoiding collapse that evaded its predecessor and for that matter its own nascent state against the Germans in the First World War.

Similarly, it’s easy to attribute Soviet victory to brute force, but not so much the considerable skill with which that force was applied. The Soviets had originated the true ‘blitzkrieg’ – the concept of the ‘deep battle’ or ‘deep space battle’, a strategy aimed at destroying enemy command and control centers as well as lines of communication. They just lacked the means to employ this strategy fully until the fourth year of war, when it had sufficient elite or experienced armored and mechanized formations as well as the logistics and mobility to support them. And oh boy, it showed with the Soviet campaigns from Operation Bagration onwards, among the best of the war – or any war.

H.P. Willmott argues for the complete transposition of the German and Soviet armies in terms of military proficiency by 1945, when “the operational and technical quality of the Soviet army was at least the equal of the Wehrmacht at its peak” while “the German army of 1944-45, for all its reputation, had the characteristics so meticulously catalogued when displayed by the Soviet army in 1941”.

The biggest mistake by the Soviets in the art of war was their pact with Germany. By it the Soviets hoped but failed to achieve one of best ways of winning without fighting – having others do the fighting for you, in its adversarial version of having your enemies fight each other, in this case Germany and the western allies.

But wait a minute Stark After Dark, I hear you say – didn’t you place the Chinese communists in top spot for much the same strategy? The difference is that the Soviets failed where the Chinese communists succeeded.

You see, like most things, there’s a catch. The adversarial version of having your adversaries fight each other needs good judgment – in correctly judging that your adversaries will destroy each other, rather than one defeating the other and becoming stronger or more dangerous to you as a result.

In fairness, everyone else was as surprised as the Soviets by the collapse of France – but then, not everyone else was next in the firing line, let alone left alone on the European continent with the nation that hated them. And that brings us to the lapse of judgement that was very much on them – correctly judging your “adversaries” for how adversarial they actually are to you, where clearly Germany was far more adversarial to the Soviets than Britain and France.

 

B-TIER (HIGH TIER)

 

(4) BRITAIN

 

Yes, Britain won but they didn’t win as big as the US or USSR – and like the USSR, they also lost big, not in terms of casualties (which were less than their casualties in WW1) but in global hegemony, which they effectively ceded to the US, as well as the loss of their empire.

Although in fairness that’s probably not as much of a loss as it might seem, as their empire and global hegemony were waning, at least from WW1 but arguably from the late nineteenth century onwards, when their industrial economy that was the foundation for both was eclipsed first by the United States and then by Germany. In reality, the twentieth century was for Britain really just a matter of choice as to which rising power – the United States, Germany, and Russia or the Soviet Union – to align themselves with and their choice to align with the United States is hardly surprising.

When it comes to the art of war in WW2, Britain resembles the US for winning without fighting, only just not as well from reason of being a similar but smaller military power closer to the firing line.

That is, Britain won by allies doing most of the fighting for it, as well through financial or imperial assets and intelligence.

Indeed, when the British did do their own fighting, they were consistently bad at it (until the end of 1942) – which arguably takes their art of war up a notch, to winning even when fighting badly.

WW2 historian Gerhard Weinberg observed that Britain’s consistently poor performance fighting the Germans and Japanese is an issue deserving more attention by historians. Even Churchill observed that the Battle of El Alamein was a turning point for Britain, in that before it they almost never had a victory and after it they almost never had a defeat.

That again just takes their art of war up a notch in my eyes, such that I’ve quipped that in both world wars, the British were lackluster soldiers but excellent diplomats and spies, running rings around their adversaries to win.

Also, fighting in the war may not have involved their traditional “splendid isolationism” but did involve a certain practical isolationism – that is, the practical effect that they sat out most of the fighting in Europe, albeit by fortunate circumstance of their island geography and necessity of being predominantly a naval power. In a sense they improved upon the trench warfare of the first WW1 by sitting behind the bigger trench of the English Channel and accordingly had fewer casualties. Hence their notorious caution and circumspection about opening the second front compared to the Americans.

On the other hand, their biggest mistake essentially involved trying to sit out any military action at all towards Germany prior to the war – appeasement in other words – by which they could readily have preempted the war before it began. Anzar Gat observes a common observation among historians – that the victors of WW1, Britain and France, are unparalleled in forfeiting their overwhelming military advantage that could readily have defeated their German opponent before it even began at effectively no cost to themselves.

That would have been the true art of winning without fighting – and Britain’s failure to do so had to cost it dearly from ranking any higher.

 

C-TIER (MID-TIER)

 

(5) CHINA

 

Yes, it’s the other China – the China that was the primary Chinese combatant in WW2, the China that was (and is) usually recognized as the China of WW2, Nationalist China or Kuomintang China governed by Chiang Kai-shek.

As I observed in my entry for communist China. Nationalist China spent the war being relentlessly pounded into defeat and through no real fault of its own other than being in the wrong place at the wrong time – next to Imperial Japan in the 1930s and 1940s.

I’m still ranking it higher than France.

In fairness, China didn’t do too badly, particularly given it was the weakest of the major combatants, lacking the industrial base of its antagonist Japan or anyone else really.

WW2 historian Gerhard Weinberg thought it a question for historians rivalling that of Britain’s persistent poor military performance as to how China was able to endure as it did.

At least part of it might be attributed to art of war. China was simply too big and populous to fall to Japan, so could resort to what was effectively a passive guerilla strategy, avoiding fighting Japan in open contest (or at all) as much as possible. The result was a stalemate for Japan, forcing Japan into conflict with more powerful nations for the resources to continue the war – nations that would win China’s war for it.

Also, I have to admit blowing up the Yellow River dykes to flood the Japanese out as pretty badass.

 

D-TIER (LOW TIER)

 

(6) FRANCE

 

That’s right, we’ve reached the lowest tier, the losing tier in other words, among the winning side – France.

Put simply, France lost in 1940 and only ranks on the winning side because that defeat was reversed by the victory of the other Allies, liberating it in the process. Sure, some expatriate or exiled French forces fought as part of the Allied forces, as did other defeated European nations. However, the question caustically posed by WW2 historian Gerhard Weinberg remains – why the Vichy French regime or colonial governments submitted so readily to the Germans or Japanese but resisted the Allies.

I suppose you could argue that having other nations liberate your nation and defeat your enemy for you is one way of winning without fighting, but that’s too dependent on their goodwill and strategic interests aligning with yours for it to count in my opinion.

Also, their defeat in 1940 was too big for that, in one blow wiping out French military reputation and substituting the trope of “cheese-eating surrender monkeys”. As military historian H.P. Willmott observed, it poses the questions of “why the German victory was so rapid and one-sided, or in its alternative form, why it was that the French army for three centuries the warrior host of Europe, and for the previous two decades the most prestigious army in the world, collapsed the way it did”.

The only reason I don’t rank France lower is that it did, after all, end up on the winning side. That’s not as flippant as it sounds but reflects that their longer-term strategic instincts were essentially sound in that Germany would not win the prolonged conflict they anticipated. It’s just that they failed their immediate defense and hence to remain an active part of that prolonged conflict which was then won by others, France lacking the resources, space or time that the other major allied combatants had to recover from defeat.

Their biggest mistake was to forfeit their overwhelming military advantage they held over Germany as victor in the First World War by not pre-empting the war before it began. You know, in those two decades as the most prestigious army in the world – when they could have done it by show of force at no cost to themselves as late as the German reoccupation of the Rhineland.

 

(7) ITALY

 

And from the losing tier of the winning side, we go to the winning tier of the losing side – Italy, which managed to negotiate a conditional surrender and switch sides to the Allies (with far fewer casualties than Germany or Japan).

That is, apart from Finland, which also managed the impressive feat of extracting itself from the war while avoiding Soviet occupation.

Italy is notorious for its lack of military proficiency – a notoriety that is overstated as Italy was not so much universally bad as it was inconsistent in military performance, an inconsistency that is largely explicable from its underlying weaknesses before and during the war.

However, this is not ranking combatants by military proficiency but by art of war, particularly as it involves winning without fighting.

And for that Italy deserves credit for pulling off its massive bluff of being taken far more seriously as a great power despite its weakness. Italy’s biggest mistake was calling its own bluff by, you know, actually getting involved in the war, although even then it tried to win with as little fighting as possible while preserving its one real strength – its navy.

That goes all the way back to its anachronistic policy of trying to revive the Roman Empire, half a millennium too late after the world economy had moved on from the Mediterranean – which in practice involved attacking countries poorer than itself, Abyssinia and Albania, hence of little benefit to itself even when it won.

The war on Abyssinia was particularly ill-advised, doubling down on anachronism with a revival of the Scramble for Africa – alienating its former WW1 allies Britain and France, while leaving its forces exposed by their isolation if Britain did turn against them, as actually happened in WW2.

Italy’s contribution to the Spanish Civil War was a prewar drain on its military with little benefit to itself – while it did see victory for a fellow idealogue regime, that regime was unable and unwilling to reciprocate the favor to Italy or Germany in WW2.

Italy should have taken a leaf from Spain’s book, the latter proving far wiser in its cautious neutrality despite initial German victory. Italy should have stayed sitting it out at the sidelines rather than making the Mediterranean and ultimately itself a front line.

In other words, playing the balance of power and making money through trading with both sides, which probably would have seen it entering the war, if at all, on the winning Allied side later in the war and without turning itself into a battlefield except perhaps at the Alps.

Ironically, the British Cabinet also considered whether Britain’s situation would be better if Italy remained neutral or entered the war on Germany’s side. They concluded the former – narrowly – but they may have underestimated how much Italy would drag Germany down

I’d like to think that Italy was playing the long game against Germany, professing to support Germany’s war while secretly working against it by deliberate incompetence – much like Admiral Canaris and his Abwehr in Germany – but sadly I can’t quite pull off the mental gymnastics and it was just too self-destructive for Italy even if it was true.

 

F-TIER (FAIL TIER)

 

(8) JAPAN

 

This can’t be a surprise. If this was ranking combatants by fighting or military proficiency, Japan would rank higher. In terms of the art of war or waging war as opposed to fighting, Japan was hopelessly outclassed by the Allies – and indeed outranked by every major combatant except one.

Japan literally defined strategy only in the short term, with the concept of the decisive battle, particularly as held by its navy – that is, that war would be won by fighting and winning a single knockout below. First, Pearl Harbor, then Midway, and then, well, never as it forever receded back to the horizon and Japan ever more desperately sought to conserve their fleet – until it was a kamikaze last-ditch defense to somehow knock out the Americans in the invasion of Japan itself.

Japan’s long-term strategy was incoherent, to the extent that it had any at all beyond wishful thinking that the United States would simply give up or relied upon Japan’s allegedly superior martial qualities to overcome the overwhelming material superiority of the United States.

“There was no plan at all to invade America, knock her out of the war or destroy her capacity to wage it. In short, there was no strategic war-winning plan at all. Instead, there was an optimistic assumption that, at some stage, America (and Britain) would negotiate a compromise peace.”

In one of my favorite anecdotes from popular historian Paul Johnson, “on 3 January 1942, H!tler admitted to the Japanese ambassador, General Hiroshi Oshima, that he did not yet know ‘how America could be defeated'” – “That made two of them: the Japanese did not know either.”

Worse, not only did Japan have no long-term strategy, but it also effectively had two bodies for planning any strategy, almost as much in competition with each other as with their external adversaries, in the worst high command arrangements of any combatant – its army and navy.

Even at the most basic tactical level, Japan “had almost completely neglected submarine warfare, both defensive and offensive” – which meant that it had no means for ensuring supplies for its forces scattered across the Pacific “or, conversely, of inhibiting the Allies from moving their own supplies”, such that “in the long run, Japan could not prevent America from developing a war-winning strategy.”

That was a fatal flaw for an island nation almost entirely reliant on maritime trade or supply lines, going to war in a naval contest that was essentially a competition of industrial production against an opponent of overwhelmingly superior economic and industrial capacity.

In what you may detect to be a running theme among the Axis, Japan’s biggest mistake was going to war at all when it should have done everything possible as an alternative to avoid it – “Japan’s decision to go to war made no sense. It was hara-kiri”.

And that went all the way back to every decision to go to war – or to ally itself with the Axis – after the First World War. The occupation of Manchuria in 1931 simply opened up the potential for wider war with the larger nations bordering it, China and the Soviet Union, as indeed occurred. The wider war with China exceeded Japan’s ability to defeat it or achieve anything other than a stalemate – and the need for resources, particularly oil, to continue waging that war forced Japan to the widest war of all in the Pacific against the United States, that was entirely beyond its means for anything but defeat.

 

(9) GERMANY

 

The lowest of low tier – no prizes for guessing Germany as the major combatant ranked lowest for the art of war in WW2.

Japan might otherwise have ranked lower as its strategy was more incoherent, but Germany loses out if only because they pulled this crap twice. As historian H.P. Willmott paraphrased Oscar Wilde, to lose one world war may be regarded as misfortune, to lose both looks like carelessness.

As for Japan, if this was ranking combatants by fighting or military proficiency, Germany would rank higher – some would argue highest. As Willmott opined, Germany’s military genius lay in fighting, not in war. When it came to understanding war and waging it, Germany was hopelessly outclassed by the Allies – a situation shared by Germany’s ally Japan. All Germany managed to achieve in two world wars was its encirclement and attrition by enemies with superior resources.

As H.P. Willmott opined on his “theme of Germany’s defeat as a result of her inability to understand war” – The failure to understand the limits, both of military force in the conduct of war and of German national  power within the international community characterized Germany’s actions in two world wars, almost as if the very success of the one German leader who had understood both – Bismarck – blinded successive generations of Germans to these realities because they saw only his military victories”.

Their biggest mistake in the art of war? You guessed it – going to war in the first place, although as Willmott observed that went all the way back through successive German leaders screwing things up after Bismarck (which could be the subject of its own list).

 

X-TIER (WILD TIER)

 

(10) AUSTRALIA

 

I’m rounding out ten entries for my WW2 combatant art of war rankings with Australia in wild tier, because we all know if I was to rank it anywhere else, it would be in god tier top spot for both military proficiency and art of war.

For military proficiency, Australia was the first to defeat both Germany and Japan on land – with Australia’s Ninth Division stopping Rommel’s Afrika Korps at Tobruk in 1941 and Australian forces stopping the Japanese at Milne Bay in 1942 (as well as along the Kokoda Trail).

And art of war for a small nation (in population) like Australia is essentially a matter of allies – so swapping out Britain for the US as ally in the war against Japan, the only real threat of battle on or invasion of its own home territory that Australia faced in war, is prime art of war.

Rightly so too – Australia has never forgiven Churchill for screwing it over in both world wars, “starting with his habit of borrowing the country’s navy and army whenever world war broke out”. Gallipoli, anyone?

But at least Gallipoli didn’t risk the invasion of Australia itself, as opposed to WW2 where Churchill first sought to retain Australia’s troops in the Middle East, then to divert them to Burma when Australia recalled them to defend itself against Japan.

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (Complete Top 10)

Second Floor, Northwest Gallery. Mural of War by Gari Melchers. Library of Congress Thomas Jefferson Building, Washington, D.C – photographed by Carol Highsmith (public domain image)

 

 

TOP 10 TYPES OF WAR

 

I always found wars a fascinating subject of history as a hobby of mine, from the comfortable armchair of hindsight and the fortunate perspective of being well removed from any firsthand experience of them.

Hence, I’ve ranked my Top 10 Wars of history, but it doesn’t end there. No, indeed there’s my Top 10 Types of War in history, as the broad types of war arguably outrank individual wars in historical importance – or at least rank as high as a tool for the study of individual wars, albeit many wars fall into or consist of more than one type of war.

Just some notes – there is almost an infinite variety of types by or into which one can classify wars. One could even compile a top ten for types of types of war, classifying types within broader themes – political, strategic, technological, and so on. I have a mix of types from different broad themes, although I tend to focus on types by strategic doctrine or technological nature of weaponry.

This is also one of my more unusual top ten lists where I don’t count down from tenth to first place but instead simply count out in the reverse direction, from first to tenth place. What’s more, I’ve ranked them mostly in chronological order rather than historical importance, although there’s a general overlap between the two, as longer history tends to coincide with their greater impact, albeit not always.

Interestingly, six of my top ten types of war are ancient or even earlier, so much so that they might be regarded as transcending mere types of war to being archetypes of it. On the other hand, four are distinctively modern – and by modern, I mean twentieth century and onwards – but have effectively reshaped war in their own image.

 

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

Awesome artwork “Roicroi, the last tercio” by Augusto Ferrer-Dalmau, portraying infantry of a Spanish tercio at the 1643 Battle of Rocroi, in Wikipedia “Infantry” under license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en

 

 

(1) INFANTRY WARFARE

 

Warfare in history commenced as infantry warfare, which has endured as the foundation of war and the predominant means of waging it.

That’s not to say that prehistoric war wasn’t also infantry war. In the broadest usage of infantry war as fighting on foot, all prehistoric war was infantry war (except to the extent of anyone ramming canoes or rafts into each other) – but for the most part, prehistoric war lacked the characteristic drill or regimen of infantry war, fighting as warriors rather than soldiers.

And that’s the essential nature of infantry war – fighting on foot and in formation, coordinated with each other rather solo-ing off into single combat, as soldiers with drill and regimen, typically with standardized weapons and equipment.

As such, the origins of infantry war are the origins of war itself in recorded history, since the first ancient empires fought with regular infantry, albeit often as an elite supplemented by conscript masses or militia as irregular infantry – something that has surprisingly endured as a practice since then to the modern period.

The ancient archetype of regular infantry remains the Greek phalanx, and even more so, the Roman legion.

While the archetypal infantry travels on foot – marches, that is, in a style and pace that has remained remarkably consistent throughout history – the defining trait of infantry is that they fight on foot, not necessarily that they get to the fight on foot.

Hence, there has been a variety of infantry distinguished by getting to the fight by other means than marching to it – most notably mechanized infantry or mobile infantry in the modern period but also mounted infantry, naval infantry, airborne infantry, and air assault infantry.

“Before the adoption of the chariot to create the first mobile fighting forces c. 2000 BC, all armies were pure infantry. Even after, with a few exceptions like the Mongol Empire, infantry has been the largest component of most armies in history.”

Infantry also remains the most basic or fundamental unit of war – the proverbial boots on the ground – for achieving strategic objectives, particularly when those objectives are measured in territory.

As such, infantry has not waned in war, albeit it has evolved with technology. Gunpowder saw infantry shift to line infantry tactics, shooting volleys at each other – until modern firepower overwhelmed even that, forcing infantry for its own survival to use “dispersed, maneuver-based, and heavily supported infantry units” as well as combined arms and the paramount importance of cover on the battlefield.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

Charge of the French 4th Hussars at the battle of Friedland, 14 June 1807 – painting by Edouard Detaille in 1891 (public domain image)

 

 

(2) CAVALRY WARFARE

 

“Cavalryman, horseman, trooper, cataphract, knight, drabant, hussar, uhlan, mamluk, curaisser, lancer, dragoon, samurai or horse archer”.

Where infantry was the fundamental unit of war in history, cavalry was the fundamental means of mobile war – “providing armies with superior speed, mobility, and shock impact” as well as things for which mobility is used such as “scouting, screening, flanking and pursuing enemies” or “breaking enemy lines”.

Cavalry warfare involved soldiers or warriors fighting mounted on horseback – ranging from ancient horse archers to armored knights and modern light cavalry”. Obviously, the fundamental ingredient for cavalry is the domestication of the horse, or more precisely the domestication of the horse followed by breeding horses of sufficient size for warriors mounted on them.

Prior to being of sufficient size to be used for cavalry proper, the smaller domesticated horses were able to be used to draw chariots as the first mobile forces in about 2000 BC. Chariots played much the same role as cavalry but were obsolescent by cavalry once horses were of sufficient size. Hence the designation of cavalry is not usually given to “any military forces that used other animals or platforms for mounts, such as chariots” – or those occasional other animals used in war, camels or elephants. Interestingly, the last use of chariots was by the Britons at the time of the Roman conquest of Britain.

Also interestingly, that won’t be the last we see of obsolescence when it comes to cavalry war, but from its origin through to the twentieth century, cavalry has tended to eclipse infantry for decisive importance or impact – as the dominant force for winning battles rather than waging wars.

Of course, that is an oversimplification of the strategic balance between infantry and cavalry in war, as it has seesawed between them, complicated by the usual numeric predominance of infantry in armies and the higher cost of cavalry.

Certainly, the dominance of cavalry is reflected in the recurring military proficiency or superiority of the mounted nomadic warriors of the Eurasian steppes – as observed by military historians such as Azar Gat and John Keegan, as well as the colorful phrases of the “steppe effect” by Walter Scheidel and the “Golden Age of the Barbarians” by James C. Scott.

There was also the medieval dominance of cavalry, originating in the late Roman period, where “mounted forces became the dominant, often aristocratic, arm of European armies throughout the age of feudalism”.

“Cavalry had the advantage of improved mobility, and a soldier fighting from horseback also had the advantages of greater height, speed, and inertial mass over an opponent on foot. Another element of horse mounted warfare is the psychological impact a mounted soldier can inflict on an opponent.”

However, it is weird to think of cavalry forces originating without the subsequent aids to riding – spurs, saddles, and above all stirrups, which facilitated heavy cavalry and the use of lances.

One might also add a certain romanticism that has attached to cavalry throughout history, albeit not necessarily as a matter of strategic or tactical advantage.

Sadly for such romanticism, infantry has had the last laugh, as unlike infantry but like chariots, cavalry has become obsolescent from the twentieth century to, well, another entry in this top ten – which has assumed the same role and often even the same title as cavalry with greater mobility and less vulnerability, as have airborne or air assault units such as in the famous fictional depiction of the helicopter air assault 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment in Apocalypse Now.

Whereas infantry could evolve, cavalry could not, at least on a large scale – the same deadly firepower of modern history that forced the evolution of infantry was fatal to cavalry.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

The 1805 Battle of Trafalgar painted by Louis-Phillipe Crepin (“Le Redoutable a Trafalgar”) in 1806 – public domain image used in Wikipedia “Naval Warfare”

 

 

(3) NAVAL WARFARE

 

War on water!

No – not like when Roman Emperor Caligula literally declared war on the sea (in the form of the god Neptune or Poseidon), but war fought on water, albeit overlapping with war fought on land in amphibious operations and naval landings.

“Naval warfare involves military operations on, under, and over the sea” – “combat in and on the sea, the ocean, or any other battlespace involving a major body of water such as a large lake or wide river”.

As surprisingly capable humans are as swimmers for terrestrial mammals (particularly primates), naval warfare obviously involves the various vessels humans have devised for transport on water. Of course, it doesn’t just involve vessels but vessels of sufficient size, resilience, and above all means for combat with other vessels. Hence naval warfare originated from the Bronze Age onwards, with the first recorded sea battle as the Battle of the Delta between the Egyptians and the Sea Peoples in about 1175 BC, although the very name of the latter suggests some sort of naval warfare before that.

Prehistoric humans probably fought each other from canoes or even rafts but that seems more a form of naval proto-warfare. However, the former persisted in recorded history with the use of war canoes, usually as a form of amphibious warfare – an important subset of naval warfare – although “canoe versus canoe engagements…were also significant”.

Naval warfare rose to a surprising importance and prominence in ancient history that are often overlooked for the more famous warfare on land. That importance seems even more surprising as naval warfare was predominantly fought either by boarding enemy ships or ramming them – methods which seem crude by the standards of modern naval warfare but persisted for a surprisingly long time until (and to some extent even after) the advent of gunpowder allowed for shipborne artillery as the standard means of naval combat.

Homer’s Iliad may have had the siege of Troy as its focus but famously features the so-called Catalogue of Ships, in its second book no less, albeit for the transport of Greek forces to Troy rather than naval combat with Trojan ships.

Thereafter, naval warfare looms large in ancient history – from the Persians and Greeks (particularly the Athenians) through to the Romans, whose Pax Romana was as much a matter of Mare Nostrum as it was of the legions.

Galleys were the primary means of ancient naval warfare and persisted as the dominant vessels for war until the early modern period in that primary arena of naval warfare, the Mediterranean. Galleys were superseded by the vessels of the Age of Sail, which also saw naval warfare expand with maritime transportation from mostly hugging the coasts in seas to the open ocean – although it is striking how often naval battles continued to be fought in coastal waters.

On that point, while we typically think of naval warfare as battles fought on the sea or ocean, there’s also naval warfare fought on lakes and rivers – reflecting that “even in the interior of large landmasses, transportation before the advent of extensive railways was largely dependent on rivers, lakes, canals, and other navigable waterways”. Hence the modern distinction between brown-water navies for riverine or littoral bodies of water and blue-water navies (or green-water navies) for open oceans or seas.

From the Age of Sail to the Age of Steam and Steel – with naval warfare in the latter evolving to steam power for ships and coaling stations for bases or ports. The latter also saw “ironclad” ships – first used in naval combat in the American Civil War – reflecting the improved chemistry and metallurgy which not only provided the means for armor to ships but also the guns and shells “capable of demolishing a wooden ship at a single blow” for which the armor was required.

Interestingly, naval supremacy underlaid modern superpower in a similar manner to the Pax Romana, only more so – with the Pax Britannica of the 19th century (with the Indian Ocean being dubbed a “British lake” in a similar manner to the Mare Nostrum), succeeded by the Pax Americana in the 20th century.

Modern naval warfare has seen a proliferation of forms through technology – notably naval aviation and aircraft carriers or submarine warfare which came to the fore in the Second World War (effectively superseding battleships) but also more recently missiles and aerial or naval drones.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

Guerrilla warfare during the Peninsular War, by Roque Gameiro, depicting a Portuguese guerrilla ambush against French forces (in the war that gave us the term guerilla) in “Pictures of the History of Portugal”, 2017 (public domain image used in Wikipedia “Guerilla Warfare”)

 

 

(4) GUERILLA WARFARE

 

Although the term originates from the Peninsular War in Spain against Napoleon’s France, guerilla war predates the Peninsular War all the way back to prehistory. Indeed, it was conventional war that was the more recent outlier, originating only in the Bronze Age and recorded history, while guerilla war was the baseline or default setting of war before that – and since, with Sun Tzu’s Art of War essentially a handbook in guerilla war strategy.

Nor was guerilla war strategy isolated to China. The Romans are probably more famous for fighting against guerilla war in revolts against their empire, in the process demonstrating why guerilla war was not so prevalent against ancient states with their resort to removing entire population, but they also famously resorted to guerilla war tactics when they had to against Hannibal in the Second Punic War.

“Guerrilla warfare is a form of unconventional, asymmetrical conflict where small, mobile groups of irregular forces (rebels, partisans) use hit-and-run tactics, sabotage, and ambushes to fight larger, traditional military forces. Originating from the Spanish for “little war,” it focuses on harassment, psychological warfare, and exploiting local knowledge to weaken a superior enemy over time.”

As such, guerilla war often tends to combine more than one type of war – infantry war may predominate in guerilla war, but the mobility of cavalry often leads to guerilla war or at least similar tactics. Arguably, even naval forces have resorted to a style similar to guerilla warfare – most notably for privateers, merchant raiders, or submarine attacks on shipping.

Guerilla war strategy aims to avoid “”direct, conventional battles, focusing instead on reducing enemy morale, seizing supplies, and dragging out conflicts to exhaust the opponent’s political will” – relying heavily on “support from the local population for food, shelter, intelligence, and recruits” or “familiar, difficult terrain like jungles, mountains, or crowded urban areas”.

That literal usage of little war from Spanish has lent itself to one of the most common modern descriptors of guerilla war as “small wars”, although that has often been synonymous with “dirty wars” in description and practice, for all sides of such conflicts.

Guerilla war often seems the most distinctive and prolific type of war in modern warfare, from the Vietnam War onwards – as the destructive power of modern technology seems more favorable to guerilla war, and even more so, modern political ideologies enlisting populations for or against guerillas.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

The siege of Rancagua during the Chilean War of Independence, painting by Pedro Subercaseaux (public domain image used in Wikipedia “Siege”)

 

 

 

(5) SIEGE & URBAN WARFARE

 

With fortifications – a historical development significant enough for its own interlude in John Keegan’s A History of Warfare – came siege warfare.

Or perhaps more precisely, prehistorical development, given that both cities or at least human settlements of sufficient size and fortifications emerged in the Neolithic and Bronze Age – indeed, one of the key features for archaeology. There may have been prototypes of fortifications or fortified positions using natural features or chokepoints in the Paleolithic, but not the resources for standing or field armies to hold or take them on the same scale.

“Siege warfare is a form of constant, low-intensity conflict focused on capturing a fortified position (castle, city, or fort) by surrounding it to block supplies (investment) and using active assaults to breach defenses. Common methods include starving defenders, utilizing artillery, tunnelling under walls, or scaling them.”

Sun Tzu in The Art of War admonished besieging cities as the “worst policy”, given the cost in time, resources and forces exceeds even that of the usual costly attrition to be avoided for war in general.

However, siege warfare is surprisingly prolific in history, notably in later medieval history where “sieges were more common than pitched battles”. It’s also surprisingly prolific in fictional depictions of war, in part due to the dramatic nature of last stands.

The rosy-fingered dawn of Western literature, Homer’s Iliad, is ultimately about the siege of Troy – which may or may not have some Bronze Age historicity. Similarly, both the literary and cinematic versions of Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings feature key battles, such as those for Helm’s Deep and Minas Tirith, that are sieges.

Without winning a siege by assault or attrition, that left options of negotiating surrender by diplomacy, “the use of deception or treachery to bypass defenses” or the blunter options that could affect either the besieged or besiegers – “starvation, thirst or disease”.

Siege warfare is usually seen as ending with gunpowder but that’s not strictly or initially the case, as something of an arms race developed between fortifications and artillery in early modern history. It was with the advent of greater firepower from the nineteenth century and particularly of mobile warfare from the twentieth century, that “the significance of classical siege declined” and “a single fortified stronghold is no longer as decisive as it once was”.

Ironically however, while the “classical siege” may have declined from modern firepower and mobile warfare, the same force of industrialization that underlay both led to battles or wars of attrition that resembled sieges. States had the means to maintain and supply forces in the field that could then effectively besiege each other or their defensive positions on an unprecedented scale and span.

The trench warfare on the Western Front of the First World War resembled a form of siege warfare. The Second World War might seem to have displaced that through combined arms and maneuver, but it is striking how many battles of that war were or resembled sieges – Stalingrad and Monte Cassino to name just two of them, apart from the famous siege of Leningrad.

The battles or sieges of the Second World War also demonstrate that while city walls may have stopped being a feature in siege warfare, cities themselves did not – with urban warfare resembling a form of siege warfare, only now of attrition of defensive positions within the city itself. Since the Second World War, urban warfare has also often combined elements of guerilla warfare with siege warfare.

The attritional nature of modern industrial warfare has extended beyond individual battles or even any direct combat to resemble sieges on a grand scale – such as the submarine warfare of the Second World War, with the Germans effectively besieging Britain and the Americans besieging Japan, or for that matter the Cold War in Europe, resembling two armies besieging each other.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

A 155 mm artillery shell fired by a United States 11th Marine Regiment M-198 howitzer during training – public domain image in Wikipedia “Artillery”

 

 

(6) ARTILLERY WARFARE

 

“The god of war” according to Stalin – generally providing the majority of the total firepower for modern armies as well as causing the majority of combat deaths in the Napoleonic Wars and world wars.

“Artillery consists of ranged weapons that launch munitions far beyond the range and power of infantry firearms” – “since the introduction of gunpowder and cannon, artillery has largely meant cannon, and in contemporary usage, usually refers to shell-firing guns, howitzers, and mortars…and rocket artillery”.

Hence, artillery is a large part, if not the primary part, of the firepower that transformed infantry warfare and made cavalry warfare obsolete in modern history – although with some caveat that infantry firepower has also been transformed in ways that matches or eclipses historic artillery, such as RPGs or rocket-propelled grenades.

As we have seen, it has also transformed naval warfare, by becoming the predominant means of that warfare as opposed to the boarding or ramming of ships that preceded it – as well as coastal artillery to defend against ships.

And it is only apt that artillery warfare is the next entry after siege and urban warfare – “early artillery development focused on the ability to breach defensive walls and fortifications during siege and led to heavy, fairly immobile siege engines”.

“Although not called by that name, siege engines performing the role recognizable as artillery have been employed in warfare since antiquity. The first known catapult was developed in Syracuse in 399 BC. Until the introduction of  gunpowder into western warfare, artillery was dependent upon mechanical energy, which not only severely limited the kinetic energy of the projectiles, but also required the construction of very large engines to accumulate sufficient energy. A 1st-century BC Roman catapult launching 6.55 kg (14.4 lb) stones achieved a kinetic energy of 16 kilojoules, compared to a mid-19th-century 12-pounder gun, which fired a 4.1 kg (9.0 lb) round, with a kinetic energy of 240 kilojoules, or a 20th-century US battleship that fired a 1,225 kg (2,701 lb) projectile from its main battery with an energy level surpassing 350 megajoules.”

With lighter and more mobile artillery through technological improvement there came feild artillery – usually horse-drawn prior to the steam and internal combustion engines that saw railway guns, the largest artillery ever conceived, and the artillery, both offensive and defensive, of the next two entries.

Such is the modern importance of artillery that it is typically its own arm of service within modern armies – as well as navies and air forces for coastal and anti-aircraft artillery respectively, although organization and practice varies.

Technological improvement of artillery not only involves the delivery systems or “engines” as well the projectiles or munitions fired or launched by them, but also target acquisition and techniques or “fire control”.

 

RATING:

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

Promotional art for the Armored Warfare video game

 

 

(7) MECHANIZED & ARMORED WAR

 

Where the steam engine transformed naval warfare, the internal combustion engine transformed warfare on land – as well as the balance between land and sea in warfare.

Let me elaborate.

Sure, the steam engine, used for trains and railways, also transformed warfare on land but more in logistics and mobilization than actual combat.

However, to transform combat on land – and replace cavalry for mobile warfare – it took the advent of the internal combustion engine for vehicles used in war from the twentieth century onwards.

What is often overlooked is that the advent of the internal combustion engine in war also reversed the balance between a seaborne invading force and the land-based defending force. Prior to the internal combustion engine, a seaborne force had the advantage of greater mobility and speed bringing troops and supplies to a beachhead over the land-based force defending it. After the internal combustion engine, the land-based force had that advantage.

Mechanized warfare, often interchangeably used with armored warfare given how much both are represented tanks, “is the operational use of armored fighting vehicles—such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled artillery—combined with motorized infantry to achieve rapid movement, high firepower, and protection on the battlefield. It represents a shift from infantry-centric fighting to machine-driven combat, originating in WWI”.

While the tank is definitive of mechanized warfare (and obviously of armored warfare), it is not the war-breaking weapon in isolation as it is often seen to be in popular imagination. Indeed, tanks in isolation without support are dangerously vulnerable to counterattack, particularly with the advent of artillery and infantry anti-tank weaponry in the Second World War. I’ve read that tanks aren’t even the best weapon to use against other tanks.

Instead, tanks are used as part of combined arms strategy or tactics – “much of the application of armoured warfare depends on the use of tanks and related vehicles used by other supporting arms such as infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, and other combat vehicles, as well as mounted combat engineers and other support units”.

The use of tanks has been inflated in popular imagination by their identification as the instrument of German blitzkrieg in the Second World War. Setting aside that blitzkrieg itself was a propaganda term applied to traditional German maneuver warfare (Bewegungskrieg), tanks were obviously important but as a component of combined arms – H.P. Willmott argued that the use of radio (to coordinate combined arms) was the more decisive component. Even then, the success of German “blitzkrieg” reflected a brief window where the balance swung in favor of mobile offensive firepower over defence, but the balance swang back towards defensive firepower during the Second World War – hence the strength of German defence in the latter part of the war and the relatively greater force the Allies required to overcome it.

 

RATING:

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

An air-to-air right side view of an 81st Tactical Fighter Squadron F-4E Phantom II aircraft releasing 18 Mark-82 500-pound bombs over the Bardenas Reales Gunnery Range. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. David Nolan) – public domain image in Wikipedia “Aerial Warfare”

 

 

(8) AERIAL WARFARE

 

War in air!

It’s commonly observed that only 66 years separated the American Wright Brothers’ flights in 1903, recognized to be “the first sustained and controlled heavier than air powered flight”, and the moon landing in 1969.

However, less than a decade separated those flights from the first use of aircraft in war, the Italo-Turkish War in 1911, although their more famous and prolific use was in the First World War, firstly for aerial reconnaissance but then for aerial combat, air support and bombing.

Such was the development of military airpower in only two decades after the First World War that it became of decisive importance in the Second World War, particularly for achieving air superiority or supremacy – arguably to the extent of war-breaking importance, as the critical margin of victory or defeat, but not war-winning of itself.

Military airpower has only increased since then – with jets, missiles, more powerful or precise munitions, electronic or stealth technology, and drones or unmanned aerial vehicles – but the jury is still out whether airpower alone can win wars, at least in the absence of another entry in this top ten. Still, it can come damn close, perhaps even win on occasion by itself or with minimal use of ground forces.

“Aerial warfare includes bombers attacking enemy installations or a concentration of enemy troops or strategic targets; fighter aircraft battling for control of airspace; attack aircraft engaging in close air support against ground targets; naval aviation flying against sea and nearby land targets; gliders, helicopters and other aircraft to carry airborne forces such as paratroopers; aerial refueling tankers to extend operation time or range; and military transport aircraft to move cargo and personnel.”

That is hardly exhaustive of military airpower. Kites and balloons, manned and unmanned, were used in warfare even prior to heavier than air powered flight, primarily for reconnaissance, and continue to have applications since. Lighter-than-air airships have also been used in warfare, with the high point (heh) of their use for bombing cities in the First World War although they had and continue to have more limited applications.

Returning to heavier than air powered aircraft, they have also been used and continued to be used for communications, command and control as well as early warning, surveillance, and intelligence. There’s also the use of aircraft for evacuation and rescue – as well as the medical transport, such as the titular Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals of the TV series with its iconic helicopter ambulance opening scene.

On the other side, “surface forces are likely to respond to enemy air activity with anti-aircraft warfare”.

 

RATING:

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

 

An MQ-1 Predator, armed with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, piloted by Lt. Col. Scott Miller on a combat mission over southern Afghanistan. (U.S. Air Force Photo / Lt. Col. Leslie Pratt) – public domain image in Wikipedia “General Atomics MQ-1 Predator”

 

 

(9) DRONE WARFARE

 

Drones, drone strikes and drone swarms.

“Drone warfare is a form of warfare that involves the deployment of military robots and unmanned systems. The unmanned systems may be remoted controlled by a pilot or have varying levels of autonomy during their mission, enhancing offensive and defensive capabilities while reducing the need for personnel.”

‘Nuff said, except that drone warfare is not only emerging as the type of warfare that defines the conflicts of the twenty-first century, but also a game-changing one that increasingly defines their battlespace.

And I say battlespace to invoke the multiple domains of drone warfare – “types of unmanned systems and platforms include unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) or weaponized commercial unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), unmanned surface vehicles (USV) or unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), and unmanned ground vehicles (UGV)”.

“Military applications of drones range from reconnaissance tasks, kamikaze missions, logistical support, bomb disposal, training and medical evacuation to electronic warfare, anti-war, anti-armor, and anti-personnel roles…Drones are primarily utilized to conduct intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions, facilitating direct attacks on targets”.

Drone warfare was defined by US drone strikes in the War on Terror but has “evolved and proliferated quickly in the 2010s and 2020s”. Even so, I wouldn’t have ranked it in my top ten before the Russo-Ukrainian War, which saw it rise to game-changing prominence that’s here to stay.

“The Russo-Ukrainian war is widely recognised as the world’s first drone war due to the large scale and high intensity of drone attacks, and the role of this experience in evolving the tactics of modern conventional warfare…The Russo-Ukrainian war demonstrated how drones have disrupted traditional military doctrines in a manner similar to how gunpowder revolutionized warfare, making them a decisive factor in all future conflicts.”

Such is the role of drones in that war that “Ukraine became the first country to create a military branch exclusively dedicated to drone warfare – the Unmanned Systems Forces”, with Russia following suit and I anticipate more to follow beyond that war and its combatants.

 

RATING:

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

 

Operation Buster-Jungle Dog in exercise Desert Rock I at the Nevada Test Site, 1 November 1951 – the first US nuclear field exercise conducted on land with troops only 6 miles from the blast, public domain image in Wikipedia “Nuclear Warfare”

 

 

(10) NUCLEAR WARFARE

 

“It’s Defcon One…get me Big Mac, fries to go!”

Few forms of warfare have loomed as large as nuclear warfare but at the same time to have never existed in actual warfare except as threat or hypothetical prospect with one exception – fortunately, “the first and only use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict was the United States atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki”.

While nuclear weapons haven’t been used in warfare apart from that exception, that hasn’t stopped a select few nations with the means to acquire or develop them, primarily the United States and the Soviet Union or Russia, from detonating them “on over 2,000 occasions for various testing purposes” or deploying them on a large scale in readiness for use.

The prospect or threat of nuclear warfare has effectively operated as a limit on other forms of warfare, at least directly between states with nuclear weapons, to avoid escalating to nuclear warfare with each other, given the sheer destructive potential of mutually assured destruction at best and the possibility of human extinction at worst – “nuclear winter, nuclear famine, and societal collapse”, oh my!

And that pretty much sums up nuclear warfare, except for how dangerously close we’ve come to the tripwire for it.

“Countries have increased their readiness to carry out strategic and tactical nuclear attacks in response to intensifying conflicts, including the Korean War, First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises, Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam War, Sino-Soviet border conflict, Yom Kippur War, Gulf War, and Russo-Ukrainian War”.

“The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, between the nuclear superpowers of the U.S. and Soviet Union, is often considered the closest call with a nuclear exchange” – one of two occasions, along with the Yom Kippur War, that the United States was at Defcon Two, the stage before actual deployment in Defcon One.

The other famous measurement of the risk of nuclear war is the Doomsday Clock.

Throw in the extraordinary extent to which states have planned for “limited” nuclear war or had tactical nuclear weapons deployed for use on the battlefield – missiles, munitions, torpedoes and depth charges on the battlefields – as well as the risk of deployment from accident or false alarms, and one sometimes wonders how we ever made it this far without nuking ourselves.

 

RATING:

X-TIER (WILD TIER)

 

 

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (Complete & Revised: Part 2)

A 155 mm artillery shell fired by a United States 11th Marine Regiment M-198 howitzer during training – public domain image in Wikipedia “Artillery”

 

 

(6) ARTILLERY WARFARE

 

“The god of war” according to Stalin – generally providing the majority of the total firepower for modern armies as well as causing the majority of combat deaths in the Napoleonic Wars and world wars.

“Artillery consists of ranged weapons that launch munitions far beyond the range and power of infantry firearms” – “since the introduction of gunpowder and cannon, artillery has largely meant cannon, and in contemporary usage, usually refers to shell-firing guns, howitzers, and mortars…and rocket artillery”.

Hence, artillery is a large part, if not the primary part, of the firepower that transformed infantry warfare and made cavalry warfare obsolete in modern history – although with some caveat that infantry firepower has also been transformed in ways that matches or eclipses historic artillery, such as RPGs or rocket-propelled grenades.

As we have seen, it has also transformed naval warfare, by becoming the predominant means of that warfare as opposed to the boarding or ramming of ships that preceded it – as well as coastal artillery to defend against ships.

And it is only apt that artillery warfare is the next entry after siege and urban warfare – “early artillery development focused on the ability to breach defensive walls and fortifications during siege and led to heavy, fairly immobile siege engines”.

“Although not called by that name, siege engines performing the role recognizable as artillery have been employed in warfare since antiquity. The first known catapult was developed in Syracuse in 399 BC. Until the introduction of  gunpowder into western warfare, artillery was dependent upon mechanical energy, which not only severely limited the kinetic energy of the projectiles, but also required the construction of very large engines to accumulate sufficient energy. A 1st-century BC Roman catapult launching 6.55 kg (14.4 lb) stones achieved a kinetic energy of 16 kilojoules, compared to a mid-19th-century 12-pounder gun, which fired a 4.1 kg (9.0 lb) round, with a kinetic energy of 240 kilojoules, or a 20th-century US battleship that fired a 1,225 kg (2,701 lb) projectile from its main battery with an energy level surpassing 350 megajoules.”

With lighter and more mobile artillery through technological improvement there came feild artillery – usually horse-drawn prior to the steam and internal combustion engines that saw railway guns, the largest artillery ever conceived, and the artillery, both offensive and defensive, of the next two entries.

Such is the modern importance of artillery that it is typically its own arm of service within modern armies – as well as navies and air forces for coastal and anti-aircraft artillery respectively, although organization and practice varies.

Technological improvement of artillery not only involves the delivery systems or “engines” as well the projectiles or munitions fired or launched by them, but also target acquisition and techniques or “fire control”.

 

RATING:

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

Promotional art for the Armored Warfare video game

 

 

(7) MECHANIZED & ARMORED WAR

 

Where the steam engine transformed naval warfare, the internal combustion engine transformed warfare on land – as well as the balance between land and sea in warfare.

Let me elaborate.

Sure, the steam engine, used for trains and railways, also transformed warfare on land but more in logistics and mobilization than actual combat.

However, to transform combat on land – and replace cavalry for mobile warfare – it took the advent of the internal combustion engine for vehicles used in war from the twentieth century onwards.

What is often overlooked is that the advent of the internal combustion engine in war also reversed the balance between a seaborne invading force and the land-based defending force. Prior to the internal combustion engine, a seaborne force had the advantage of greater mobility and speed bringing troops and supplies to a beachhead over the land-based force defending it. After the internal combustion engine, the land-based force had that advantage.

Mechanized warfare, often interchangeably used with armored warfare given how much both are represented tanks, “is the operational use of armored fighting vehicles—such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled artillery—combined with motorized infantry to achieve rapid movement, high firepower, and protection on the battlefield. It represents a shift from infantry-centric fighting to machine-driven combat, originating in WWI”.

While the tank is definitive of mechanized warfare (and obviously of armored warfare), it is not the war-breaking weapon in isolation as it is often seen to be in popular imagination. Indeed, tanks in isolation without support are dangerously vulnerable to counterattack, particularly with the advent of artillery and infantry anti-tank weaponry in the Second World War. I’ve read that tanks aren’t even the best weapon to use against other tanks.

Instead, tanks are used as part of combined arms strategy or tactics – “much of the application of armoured warfare depends on the use of tanks and related vehicles used by other supporting arms such as infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, and other combat vehicles, as well as mounted combat engineers and other support units”.

The use of tanks has been inflated in popular imagination by their identification as the instrument of German blitzkrieg in the Second World War. Setting aside that blitzkrieg itself was a propaganda term applied to traditional German maneuver warfare (Bewegungskrieg), tanks were obviously important but as a component of combined arms – H.P. Willmott argued that the use of radio (to coordinate combined arms) was the more decisive component. Even then, the success of German “blitzkrieg” reflected a brief window where the balance swung in favor of mobile offensive firepower over defence, but the balance swang back towards defensive firepower during the Second World War – hence the strength of German defence in the latter part of the war and the relatively greater force the Allies required to overcome it.

 

RATING:

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

An air-to-air right side view of an 81st Tactical Fighter Squadron F-4E Phantom II aircraft releasing 18 Mark-82 500-pound bombs over the Bardenas Reales Gunnery Range. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. David Nolan) – public domain image in Wikipedia “Aerial Warfare”

 

 

(8) AERIAL WARFARE

 

War in air!

It’s commonly observed that only 66 years separated the American Wright Brothers’ flights in 1903, recognized to be “the first sustained and controlled heavier than air powered flight”, and the moon landing in 1969.

However, less than a decade separated those flights from the first use of aircraft in war, the Italo-Turkish War in 1911, although their more famous and prolific use was in the First World War, firstly for aerial reconnaissance but then for aerial combat, air support and bombing.

Such was the development of military airpower in only two decades after the First World War that it became of decisive importance in the Second World War, particularly for achieving air superiority or supremacy – arguably to the extent of war-breaking importance, as the critical margin of victory or defeat, but not war-winning of itself.

Military airpower has only increased since then – with jets, missiles, more powerful or precise munitions, electronic or stealth technology, and drones or unmanned aerial vehicles – but the jury is still out whether airpower alone can win wars, at least in the absence of another entry in this top ten. Still, it can come damn close, perhaps even win on occasion by itself or with minimal use of ground forces.

“Aerial warfare includes bombers attacking enemy installations or a concentration of enemy troops or strategic targets; fighter aircraft battling for control of airspace; attack aircraft engaging in close air support against ground targets; naval aviation flying against sea and nearby land targets; gliders, helicopters and other aircraft to carry airborne forces such as paratroopers; aerial refueling tankers to extend operation time or range; and military transport aircraft to move cargo and personnel.”

That is hardly exhaustive of military airpower. Kites and balloons, manned and unmanned, were used in warfare even prior to heavier than air powered flight, primarily for reconnaissance, and continue to have applications since. Lighter-than-air airships have also been used in warfare, with the high point (heh) of their use for bombing cities in the First World War although they had and continue to have more limited applications.

Returning to heavier than air powered aircraft, they have also been used and continued to be used for communications, command and control as well as early warning, surveillance, and intelligence. There’s also the use of aircraft for evacuation and rescue – as well as the medical transport, such as the titular Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals of the TV series with its iconic helicopter ambulance opening scene.

On the other side, “surface forces are likely to respond to enemy air activity with anti-aircraft warfare”.

 

RATING:

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

 

An MQ-1 Predator, armed with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, piloted by Lt. Col. Scott Miller on a combat mission over southern Afghanistan. (U.S. Air Force Photo / Lt. Col. Leslie Pratt) – public domain image in Wikipedia “General Atomics MQ-1 Predator”

 

 

(9) DRONE WARFARE

 

Drones, drone strikes and drone swarms.

“Drone warfare is a form of warfare that involves the deployment of military robots and unmanned systems. The unmanned systems may be remoted controlled by a pilot or have varying levels of autonomy during their mission, enhancing offensive and defensive capabilities while reducing the need for personnel.”

‘Nuff said, except that drone warfare is not only emerging as the type of warfare that defines the conflicts of the twenty-first century, but also a game-changing one that increasingly defines their battlespace.

And I say battlespace to invoke the multiple domains of drone warfare – “types of unmanned systems and platforms include unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) or weaponized commercial unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), unmanned surface vehicles (USV) or unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), and unmanned ground vehicles (UGV)”.

“Military applications of drones range from reconnaissance tasks, kamikaze missions, logistical support, bomb disposal, training and medical evacuation to electronic warfare, anti-war, anti-armor, and anti-personnel roles…Drones are primarily utilized to conduct intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions, facilitating direct attacks on targets”.

Drone warfare was defined by US drone strikes in the War on Terror but has “evolved and proliferated quickly in the 2010s and 2020s”. Even so, I wouldn’t have ranked it in my top ten before the Russo-Ukrainian War, which saw it rise to game-changing prominence that’s here to stay.

“The Russo-Ukrainian war is widely recognised as the world’s first drone war due to the large scale and high intensity of drone attacks, and the role of this experience in evolving the tactics of modern conventional warfare…The Russo-Ukrainian war demonstrated how drones have disrupted traditional military doctrines in a manner similar to how gunpowder revolutionized warfare, making them a decisive factor in all future conflicts.”

Such is the role of drones in that war that “Ukraine became the first country to create a military branch exclusively dedicated to drone warfare – the Unmanned Systems Forces”, with Russia following suit and I anticipate more to follow beyond that war and its combatants.

 

RATING:

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

 

Operation Buster-Jungle Dog in exercise Desert Rock I at the Nevada Test Site, 1 November 1951 – the first US nuclear field exercise conducted on land with troops only 6 miles from the blast, public domain image in Wikipedia “Nuclear Warfare”

 

 

(10) NUCLEAR WARFARE

 

“It’s Defcon One…get me Big Mac, fries to go!”

Few forms of warfare have loomed as large as nuclear warfare but at the same time to have never existed in actual warfare except as threat or hypothetical prospect with one exception – fortunately, “the first and only use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict was the United States atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki”.

While nuclear weapons haven’t been used in warfare apart from that exception, that hasn’t stopped a select few nations with the means to acquire or develop them, primarily the United States and the Soviet Union or Russia, from detonating them “on over 2,000 occasions for various testing purposes” or deploying them on a large scale in readiness for use.

The prospect or threat of nuclear warfare has effectively operated as a limit on other forms of warfare, at least directly between states with nuclear weapons, to avoid escalating to nuclear warfare with each other, given the sheer destructive potential of mutually assured destruction at best and the possibility of human extinction at worst – “nuclear winter, nuclear famine, and societal collapse”, oh my!

And that pretty much sums up nuclear warfare, except for how dangerously close we’ve come to the tripwire for it.

“Countries have increased their readiness to carry out strategic and tactical nuclear attacks in response to intensifying conflicts, including the Korean War, First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises, Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam War, Sino-Soviet border conflict, Yom Kippur War, Gulf War, and Russo-Ukrainian War”.

“The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, between the nuclear superpowers of the U.S. and Soviet Union, is often considered the closest call with a nuclear exchange” – one of two occasions, along with the Yom Kippur War, that the United States was at Defcon Two, the stage before actual deployment in Defcon One.

The other famous measurement of the risk of nuclear war is the Doomsday Clock.

Throw in the extraordinary extent to which states have planned for “limited” nuclear war or had tactical nuclear weapons deployed for use on the battlefield – missiles, munitions, torpedoes and depth charges on the battlefields – as well as the risk of deployment from accident or false alarms, and one sometimes wonders how we ever made it this far without nuking ourselves.

 

RATING:

X-TIER (WILD TIER)

 

 

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (Revised: New Entry) (6) Artillery Warfare

A 155 mm artillery shell fired by a United States 11th Marine Regiment M-198 howitzer during training – public domain image in Wikipedia “Artillery”

 

 

(6) ARTILLERY WARFARE

 

“The god of war” according to Stalin – generally providing the majority of the total firepower for modern armies as well as causing the majority of combat deaths in the Napoleonic Wars and world wars.

“Artillery consists of ranged weapons that launch munitions far beyond the range and power of infantry firearms” – “since the introduction of gunpowder and cannon, artillery has largely meant cannon, and in contemporary usage, usually refers to shell-firing guns, howitzers, and mortars…and rocket artillery”.

Hence, artillery is a large part, if not the primary part, of the firepower that transformed infantry warfare and made cavalry warfare obsolete in modern history – although with some caveat that infantry firepower has also been transformed in ways that matches or eclipses historic artillery, such as RPGs or rocket-propelled grenades.

As we have seen, it has also transformed naval warfare, by becoming the predominant means of that warfare as opposed to the boarding or ramming of ships that preceded it – as well as coastal artillery to defend against ships.

And it is only apt that artillery warfare is the next entry after siege and urban warfare – “early artillery development focused on the ability to breach defensive walls and fortifications during siege and led to heavy, fairly immobile siege engines”.

“Although not called by that name, siege engines performing the role recognizable as artillery have been employed in warfare since antiquity. The first known catapult was developed in Syracuse in 399 BC. Until the introduction of  gunpowder into western warfare, artillery was dependent upon mechanical energy, which not only severely limited the kinetic energy of the projectiles, but also required the construction of very large engines to accumulate sufficient energy. A 1st-century BC Roman catapult launching 6.55 kg (14.4 lb) stones achieved a kinetic energy of 16 kilojoules, compared to a mid-19th-century 12-pounder gun, which fired a 4.1 kg (9.0 lb) round, with a kinetic energy of 240 kilojoules, or a 20th-century US battleship that fired a 1,225 kg (2,701 lb) projectile from its main battery with an energy level surpassing 350 megajoules.”

With lighter and more mobile artillery through technological improvement there came feild artillery – usually horse-drawn prior to the steam and internal combustion engines that saw railway guns, the largest artillery ever conceived, and the artillery, both offensive and defensive, of the next two entries.

Such is the modern importance of artillery that it is typically its own arm of service within modern armies – as well as navies and air forces for coastal and anti-aircraft artillery respectively, although organization and practice varies.

Technological improvement of artillery not only involves the delivery systems or “engines” as well the projectiles or munitions fired or launched by them, but also target acquisition and techniques or “fire control”.

 

RATING:

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (Complete & Revised: Part 1)

Second Floor, Northwest Gallery. Mural of War by Gari Melchers. Library of Congress Thomas Jefferson Building, Washington, D.C – photographed by Carol Highsmith (public domain image)

 

 

TOP 10 TYPES OF WAR

 

I always found wars a fascinating subject of history as a hobby of mine, from the comfortable armchair of hindsight and the fortunate perspective of being well removed from any firsthand experience of them.

Hence, I’ve ranked my Top 10 Wars of history, but it doesn’t end there. No, indeed there’s my Top 10 Types of War in history, as the broad types of war arguably outrank individual wars in historical importance – or at least rank as high as a tool for the study of individual wars, albeit many wars fall into or consist of more than one type of war.

Just some notes – there is almost an infinite variety of types by or into which one can classify wars. One could even compile a top ten for types of types of war, classifying types within broader themes – political, strategic, technological, and so on. I have a mix of types from different broad themes, although I tend to focus on types by strategic doctrine or technological nature of weaponry.

This is also one of my more unusual top ten lists where I don’t count down from tenth to first place but instead simply count out in the reverse direction, from first to tenth place. What’s more, I’ve ranked them mostly in chronological order rather than historical importance, although there’s a general overlap between the two, as longer history tends to coincide with their greater impact, albeit not always.

Interestingly, six of my top ten types of war are ancient or even earlier, so much so that they might be regarded as transcending mere types of war to being archetypes of it. On the other hand, four are distinctively modern – and by modern, I mean twentieth century and onwards – but have effectively reshaped war in their own image.

 

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

Awesome artwork “Roicroi, the last tercio” by Augusto Ferrer-Dalmau, portraying infantry of a Spanish tercio at the 1643 Battle of Rocroi, in Wikipedia “Infantry” under license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en

 

 

(1) INFANTRY WARFARE

 

Warfare in history commenced as infantry warfare, which has endured as the foundation of war and the predominant means of waging it.

That’s not to say that prehistoric war wasn’t also infantry war. In the broadest usage of infantry war as fighting on foot, all prehistoric war was infantry war (except to the extent of anyone ramming canoes or rafts into each other) – but for the most part, prehistoric war lacked the characteristic drill or regimen of infantry war, fighting as warriors rather than soldiers.

And that’s the essential nature of infantry war – fighting on foot and in formation, coordinated with each other rather solo-ing off into single combat, as soldiers with drill and regimen, typically with standardized weapons and equipment.

As such, the origins of infantry war are the origins of war itself in recorded history, since the first ancient empires fought with regular infantry, albeit often as an elite supplemented by conscript masses or militia as irregular infantry – something that has surprisingly endured as a practice since then to the modern period.

The ancient archetype of regular infantry remains the Greek phalanx, and even more so, the Roman legion.

While the archetypal infantry travels on foot – marches, that is, in a style and pace that has remained remarkably consistent throughout history – the defining trait of infantry is that they fight on foot, not necessarily that they get to the fight on foot.

Hence, there has been a variety of infantry distinguished by getting to the fight by other means than marching to it – most notably mechanized infantry or mobile infantry in the modern period but also mounted infantry, naval infantry, airborne infantry, and air assault infantry.

“Before the adoption of the chariot to create the first mobile fighting forces c. 2000 BC, all armies were pure infantry. Even after, with a few exceptions like the Mongol Empire, infantry has been the largest component of most armies in history.”

Infantry also remains the most basic or fundamental unit of war – the proverbial boots on the ground – for achieving strategic objectives, particularly when those objectives are measured in territory.

As such, infantry has not waned in war, albeit it has evolved with technology. Gunpowder saw infantry shift to line infantry tactics, shooting volleys at each other – until modern firepower overwhelmed even that, forcing infantry for its own survival to use “dispersed, maneuver-based, and heavily supported infantry units” as well as combined arms and the paramount importance of cover on the battlefield.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

Charge of the French 4th Hussars at the battle of Friedland, 14 June 1807 – painting by Edouard Detaille in 1891 (public domain image)

 

 

(2) CAVALRY WARFARE

 

“Cavalryman, horseman, trooper, cataphract, knight, drabant, hussar, uhlan, mamluk, curaisser, lancer, dragoon, samurai or horse archer”.

Where infantry was the fundamental unit of war in history, cavalry was the fundamental means of mobile war – “providing armies with superior speed, mobility, and shock impact” as well as things for which mobility is used such as “scouting, screening, flanking and pursuing enemies” or “breaking enemy lines”.

Cavalry warfare involved soldiers or warriors fighting mounted on horseback – ranging from ancient horse archers to armored knights and modern light cavalry”. Obviously, the fundamental ingredient for cavalry is the domestication of the horse, or more precisely the domestication of the horse followed by breeding horses of sufficient size for warriors mounted on them.

Prior to being of sufficient size to be used for cavalry proper, the smaller domesticated horses were able to be used to draw chariots as the first mobile forces in about 2000 BC. Chariots played much the same role as cavalry but were obsolescent by cavalry once horses were of sufficient size. Hence the designation of cavalry is not usually given to “any military forces that used other animals or platforms for mounts, such as chariots” – or those occasional other animals used in war, camels or elephants. Interestingly, the last use of chariots was by the Britons at the time of the Roman conquest of Britain.

Also interestingly, that won’t be the last we see of obsolescence when it comes to cavalry war, but from its origin through to the twentieth century, cavalry has tended to eclipse infantry for decisive importance or impact – as the dominant force for winning battles rather than waging wars.

Of course, that is an oversimplification of the strategic balance between infantry and cavalry in war, as it has seesawed between them, complicated by the usual numeric predominance of infantry in armies and the higher cost of cavalry.

Certainly, the dominance of cavalry is reflected in the recurring military proficiency or superiority of the mounted nomadic warriors of the Eurasian steppes – as observed by military historians such as Azar Gat and John Keegan, as well as the colorful phrases of the “steppe effect” by Walter Scheidel and the “Golden Age of the Barbarians” by James C. Scott.

There was also the medieval dominance of cavalry, originating in the late Roman period, where “mounted forces became the dominant, often aristocratic, arm of European armies throughout the age of feudalism”.

“Cavalry had the advantage of improved mobility, and a soldier fighting from horseback also had the advantages of greater height, speed, and inertial mass over an opponent on foot. Another element of horse mounted warfare is the psychological impact a mounted soldier can inflict on an opponent.”

However, it is weird to think of cavalry forces originating without the subsequent aids to riding – spurs, saddles, and above all stirrups, which facilitated heavy cavalry and the use of lances.

One might also add a certain romanticism that has attached to cavalry throughout history, albeit not necessarily as a matter of strategic or tactical advantage.

Sadly for such romanticism, infantry has had the last laugh, as unlike infantry but like chariots, cavalry has become obsolescent from the twentieth century to, well, another entry in this top ten – which has assumed the same role and often even the same title as cavalry with greater mobility and less vulnerability, as have airborne or air assault units such as in the famous fictional depiction of the helicopter air assault 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment in Apocalypse Now.

Whereas infantry could evolve, cavalry could not, at least on a large scale – the same deadly firepower of modern history that forced the evolution of infantry was fatal to cavalry.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

The 1805 Battle of Trafalgar painted by Louis-Phillipe Crepin (“Le Redoutable a Trafalgar”) in 1806 – public domain image used in Wikipedia “Naval Warfare”

 

 

(3) NAVAL WARFARE

 

War on water!

No – not like when Roman Emperor Caligula literally declared war on the sea (in the form of the god Neptune or Poseidon), but war fought on water, albeit overlapping with war fought on land in amphibious operations and naval landings.

“Naval warfare involves military operations on, under, and over the sea” – “combat in and on the sea, the ocean, or any other battlespace involving a major body of water such as a large lake or wide river”.

As surprisingly capable humans are as swimmers for terrestrial mammals (particularly primates), naval warfare obviously involves the various vessels humans have devised for transport on water. Of course, it doesn’t just involve vessels but vessels of sufficient size, resilience, and above all means for combat with other vessels. Hence naval warfare originated from the Bronze Age onwards, with the first recorded sea battle as the Battle of the Delta between the Egyptians and the Sea Peoples in about 1175 BC, although the very name of the latter suggests some sort of naval warfare before that.

Prehistoric humans probably fought each other from canoes or even rafts but that seems more a form of naval proto-warfare. However, the former persisted in recorded history with the use of war canoes, usually as a form of amphibious warfare – an important subset of naval warfare – although “canoe versus canoe engagements…were also significant”.

Naval warfare rose to a surprising importance and prominence in ancient history that are often overlooked for the more famous warfare on land. That importance seems even more surprising as naval warfare was predominantly fought either by boarding enemy ships or ramming them – methods which seem crude by the standards of modern naval warfare but persisted for a surprisingly long time until (and to some extent even after) the advent of gunpowder allowed for shipborne artillery as the standard means of naval combat.

Homer’s Iliad may have had the siege of Troy as its focus but famously features the so-called Catalogue of Ships, in its second book no less, albeit for the transport of Greek forces to Troy rather than naval combat with Trojan ships.

Thereafter, naval warfare looms large in ancient history – from the Persians and Greeks (particularly the Athenians) through to the Romans, whose Pax Romana was as much a matter of Mare Nostrum as it was of the legions.

Galleys were the primary means of ancient naval warfare and persisted as the dominant vessels for war until the early modern period in that primary arena of naval warfare, the Mediterranean. Galleys were superseded by the vessels of the Age of Sail, which also saw naval warfare expand with maritime transportation from mostly hugging the coasts in seas to the open ocean – although it is striking how often naval battles continued to be fought in coastal waters.

On that point, while we typically think of naval warfare as battles fought on the sea or ocean, there’s also naval warfare fought on lakes and rivers – reflecting that “even in the interior of large landmasses, transportation before the advent of extensive railways was largely dependent on rivers, lakes, canals, and other navigable waterways”. Hence the modern distinction between brown-water navies for riverine or littoral bodies of water and blue-water navies (or green-water navies) for open oceans or seas.

From the Age of Sail to the Age of Steam and Steel – with naval warfare in the latter evolving to steam power for ships and coaling stations for bases or ports. The latter also saw “ironclad” ships – first used in naval combat in the American Civil War – reflecting the improved chemistry and metallurgy which not only provided the means for armor to ships but also the guns and shells “capable of demolishing a wooden ship at a single blow” for which the armor was required.

Interestingly, naval supremacy underlaid modern superpower in a similar manner to the Pax Romana, only more so – with the Pax Britannica of the 19th century (with the Indian Ocean being dubbed a “British lake” in a similar manner to the Mare Nostrum), succeeded by the Pax Americana in the 20th century.

Modern naval warfare has seen a proliferation of forms through technology – notably naval aviation and aircraft carriers or submarine warfare which came to the fore in the Second World War (effectively superseding battleships) but also more recently missiles and aerial or naval drones.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

Guerrilla warfare during the Peninsular War, by Roque Gameiro, depicting a Portuguese guerrilla ambush against French forces (in the war that gave us the term guerilla) in “Pictures of the History of Portugal”, 2017 (public domain image used in Wikipedia “Guerilla Warfare”)

 

 

(4) GUERILLA WARFARE

 

Although the term originates from the Peninsular War in Spain against Napoleon’s France, guerilla war predates the Peninsular War all the way back to prehistory. Indeed, it was conventional war that was the more recent outlier, originating only in the Bronze Age and recorded history, while guerilla war was the baseline or default setting of war before that – and since, with Sun Tzu’s Art of War essentially a handbook in guerilla war strategy.

Nor was guerilla war strategy isolated to China. The Romans are probably more famous for fighting against guerilla war in revolts against their empire, in the process demonstrating why guerilla war was not so prevalent against ancient states with their resort to removing entire population, but they also famously resorted to guerilla war tactics when they had to against Hannibal in the Second Punic War.

“Guerrilla warfare is a form of unconventional, asymmetrical conflict where small, mobile groups of irregular forces (rebels, partisans) use hit-and-run tactics, sabotage, and ambushes to fight larger, traditional military forces. Originating from the Spanish for “little war,” it focuses on harassment, psychological warfare, and exploiting local knowledge to weaken a superior enemy over time.”

As such, guerilla war often tends to combine more than one type of war – infantry war may predominate in guerilla war, but the mobility of cavalry often leads to guerilla war or at least similar tactics. Arguably, even naval forces have resorted to a style similar to guerilla warfare – most notably for privateers, merchant raiders, or submarine attacks on shipping.

Guerilla war strategy aims to avoid “”direct, conventional battles, focusing instead on reducing enemy morale, seizing supplies, and dragging out conflicts to exhaust the opponent’s political will” – relying heavily on “support from the local population for food, shelter, intelligence, and recruits” or “familiar, difficult terrain like jungles, mountains, or crowded urban areas”.

That literal usage of little war from Spanish has lent itself to one of the most common modern descriptors of guerilla war as “small wars”, although that has often been synonymous with “dirty wars” in description and practice, for all sides of such conflicts.

Guerilla war often seems the most distinctive and prolific type of war in modern warfare, from the Vietnam War onwards – as the destructive power of modern technology seems more favorable to guerilla war, and even more so, modern political ideologies enlisting populations for or against guerillas.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

The siege of Rancagua during the Chilean War of Independence, painting by Pedro Subercaseaux (public domain image used in Wikipedia “Siege”)

 

 

 

(5) SIEGE & URBAN WARFARE

 

With fortifications – a historical development significant enough for its own interlude in John Keegan’s A History of Warfare – came siege warfare.

Or perhaps more precisely, prehistorical development, given that both cities or at least human settlements of sufficient size and fortifications emerged in the Neolithic and Bronze Age – indeed, one of the key features for archaeology. There may have been prototypes of fortifications or fortified positions using natural features or chokepoints in the Paleolithic, but not the resources for standing or field armies to hold or take them on the same scale.

“Siege warfare is a form of constant, low-intensity conflict focused on capturing a fortified position (castle, city, or fort) by surrounding it to block supplies (investment) and using active assaults to breach defenses. Common methods include starving defenders, utilizing artillery, tunnelling under walls, or scaling them.”

Sun Tzu in The Art of War admonished besieging cities as the “worst policy”, given the cost in time, resources and forces exceeds even that of the usual costly attrition to be avoided for war in general.

However, siege warfare is surprisingly prolific in history, notably in later medieval history where “sieges were more common than pitched battles”. It’s also surprisingly prolific in fictional depictions of war, in part due to the dramatic nature of last stands.

The rosy-fingered dawn of Western literature, Homer’s Iliad, is ultimately about the siege of Troy – which may or may not have some Bronze Age historicity. Similarly, both the literary and cinematic versions of Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings feature key battles, such as those for Helm’s Deep and Minas Tirith, that are sieges.

Without winning a siege by assault or attrition, that left options of negotiating surrender by diplomacy, “the use of deception or treachery to bypass defenses” or the blunter options that could affect either the besieged or besiegers – “starvation, thirst or disease”.

Siege warfare is usually seen as ending with gunpowder but that’s not strictly or initially the case, as something of an arms race developed between fortifications and artillery in early modern history. It was with the advent of greater firepower from the nineteenth century and particularly of mobile warfare from the twentieth century, that “the significance of classical siege declined” and “a single fortified stronghold is no longer as decisive as it once was”.

Ironically however, while the “classical siege” may have declined from modern firepower and mobile warfare, the same force of industrialization that underlay both led to battles or wars of attrition that resembled sieges. States had the means to maintain and supply forces in the field that could then effectively besiege each other or their defensive positions on an unprecedented scale and span.

The trench warfare on the Western Front of the First World War resembled a form of siege warfare. The Second World War might seem to have displaced that through combined arms and maneuver, but it is striking how many battles of that war were or resembled sieges – Stalingrad and Monte Cassino to name just two of them, apart from the famous siege of Leningrad.

The battles or sieges of the Second World War also demonstrate that while city walls may have stopped being a feature in siege warfare, cities themselves did not – with urban warfare resembling a form of siege warfare, only now of attrition of defensive positions within the city itself. Since the Second World War, urban warfare has also often combined elements of guerilla warfare with siege warfare.

The attritional nature of modern industrial warfare has extended beyond individual battles or even any direct combat to resemble sieges on a grand scale – such as the submarine warfare of the Second World War, with the Germans effectively besieging Britain and the Americans besieging Japan, or for that matter the Cold War in Europe, resembling two armies besieging each other.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (10) Drone Warfare

An MQ-1 Predator, armed with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, piloted by Lt. Col. Scott Miller on a combat mission over southern Afghanistan. (U.S. Air Force Photo / Lt. Col. Leslie Pratt) – public domain image in Wikipedia “General Atomics MQ-1 Predator”

 

 

(10) DRONE WARFARE

 

Drones, drone strikes and drone swarms.

“Drone warfare is a form of warfare that involves the deployment of military robots and unmanned systems. The unmanned systems may be remoted controlled by a pilot or have varying levels of autonomy during their mission, enhancing offensive and defensive capabilities while reducing the need for personnel.”

‘Nuff said, except that drone warfare is not only emerging as the type of warfare that defines the conflicts of the twenty-first century, but also a game-changing one that increasingly defines their battlespace.

And I say battlespace to invoke the multiple domains of drone warfare – “types of unmanned systems and platforms include unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) or weaponized commercial unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), unmanned surface vehicles (USV) or unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), and unmanned ground vehicles (UGV)”.

“Military applications of drones range from reconnaissance tasks, kamikaze missions, logistical support, bomb disposal, training and medical evacuation to electronic warfare, anti-war, anti-armor, and anti-personnel roles…Drones are primarily utilized to conduct intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions, facilitating direct attacks on targets”.

Drone warfare was defined by US drone strikes in the War on Terror but has “evolved and proliferated quickly in the 2010s and 2020s”. Even so, I wouldn’t have ranked it in my top ten before the Russo-Ukrainian War, which saw it rise to game-changing prominence that’s here to stay.

“The Russo-Ukrainian war is widely recognised as the world’s first drone war due to the large scale and high intensity of drone attacks, and the role of this experience in evolving the tactics of modern conventional warfare…The Russo-Ukrainian war demonstrated how drones have disrupted traditional military doctrines in a manner similar to how gunpowder revolutionized warfare, making them a decisive factor in all future conflicts.”

Such is the role of drones in that war that “Ukraine became the first country to create a military branch exclusively dedicated to drone warfare – the Unmanned Systems Forces”, with Russia following suit and I anticipate more to follow beyond that war and its combatants.

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Wars (Special Mention: Art of War Rankings)

Bruce Lee in his iconic pose from Enter the Dragon – he even quotes and demonstrates (in one scene) the Art of War for his fighting style in the film as winning without fighting (although fortunately for the viewer he wins by fighting with his characteristic martial arts style throughout the rest of the film)

 

 

I’ve ranked my Top 10 Wars of history, essentially by combination of iconic status and idiosyncratic preference, but how do I rank them by their art of war? Typically for the victors, that is, but not always – albeit based on my occasionally idiosyncratic application of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War?

That is, how do I rank them by the strategic or tactical brilliance on display? Entirely differently as it turns out, with no entry in the same place ranking it has in my general Top 10 Wars.

Although at least there is mostly some strategic or tactical brilliance on display in the entries in my Top 10 Wars. It’s surprising how often wars seem to be just grinding slogfests – opponents slogging it out without much (or any) strategic or tactical brilliance on display and winning through sheer attrition or as the last man standing.

In fairness, I can’t help but feel that while Sun Tzu’s The Art of War is a cult classic of military strategy, it’s a little…overrated. It often comes across as some sort of performance poetry – hiding that when it’s not being obvious, it’s being obtuse. Nowhere is this more evident than in its defining principle that the true art of war lies in winning without fighting. Well obviously, but how?

It brings to mind Bart Simpson’s response when his karate teacher gives him a copy of the book for his first lesson and instructs that we learn karate so as not to use it – “Um, I already know how not to hit a guy”. Or the meme of the armchair historian or strategist – “I would simply be superior to my opponent from the outset”.

I also can’t help but feel that The Art of War is a little outdated and hence unfair for my more modern entries. As military historian H.P. Willmott points out in his general history of one of the entries in this top ten, wars against industrial opponents are necessarily wars of attrition – for which Sun Tzu and his pre-industrial art of war has no easy answers.

Anyway, here’s how I rank my Top 10 Wars by their art of war.

 

S-TIER (GOD TIER) – could teach Sun Tzu a thing or two

 

 

(1) MONGOL CONQUESTS – MONGOL INVASION OF EUROPE

 

There were a few contenders for top spot in art of war, but I couldn’t resist giving it to the Mongols, not least for their conquest of the homeland of Sun Tzu, give or take a few centuries from Sun Tzu himself.

Forget Sun Tzu – the true Art of War was written by Genghis Khan and the Mongols, in conquest not Taoist poetry. A friend and I used to observe the irony of Sun Tzu’s homeland of China – a country that historically has gotten its ass kicked as often as not. We also observed the same irony for Machiavelli’s The Prince originating in Italy – a country historically better known for political chaos than competence.

Of course, part of that may have been the reliance of the Mongols on the use of terror, arguably a more effective way of winning without fighting than the covert pacifism of Sun Tzu.

But seriously – an army that conquered almost all Eurasia clearly excelled in the art of war, particularly given how lopsided their victories were for how small their population was compared to their enemies. Part of this was that they were supremely adaptable at coopting the people they conquered for further conquests and strategies of war beyond their characteristic horse blitzkrieg. It’s surprising how small the actual Mongol forces were.

Like other nomadic herding tribes on horseback in the Eurasian steppes until recently in history, the Mongols consistently punched far above their weight in wealth or population – a recurring feature consistently observed by historians such as Azar Gat and John Keegan, as well as with what historian Walter Scheidel dubbed the steppe effect and anthropologist James C. Scott dubbed the Golden Age of the Barbarians.

The horse blitzkrieg of the Mongols embodied much of the mobility and maneuver favored by Sun Tzu – for speed, surprise, and shock, The horse blitzkrieg was a recurring feature mounted (heh) by nomadic herding tribes in the Eurasian steppes – but none were more supremely effective at it than the Mongols, one of the most proficient and versatile military forces in history.

 

(2) ALEXANDER’S CONQUEST OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE

 

Alexander’s Conquest of the Persian Empire was a close contender for top spot in art of war, for the same reason of consistently winning against the numerical odds as the Mongol Conquests. Winning against the numerical odds or when outnumbered is probably the best demonstration of the art of war.

It only lost out to the Mongol Conquests for the top spot because I couldn’t resist the delicious irony of the Mongols conquering the homeland of Sun Tzu. It was close though as we all know Alexander the Great would have conquered China too if he’d made it there, whether he went through Central Asia or India.

Let’s face it – Alexander the Great would have kicked Sun Tzu’s ass, cutting through all that mystic Taoist poetry like the Gordian knot. I know it and you know it.

Both Alexander and the Mongols pulled off the distinctive feat of conquering Persia, often erroneously touted as some sort of military impossibility – not unlike Afghanistan being touted as the graveyard of empires, which they also both conquered.

However, Alexander did it when Persia was the Persian or Achaemenid Empire, the world’s largest empire to that date by size and by share of world population, in about seven years or so but really about half of that with the rest mopping up, with an army that was predominantly infantry unlike the Mongols.

Of course, that was because Alexander’s conquest of the Persian Empire involved one of the finest fighting forces in history, the Macedonian phalanx, led by one of finest military leaders of history, without a defeat to his name, usually against numerical odds. Heck – it’s often argued whether the Persians had more Greeks in their army than he did.

As the saying goes, fortune favors the bold and Alexander was certainly bold, with a sense of his own greatness as well as the weakness of his Persian enemy and their emperor Darius III in particular, all of which fortunately for him proved to be true.

“Alexander became legendary as a classical hero in the mould of Achilles, featuring prominently in the historical and mythical traditions of both Greek and non-Greek cultures. His military achievements and unprecedented enduring successes in battle made him the measure against which many later military leaders would compare themselves, and his tactics remain a significant subject of study”.

 

(3) SPANISH CONQUEST OF THE AZTEC EMPIRE

 

Rounding out god tier and the third of my three contenders for top spot in art of war, we have the Spanish Conquest of the Aztec Empire

Somewhat surprisingly as Cortes does not have the dazzling strategic or tactical victories in battle as Alexander or the Mongols – which perhaps best illustrates that the art of war is not a matter of winning battles.

Cortes won against far longer numerical odds against him than either the Mongols or Alexander, and arguably the longest such odds of any war in history. Obviously when your forces of a few hundred (or few thousand with reinforcements) defeat an empire of millions in a few years, you’re doing something right in the art of war.

Partly this came down to a qualitative advantage of technological superiority beyond anything in Sun Tzu’s experience, two of Jared Diamond’s titular trinity of guns, germs, and steel – although of that trinity, germs did the most damage (and the most to even the numerical odds), again beyond anything in Sun Tzu’s experience.

Partly it also came down to good fortune, and even more so, the boldness it favors – which was in Sun Tzu’s experience. Say what you will about Cortes, but he certainly had cojones.

And partly it did come down to factors you can definitely draw from Sun Tzu – subterfuge, and above all diplomacy or alliances, which was how Cortes really won his war, arguably the model of winning without fighting. The true reason for the Spanish victory was that the Spanish force didn’t win it as such but rather led a much larger military force consisting predominantly of their native American allies against the Aztecs.

 

A-TIER (TOP TIER) – not quite up there with god tier but still strategy maxxing, sometimes on more than one side

 

(4) GREEK-PERSIAN WARS

 

The Greeks in the Persian Wars were almost exact contemporaries of Sun Tzu on the other side of the world, as the Persian Wars commenced a few years before the traditional date given to Sun Tzu’s death in 496 BC – and I’m inclined to favor the Greeks over Sun Tzu when it came to demonstrated art of war in actual history. Winning without fighting is all very well, but sometimes you have little choice but to fight – and to fight in desperate defence against numerically superior forces.

Hence the genius of Greek strategy, consistently fighting at geographical bottlenecks or chokepoints, including the straits of Salamis. Beyond that, the Greeks won because “they avoided catastrophic defeats, stuck to their alliance, took advantage of Persian mistakes” and possessed tactical superiority with their hoplite forces.

However, I just can’t rank the Greeks in the Greek-Persian Wars in the same tier as Alexander’s conquest of the Persian Empire – given that after all Alexander conquered the Persian Empire rather than just repelled it and with a similar disparity of forces as faced by the Greeks in their Persian Wars.

 

(5) HUNNIC WARS – HUN INVASION OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

 

I have to rank the Huns close to the Mongols, albeit top-tier to their god-tier, as yet another horse blitzkrieg of mounted nomadic tribes from the Eurasian steppes and the most formidable one prior to the Mongols, founding an empire that should be ranked as the fourth great empire of late antiquity and menacing the other three – Persian Empire as well as eastern and western Roman empires – in turn.

Like the Mongols and those other mounted nomadic tribes from the Eurasian steppes in general, the Huns punched well above their weight in numbers – “they were likely vastly outnumbered by the settled populations they conquered or forced to move, such as the Goths.”

Certainly the Huns demonstrated the art of war, despite their reputation for savage barbarism. At a tactical level, they had the usual speed, surprise and shock of the Eurasian steppes horse blitzkrieg – while strategically, they also sought out ways of winning without fighting through tribute and political alliances.

However, I just can’t rank them in the same tier as the Mongols. Firstly, there’s the greater scale of the Mongol conquests – the world’s largest land empire after all – but secondly the greater span as well. Both the Mongol and Hunnic empires may have similarly broken up or fragmented, but the Hunnic empire did so quicker and with less enduring impact, dependent as it was on Attila’s charismatic leadership.

Also, there’s the little matter of the Huns being more demonstrably rebuffed from their invasion of the Roman Empire than were the Mongols from their invasion of Europe, notably with the Battle of the Catalaunian Plains and withdrawal from Italy. However, that’s arguably consistent with the art of war in Attila’s aims being not much more than raiding on a grand scale to exact tribute – and both the western and eastern Roman Empires, particularly the latter, got lucky from the stroke of fortune of his death from other causes, not unlike Europe with death of the Mongol great khan.

The Hunnic invasion of the Roman Empire is also interesting as one of my top ten entries that you can argue for the art of war demonstrated by both sides. Indeed, you might argue for it more so for the Roman Empire, particularly for the western empire as it managed effective resistance against the Huns even as it was crumbling.

Ironically, “the Huns really disliked eastern Romans but loved western Romans”. Indeed, the latter had effectively allied itself with the Huns against their other enemies – by further irony not unlike the eastern Romans were subsequently to do with the Mongols.

When the Huns invaded the western empire, the Romans demonstrated quite the art of war, firstly by reversing their former alliance with the Huns to ally with the Visigoths and other Germans against the Huns in Gaul, and then by diplomacy for the withdrawal of the Huns from Italy without further fighting. Of course, part of the latter was the eastern Romans under their emperor Marcion reversing their former strategy of paying off the Huns with tribute for an effective and perfectly timed attack on the Hunnic heartland.

 

(6) AMERICAN INDIAN WARS – SIOUX WARS

 

The Sioux Wars are another of my top ten entries you can argue for the art of war demonstrated by both sides, albeit far more so for the United States at the level that counts – winning the war.

Tactically, the Sioux demonstrated the speed, surprise and shock that is part of the art of war – indeed, similarly to the mounted horse tribes of Eurasian steppes that were so effective elsewhere, not surprisingly given the geography of the Plains.

The only problem was they were too little and too late – a few centuries too late, against an industrial adversary that used the true strategic art of war for winning without fighting – picking curb stomp battles from a position of overwhelming material superiority.

It also demonstrates something of an issue for guerilla warfare. Guerilla warfare is often touted as the ultimate expression of the art of war – and it often is, avoiding pitched battles to outlast the adversary, but it had one limitation, particularly in pre-modern history.

Mao Tse-Tung wrote that “the guerilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea” – which is all very well unless your opponent is willing and able to drain the sea, displacing or eliminating the whole people or at least enough of them to neutralize any guerilla resistance.

 

(7) COLD WAR

 

Wait – what? The Cold War as top tier art of war? They didn’t even fight!

Of course, that’s the point. Ironically, cold war strategy is the essence of the art of war of winning without fighting. Which the Americans and their allies did, although not without some lapses on their part – most notably land wars in Asia.

Indeed, it might be said the Second World War and Cold War were the peak of the American art of war. Although I’m not sure what Sun Tzu would have thought of his art of war being applied from the logic of nuclear weapons and mutually assured destruction.

Although you could argue for the Cold War as yet another of my top ten entries where both sides demonstrated the art of war. For their part, the Soviet Union was at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the United States at the outset of the Cold War, notably against American economic strength and atomic monopoly. However, they played to their strengths – supporting communist guerilla movements in the developing world, hence those land wars in Asia, which saw them achieve a rough parity with the United States in the 1960s and 1970s.

The United States ultimately won by playing to its strengths – not unlike Batman, the superpower of being rich and its ‘family’ of alliances, with arguably the most critical being a de facto alliance with China against the Soviet Union. Significantly, the Soviets had no major allies at the end of the Cold War – just dependencies, mostly rebellious against them.

 

B-TIER (HIGH TIER) – still strategic (on one side or another) but starting to get to winning by slogging it out

 

(8) PUNIC WAR

 

Obviously the Romans excelled in the art of war as a whole, but not so much facing Hannibal on their home territory in Italy – although arguably not even for Hannibal either, given his failure to achieve anything decisive from all his tactical brilliance and victorious battles. In fairness, Roman commanders Fabius Maximus and Scipio Africanus turned it around in Italy and Africa respectively, the latter effectively matching Hannibal’s brilliance in enemy home territory.

Reading Roman military history often prompts me to see the Romans as the Soviet Union of ancient history – winning through the manpower to replace one lost legion after another – and never more so than in the Second Punic War against Hannibal, which is eerily reminiscent of a Roman parallel for the Soviets in Barbarossa. Just ask Pyrrhus – who gave the world the term Pyrrhic victory because the Romans could just soak up their losses and keep coming.

This is something of a caricature for the Romans as well as the Soviets winning through brute force of manpower – both of which were as capable of finesse in the right circumstances, usually a combination of good leadership combined with well-maintained or experienced forces. The Roman legion was the finest fighting force of its time, with a discipline and tactical superiority that allowed it to outfight opponents that outnumbered it – as in the Battle of Alesia or Battle of Watling Street. Although one of the greatest strengths of the Roman legion was not so much its skill in fighting but in engineering, again as at Alesia.

 

X-TIER (WILD TIER) – not so Sun Tzu but something of a paradox for the art of war

 

(9) VIETNAM WAR

 

Wait – what? Surely the Vietnam War should rank in high rather than wild tier for art of war on the part of the Vietnamese, as the literal textbook example of it – both by the Vietnamese using it as their strategy text during the war and the Americans after that war as a result.

It’s been famously said that the Americans won all the battles but lost the war. Almost as famous is the Vietnamese rejoinder (to Col. Harry Summers Jr) to the Americans winning all the battles – “That may be so. But it is also irrelevant.” And so it was for the Vietnamese, the Vietnam War was not about battles but winning the war – which was a matter of endurance or outlasting their adversary, although the casualties and heavy fighting involved leads me to rank it in wild rather than high tier.

The Vietnam War, along with other successful modern insurgencies, has often led to observations of guerrilla warfare as synonymous with, or even definitive of, the art of war. Not so much in pre-modern history – although it did occur in the right circumstances, you don’t tend to hear too much of successful guerrilla warfare, because states were prepared to wipe out or displace entire populations to eliminate resistance.

However, counter-insurgency in modern warfare is notoriously tricky. There is arguably a modern, smart way of winning against insurgency, or there remains the more brutal way, but few modern states have demonstrated the means or above all patience to achieve the former without invariably lapsing into the latter or something resembling it. Just ask the Americans about the coup against Diem, My Lai, the bombing, napalm, Agent Orange or the Phoenix program.

Of course, insurgency can be tricky as well. After all, what do you do with all your forces while you are avoiding all those battles – but at the same time hoping to expand your political control? Insurgencies often default to a brutal answer – killing civilians. You know, those civilian collaborators or representatives of your enemy. Even those insurgencies seen as the “good” ones. Just ask the city of Hue during the Tet Offensive.

 

 

(10) SECOND WORLD WAR

 

The Second World War is something of a paradox when it comes to the art of war, hence its wild tier ranking

On the one hand, it was one of the most complete victories (by the Allies) in military history – and certainly in modern military history, where it is also a rare anomaly being fought to the unconditional surrender and occupation of the enemy states.

Military historian H.P. Wilmott colorfully illustrated the rarity of its victory and relative mobility by his observation that WW2 was the last war of the nineteenth century while WW1 was the first war of the twentieth century. Whatever else you might make of this observation, I think it applied at least in that most wars of the twentieth century (and onwards) are closer to the static stalemate of WW1 than to WW2, which remains something of an anomaly. Elsewhere, Willmott attributes that anomaly to a brief window where mobile offensive firepower outpaced defensive firepower – but the balance swung back to defensive firepower, even during WW2 itself, hence the strength of defense by the Axis before their defeat and the effort by the Allies required to overcome it to defeat them.

On the other hand, winning the war took a lot of fighting – and dying, although the majority of casualties were Allied civilians – seemingly contrary to Sun Tzu’s maxim that the art of war lies in winning without fighting. Historian John Ellis almost sneers to that effect in his description of Allied victory in the title of his WW2 history, Brute Force, while also observing in that book’s preface that it was only Germany and Japan that won elegant victories – that is, without crushing material superiority. Willmott offers something of a corrective to that viewpoint, particularly the question left begging by Ellis. Willmott even observes the same elegant victories – Germany in western Europe in 1940 and Japan in south-east Asia in 1941-1942 as not excelled in the war – but observing that it is demonstrative of their ultimate inability to wage war that both lost despite those victories.

In part, this apparent contradiction of Sun Tzu’s art of war is explained by two factors of which Sun Tzu knew nothing – modern firepower and modern industrial production, with Willmot observing for the latter that a modern industrial state can only be defeated by attrition.

The paradox of art of war in the Second World War is deepened in that the major combatants – Germany, Britain, the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States – all undoubtedly demonstrated military proficiency at different points or in different ways. The distinction between the Axis and Allies is that while Germany and Japan arguably demonstrated a more consistent military proficiency than their opponents, they were hopelessly outclassed by the Allies in understanding war and waging it – that is, in the art of war. Both Germany and Japan sought to achieve supremacy through victory, while the Allies achieved victory through supremacy consistent with the art of war.

The theme of H.P. Willmott’s The Great Crusade – the best single-volume history of the war – is the refutation of the popular myth of German military excellence. As he paraphrased Oscar Wilde, to lose one world war may be regarded as misfortune, to lose both looks like carelessness. Contrary to the art of war, Germany military genius lay in fighting, not in war.

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (9) Nuclear Warfare

Operation Buster-Jungle Dog in exercise Desert Rock I at the Nevada Test Site, 1 November 1951 – the first US nuclear field exercise conducted on land with troops only 6 miles from the blast, public domain image in Wikipedia “Nuclear Warfare”

 

 

(9) NUCLEAR WARFARE

 

“It’s Defcon One…get me Big Mac, fries to go!”

Few forms of warfare have loomed as large as nuclear warfare but at the same time to have never existed in actual warfare except as threat or hypothetical prospect with one exception – fortunately, “the first and only use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict was the United States atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki”.

While nuclear weapons haven’t been used in warfare apart from that exception, that hasn’t stopped a select few nations with the means to acquire or develop them, primarily the United States and the Soviet Union or Russia, from detonating them “on over 2,000 occasions for various testing purposes” or deploying them on a large scale in readiness for use.

The prospect or threat of nuclear warfare has effectively operated as a limit on other forms of warfare, at least directly between states with nuclear weapons, to avoid escalating to nuclear warfare with each other, given the sheer destructive potential of mutually assured destruction at best and the possibility of human extinction at worst – “nuclear winter, nuclear famine, and societal collapse”, oh my!

And that pretty much sums up nuclear warfare, except for how dangerously close we’ve come to the tripwire for it.

“Countries have increased their readiness to carry out strategic and tactical nuclear attacks in response to intensifying conflicts, including the Korean War, First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises, Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam War, Sino-Soviet border conflict, Yom Kippur War, Gulf War, and Russo-Ukrainian War”.

“The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, between the nuclear superpowers of the U.S. and Soviet Union, is often considered the closest call with a nuclear exchange” – one of two occasions, along with the Yom Kippur War, that the United States was at Defcon Two, the stage before actual deployment in Defcon One.

The other famous measurement of the risk of nuclear war is the Doomsday Clock.

Throw in the extraordinary extent to which states have planned for “limited” nuclear war or had tactical nuclear weapons deployed for use on the battlefield – missiles, munitions, torpedoes and depth charges on the battlefields – as well as the risk of deployment from accident or false alarms, and one sometimes wonders how we ever made it this far without nuking ourselves.