Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (Special Mention) (1) Prehistoric & Primal Warfare

Cave painting of a battle between archers, Morella la Vella, Spain – public domain image used in Wikipedia “Prehistoric Warfare”

 

 

(1) PREHISTORIC & PRIMAL WARFARE

 

Hobbes vs Rousseau – the Hobbesian state of nature or “the war of all against all” (bellum omnium contra omnes) as against Rousseau’s more noble savage state of nature.

Sadly this special mention is not for some Great Prehistoric War fought between mammoth cavalry and evil Atlantean overlords in the style of the film 10,000 BC – or a tyrannosaur-riding Neanderthal fighting off everything in the style of the Primal animated TV series, although that series seems closer to Hobbes’ state of nature.

It’s for the sheer timescale of prehistoric war compared to historic war, corresponding to the scale of prehistory in general compared to history – 98% or so of the entire span of humanity on this planet so far, all but the last 5,000 years or so out of 300,000 years. And prehistory only gets longer if you throw in our hominin ancestor species as humanity, which potentially lengthens that span to 3,000,000 years.

There’s also that prehistory didn’t just disappear with the advent of recorded history – or rather didn’t consistently disappear across time and place, instead enduring in places more remote from recorded history until the modern period. And prehistoric war hasn’t even ended now, hence the better description would be primal war – as a type of war, exemplified by ambush and raid, to which humanity regularly returns, atavistically time and time again.

Most fundamentally, there’s Hobbes vs Rousseau – the philosophical significance of prehistoric war in understanding the origins of war itself.

Of course, the origins of war in prehistory is the subject of theory or outright speculation, as by its nature prehistory involves those human societies without recorded history – typically Neolithic or Paleolithic, but potentially also more recent societies without written historical records.

It’s where prehistory meets philosophy, hence the opening dialectic of Hobbes versus Rousseau – the ongoing debate over human nature and violence or war. “The existence — and even the definition — of war in humanity’s hypothetical state of nature has been a controversial topic in the history of ideas”.

Philosopher Thomas Hobbes famously proposed that the original “state of nature” of humanity (or human nature) was inherently violent – the war of all against all in which “the life of man” is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”. Against that, philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau also famously proposed a more idealistic and idyllic state of nature as more free and peaceful – subsequently styled as that of the “noble savage” – made unequal and violent by “civilized” society.

That debate over human nature continues, not least in speculation or theories of prehistoric war, “spanning contemporary anthropology, archaeology, ethnography, history, political science, psychology, primatology, and philosophy in such divergent books as Azar Gat’s War in Human Civilization and Raymond C. Kelly’s Warless Societies and the Origin of War.”

Essentially, it boils down to those who argue for prehistoric war and violence, potentially at even higher rates than those in recorded history, and those who argue for more peaceful prehistory.

To put it that simply, however, removes all context or nuance from a debate that is much more balanced or varied, reflecting a more complex situation – that prehistory was both more violent than asserted by proponents of prehistoric pacifism and also more pacific than asserted by prehistoric warmongers.

Most concede that violence or war in human prehistory was highly variable between different societies at different times in different places or circumstances. Some societies were notoriously warlike, such as the Maori of New Zealand, the Yanomami (dubbed “the Fierce People”) of the Amazon or the inter-tribal warfare in Papua New Guinea.

On the one hand, archaeological studies of human remains from prehistory have suggested a higher rate for violent injury and death substantially above those in recorded history. One interesting feature is that a recurring motive for inter-tribal warfare is raiding for nubile women – as with the Yanomami, suggesting that the legendary motive for the Trojan War may not be so far removed from the historic or prehistoric truth.

On the other hand, depictions of human violence or war is comparatively rare until relatively recently in prehistoric art. Proponents of prehistoric pacificism persuasively suggest that low population density among prehistoric tribal hunter-gatherers – and the potential costly nature of violence between them – both allowed for and pushed towards avoiding conflict, typically by migration.

Another issue is that even if or where Paleolithic societies were violent, the scale of that violence was necessarily limited or disorganized – in the nature of feuds and raids or ambushes and skirmishes. Some argue for what is termed endemic warfare – in which “war is often ritualized with a number of taboos and practices that limit the number of casualties and the duration of the conflict”. Of course, endemic warfare could readily escalate into actual warfare without such limits.

Others have also asserted various historic or prehistoric event horizons that saw the escalation of war. One such is the development of missile weapons such as bows or slings allowing for less risk than melee combat. Another more commonly argued one is the horizon between the Paleolithic and Neolithic – with the increased sedentism from agriculture in the Neolithic seeing a corresponding increase in the intensity of scale in war.

One obvious model for theories of prehistoric war is more recent or contemporary tribal warfare. And one could argue that tribal war remains the predominant model for war in general – that most wars in history are tribal wars at heart.

Top Tens – Top 10 Wars (Special Mention: Revised) (1) Decline & Fall of the Roman Empire

 

The Course of Empire: Destruction (1836) – one of a series of five paintings by Thomas Cole (in public domain) and typically the painting used when someone wants to use a painting to depict the fall of Rome, albeit the series depicts an imaginary state or city

 

(1) DECLINE & FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

 

The decline and fall of the Roman Empire – that “melancholy, long, withdrawing roar, retreating to the breath of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear and naked shingles of the world”.

I don’t think it is overstating it to describe the decline and fall of the Roman Empire as the PTSD of western civilization. Europeans looked to the Roman Empire as their state or imperial model, with kingdoms or states purporting to succeed or revive it in one form or another thereafter.

Even now, the decline and fall of the Roman Empire informs much modern discourse about state failure – from Edward Gibbon onwards, “we have been obsessed with the fall: it has been valued as an archetype for every perceived decline, and, hence, as a symbol for our own fears”.

I would rank it in my top ten wars but for the lack of a definitive war – although my top ten entry for the Hunnic Wars comes closest – or that matter it is many wars, hence the special mention albeit in god-tier. Also as decline and fall, it involved the former as much as the latter. The Romans were consistently their own worst enemies – not just in their relentless civil wars but also in aspects of internal decline that were observed even as early as the second century – at its peak! – by contemporaries such as the historian Cassius Dio, who lamented the decline “from a kingdom of gold to one of rust and iron”.

But our interest here is its external fall or military defeats, most notoriously at the hands of barbarians at the gates – the Germanic tribes that swept over the empire in what history calls the Barbarian Invasions or Migration Period.

The empire was shocked to its core with the sack of Rome itself – twice, firstly by the Visigoths in 410, and secondly by the Vandals, who thereafter lent their name to wanton destruction, in 455. These sacks of Rome were still shocking even though the imperial capital had been moved to Ravenna in 402, such that the Roman Empire might more accurately be styled as the Ravennan Empire instead.

And there’s something about the Romans desperately trying to hold one line after another in that “melancholy, long, withdrawing roar” that resonates with me. Indeed, any last stand or waning force often invokes the fall of the Roman Empire, both in history, and as we shall see, in fantasy or science fiction.

And there’s certainly plenty to choose from with the fall of the Roman Empire in the century from the disastrous defeat in the battle of Adrianople against the Goths in 378, which opened the floodgates to barbarians invading and setting up kingdoms within the Empire itself, varying between alliance with and opposition to the Empire, until the Germanic leader Odoacer decided it would be easier not to have a puppet emperor and deposed him instead in 476.

Of course, what history tends to forget is that the proverbial decline and fall of the Roman Empire was of the western Roman Empire – the eastern Roman Empire survived and even thrived for another millennium after the fall of the western empire. It even had a damn good shot at recovering the western half of the empire under Justinian and his legendary general Belisarius, before receding again. It then ebbed and flowed, until its final decline over two centuries before its conquest by the rising Ottoman Empire in 1453. So there’s plenty to choose from there as well.

Indeed, the decline and fall of both western and eastern Roman Empires was invoked by Tolkien in The Lord of the Rings with Gondor – the eastern half of the Numenorean states that survived the fall of the western half Arnor. Of course, that would make Gondor correspond to the Byzantine Empire, increasingly focused on its capital city Minas Tirith corresponding to Constantinople making its last stand against Sauron – who would correspond to, ah, the Ottoman Turks?!

Anyway, the decline and fall of the Roman Empire – and the Great Migrations or Barbarian Invasions – might be considered to be on the scale of a world war, but is a little too piecemeal in space or time.

And one can argue we are still living in the decline of the Roman Empire. Or on our Third or Fourth Rome (or more), going by all the countries that have claimed the succession to the Roman Empire. Or the Empire never fell…according to P.K. Dick. Or something like that.

 

RATING: 5 STARS*****

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (Special Mention) (Preamble)

Mushroom cloud above Nagasaki after atomic bombing on August 9, 1945. Taken from the north west – photograph by Charles Levy, US National Archives and Records Administration, public domain image

 

 

I’ve ranked my Top 10 Wars of history, but it doesn’t end there – nor does it end with my Top 10 Types of War, because there is almost an infinite variety of types by or into which one can classify wars.

There’s certainly enough for my usual twenty special mentions per top ten, including my usual weird and wild special mentions towards the end.

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Wars (Special Mention: Revised) (Preamble)

Raising the flag on Iwo Jima as memorialized by the west side of the Marine Corps War Memorial, Arlington Ridge Park, Virigina

 

I’ve always found wars a fascinating subject of history, from the comfortable armchair of hindsight and the fortunate perspective of being well removed from any firsthand experience of them. History, particularly military history, has always been something of a hobby of mine. So of course I have ranked my Top 10 Wars.

But I don’t just have a top ten. As usual for my top tens, I have a whole host of special mentions. My usual rule is twenty special mentions – where the subject matter is prolific enough, as it is here – which I suppose would usually make each top ten a top thirty. My special mentions are also where I tend to have some fun with the subject category and splash out with some wilder entries.

Top Tens – History: Top 10 WW2 Combatant Art of War Rankings

iconic poster image of the 1970 film Patton, starring George C. Scott as the titular US general

 

 

TOP 10 WW2 COMBATANT ART OF WAR RANKINGS

 

I’ve ranked my Top 10 Wars by art of war so now it’s time to rank the major combatants in WW2 by their art of war, drawing from my occasionally idiosyncratic application of Sun Tzu’s The Art of War

Just a reminder – I ranked WW2, the top entry when ranking my Top 10 Wars in general, in tenth place for art of war, albeit in wild tier as something of a paradox.

Part of that paradox is that despite being one of most complete victories in military history (and anomalous as such in the modern history), winning the war took a lot of fighting – seemingly contrary to Sun Tzu’s maxim of winning without fighting.

That paradox is deepened in that the major combatants all demonstrated military proficiency at different points or in different ways – hence this ranking of WW2 combatants by art of war.

 

S-TIER (GOD TIER – OR IS THAT SUN TZU TIER?)

 

(1) CHINA

 

On the one hand, it seems apt that China, the homeland of Sun Tzu, should rank in top spot for art of war in WW2, particularly given the irony that, despite its claim to The Art of War, China is one of the most defeated nations in modern history.

On the other hand – what the hell? China as exemplar of art of war? In WW2?!

China – the nation that spent the war wallowing in its persistent defeat by Japan and only avoiding complete defeat because it was simply too big and because Japan was defeated in the Pacific by the United States?

Yes, because there was more than one China in WW2. I’m not talking the primary combatant – Nationalist China, the Kuomintang China under Chiang Kai-shek that is and was usually recognized as the China of WW2.

Yes, that China spent the war being relentlessly pounded into defeat and through no real fault of its own other than being in the wrong place at the wrong time – next to Imperial Japan in the 1930s and 1940s.

No, I’m talking the other major China in WW2 – Communist China under Mao Zedong.

That China went from the verge of complete defeat by Nationalist China – a defeat from which the famed Long March was a desperate retreat – to being a viable contender and ultimately victor in the postwar resumption of the civil war between them.

And it did that by one of the best ways of winning without fighting – having others do the fighting for you, with both its enemies fighting each other and Imperial Japan effectively defeating Nationalist China for it.

Yes, that was more by stroke of good fortune than strategy, but they certainly exploited that good fortune to the fullest once it presented itself.

 

(2) USA

 

USA! USA! USA!

But seriously, you must have been expecting this.

The USA was the supreme victor of WW2, emerging as the greater of the two global superpowers after the war with the fewest casualties of any major combatant (at least relative to population, and depending on estimation or through civilian casualties, in absolute numbers).

And it did that through supreme art of war – indeed, WW2 was arguably peak American art of war.

Given that the American art of war in WW2 did involve actively fighting and strategy on its part while the Chinese Communist art of war was essentially fortuitous, I might have ranked the United States in the top spot. The only reason I didn’t was to finally give China some much needed Sun Tzu street cred otherwise missing in its military history – and that where the US ended the war as it started in a position of strength, the communist Chinese were able to reverse a position of weakness to one of strength.

The United States has proved itself in the art of war (at least until recently) by being Batman – fighting wars using money and allies. In the Second World War, the United States was the goddamn Batman of the world, winning through the sheer power of its money or economic production, not to mention its Soviet ally doing most of the actual fighting against Germany. Saving Private Ryan? More like Saving Private Ivan, amirite?

As Stalin is reputed to have said of the victory in the Second World War (and if he didn’t, he should have) – England provided the time, Russia provided the blood and America provided the money. That’s how you win without fighting.

Another classic way of winning without fighting is picking curb stomp battles. Such was the economic strength and resources of the United States in both world wars, that they were really a foregone conclusion after its entry, especially when you throw in the other allies. As the United States swamped Japan with its ships and planes in the Second World War, it did indeed have some actual curb stomp battles, such as the ‘Great Marianas Turkey Shoot’ in June 1944, labelled by American naval aviators for the ease with which they shot down the remnants of Japanese carrier aviation (prompting Japan to resort to kamikaze attacks).

There was also American isolationism – the worst place to be in war is at the front line and the best place to be in war is sitting it out at the sidelines, ideally playing the balance of power and making money through financing or supplying your favored side and entering to tilt the balance of power in your direction (and you know, for your allies to pay you back).

On the other hand, but for American isolationism, the United States might well have preempted the war before it even began, arguably the model way of winning without fighting – or at least emboldened Britain and France to do so.

 

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

(3) USSR

 

Wait, what?

Sure, the USSR won – and won big, the other of the two global superpowers after the war and occupying the other half of Europe to that by the United States.

But it also lost big – with the highest casualties of any combatant – and won hard as opposed to the nearly flawless victory of the United States, doing most of the fighting contrary to Sun Tzu’s maxim of winning without fighting.

As Stalin supposedly said, Russia provided the blood and America provided the money – and I know which I’d prefer to provide.

Still, the Allied victory in general and the Soviet victory in particular demonstrates the limitations of Sun Tzu’s pre-modern art of war, which did not anticipate modern firepower or industrial production – with WW historian H.P. Willmot observing for the latter that a modern industrial state can only be defeated by attrition. Not to mention the improvement of defensive firepower during the war – from about 1942-1943 – that goes to explain the endurance and strength of German resistance when the tide turned.

Despite Sun Tzu’s airy-fairy pseudo-pacifist poetry of winning without fighting, sometimes you can’t avoid fighting – and one of those times is when you’re on the other end of the largest invasion in history. That’s when you’d better know how to win with fighting or at least learn quickly.

It is easy to point out Soviet deficiencies in 1941 but seemingly less easy to give the Soviet Union credit for its resilience in avoiding collapse that evaded its predecessor and for that matter its own nascent state against the Germans in the First World War.

Similarly, it’s easy to attribute Soviet victory to brute force, but not so much the considerable skill with which that force was applied. The Soviets had originated the true ‘blitzkrieg’ – the concept of the ‘deep battle’ or ‘deep space battle’, a strategy aimed at destroying enemy command and control centers as well as lines of communication. They just lacked the means to employ this strategy fully until the fourth year of war, when it had sufficient elite or experienced armored and mechanized formations as well as the logistics and mobility to support them. And oh boy, it showed with the Soviet campaigns from Operation Bagration onwards, among the best of the war – or any war.

H.P. Willmott argues for the complete transposition of the German and Soviet armies in terms of military proficiency by 1945, when “the operational and technical quality of the Soviet army was at least the equal of the Wehrmacht at its peak” while “the German army of 1944-45, for all its reputation, had the characteristics so meticulously catalogued when displayed by the Soviet army in 1941”.

The biggest mistake by the Soviets in the art of war was their pact with Germany. By it the Soviets hoped but failed to achieve one of best ways of winning without fighting – having others do the fighting for you, in its adversarial version of having your enemies fight each other, in this case Germany and the western allies.

But wait a minute Stark After Dark, I hear you say – didn’t you place the Chinese communists in top spot for much the same strategy? The difference is that the Soviets failed where the Chinese communists succeeded.

You see, like most things, there’s a catch. The adversarial version of having your adversaries fight each other needs good judgment – in correctly judging that your adversaries will destroy each other, rather than one defeating the other and becoming stronger or more dangerous to you as a result.

In fairness, everyone else was as surprised as the Soviets by the collapse of France – but then, not everyone else was next in the firing line, let alone left alone on the European continent with the nation that hated them. And that brings us to the lapse of judgement that was very much on them – correctly judging your “adversaries” for how adversarial they actually are to you, where clearly Germany was far more adversarial to the Soviets than Britain and France.

 

B-TIER (HIGH TIER)

 

(4) BRITAIN

 

Yes, Britain won but they didn’t win as big as the US or USSR – and like the USSR, they also lost big, not in terms of casualties (which were less than their casualties in WW1) but in global hegemony, which they effectively ceded to the US, as well as the loss of their empire.

Although in fairness that’s probably not as much of a loss as it might seem, as their empire and global hegemony were waning, at least from WW1 but arguably from the late nineteenth century onwards, when their industrial economy that was the foundation for both was eclipsed first by the United States and then by Germany. In reality, the twentieth century was for Britain really just a matter of choice as to which rising power – the United States, Germany, and Russia or the Soviet Union – to align themselves with and their choice to align with the United States is hardly surprising.

When it comes to the art of war in WW2, Britain resembles the US for winning without fighting, only just not as well from reason of being a similar but smaller military power closer to the firing line.

That is, Britain won by allies doing most of the fighting for it, as well through financial or imperial assets and intelligence.

Indeed, when the British did do their own fighting, they were consistently bad at it (until the end of 1942) – which arguably takes their art of war up a notch, to winning even when fighting badly.

WW2 historian Gerhard Weinberg observed that Britain’s consistently poor performance fighting the Germans and Japanese is an issue deserving more attention by historians. Even Churchill observed that the Battle of El Alamein was a turning point for Britain, in that before it they almost never had a victory and after it they almost never had a defeat.

That again just takes their art of war up a notch in my eyes, such that I’ve quipped that in both world wars, the British were lackluster soldiers but excellent diplomats and spies, running rings around their adversaries to win.

Also, fighting in the war may not have involved their traditional “splendid isolationism” but did involve a certain practical isolationism – that is, the practical effect that they sat out most of the fighting in Europe, albeit by fortunate circumstance of their island geography and necessity of being predominantly a naval power. In a sense they improved upon the trench warfare of the first WW1 by sitting behind the bigger trench of the English Channel and accordingly had fewer casualties. Hence their notorious caution and circumspection about opening the second front compared to the Americans.

On the other hand, their biggest mistake essentially involved trying to sit out any military action at all towards Germany prior to the war – appeasement in other words – by which they could readily have preempted the war before it began. Anzar Gat observes a common observation among historians – that the victors of WW1, Britain and France, are unparalleled in forfeiting their overwhelming military advantage that could readily have defeated their German opponent before it even began at effectively no cost to themselves.

That would have been the true art of winning without fighting – and Britain’s failure to do so had to cost it dearly from ranking any higher.

 

C-TIER (MID-TIER)

 

(5) CHINA

 

Yes, it’s the other China – the China that was the primary Chinese combatant in WW2, the China that was (and is) usually recognized as the China of WW2, Nationalist China or Kuomintang China governed by Chiang Kai-shek.

As I observed in my entry for communist China. Nationalist China spent the war being relentlessly pounded into defeat and through no real fault of its own other than being in the wrong place at the wrong time – next to Imperial Japan in the 1930s and 1940s.

I’m still ranking it higher than France.

In fairness, China didn’t do too badly, particularly given it was the weakest of the major combatants, lacking the industrial base of its antagonist Japan or anyone else really.

WW2 historian Gerhard Weinberg thought it a question for historians rivalling that of Britain’s persistent poor military performance as to how China was able to endure as it did.

At least part of it might be attributed to art of war. China was simply too big and populous to fall to Japan, so could resort to what was effectively a passive guerilla strategy, avoiding fighting Japan in open contest (or at all) as much as possible. The result was a stalemate for Japan, forcing Japan into conflict with more powerful nations for the resources to continue the war – nations that would win China’s war for it.

Also, I have to admit blowing up the Yellow River dykes to flood the Japanese out as pretty badass.

 

D-TIER (LOW TIER)

 

(6) FRANCE

 

That’s right, we’ve reached the lowest tier, the losing tier in other words, among the winning side – France.

Put simply, France lost in 1940 and only ranks on the winning side because that defeat was reversed by the victory of the other Allies, liberating it in the process. Sure, some expatriate or exiled French forces fought as part of the Allied forces, as did other defeated European nations. However, the question caustically posed by WW2 historian Gerhard Weinberg remains – why the Vichy French regime or colonial governments submitted so readily to the Germans or Japanese but resisted the Allies.

I suppose you could argue that having other nations liberate your nation and defeat your enemy for you is one way of winning without fighting, but that’s too dependent on their goodwill and strategic interests aligning with yours for it to count in my opinion.

Also, their defeat in 1940 was too big for that, in one blow wiping out French military reputation and substituting the trope of “cheese-eating surrender monkeys”. As military historian H.P. Willmott observed, it poses the questions of “why the German victory was so rapid and one-sided, or in its alternative form, why it was that the French army for three centuries the warrior host of Europe, and for the previous two decades the most prestigious army in the world, collapsed the way it did”.

The only reason I don’t rank France lower is that it did, after all, end up on the winning side. That’s not as flippant as it sounds but reflects that their longer-term strategic instincts were essentially sound in that Germany would not win the prolonged conflict they anticipated. It’s just that they failed their immediate defense and hence to remain an active part of that prolonged conflict which was then won by others, France lacking the resources, space or time that the other major allied combatants had to recover from defeat.

Their biggest mistake was to forfeit their overwhelming military advantage they held over Germany as victor in the First World War by not pre-empting the war before it began. You know, in those two decades as the most prestigious army in the world – when they could have done it by show of force at no cost to themselves as late as the German reoccupation of the Rhineland.

 

(7) ITALY

 

And from the losing tier of the winning side, we go to the winning tier of the losing side – Italy, which managed to negotiate a conditional surrender and switch sides to the Allies (with far fewer casualties than Germany or Japan).

That is, apart from Finland, which also managed the impressive feat of extracting itself from the war while avoiding Soviet occupation.

Italy is notorious for its lack of military proficiency – a notoriety that is overstated as Italy was not so much universally bad as it was inconsistent in military performance, an inconsistency that is largely explicable from its underlying weaknesses before and during the war.

However, this is not ranking combatants by military proficiency but by art of war, particularly as it involves winning without fighting.

And for that Italy deserves credit for pulling off its massive bluff of being taken far more seriously as a great power despite its weakness. Italy’s biggest mistake was calling its own bluff by, you know, actually getting involved in the war, although even then it tried to win with as little fighting as possible while preserving its one real strength – its navy.

That goes all the way back to its anachronistic policy of trying to revive the Roman Empire, half a millennium too late after the world economy had moved on from the Mediterranean – which in practice involved attacking countries poorer than itself, Abyssinia and Albania, hence of little benefit to itself even when it won.

The war on Abyssinia was particularly ill-advised, doubling down on anachronism with a revival of the Scramble for Africa – alienating its former WW1 allies Britain and France, while leaving its forces exposed by their isolation if Britain did turn against them, as actually happened in WW2.

Italy’s contribution to the Spanish Civil War was a prewar drain on its military with little benefit to itself – while it did see victory for a fellow idealogue regime, that regime was unable and unwilling to reciprocate the favor to Italy or Germany in WW2.

Italy should have taken a leaf from Spain’s book, the latter proving far wiser in its cautious neutrality despite initial German victory. Italy should have stayed sitting it out at the sidelines rather than making the Mediterranean and ultimately itself a front line.

In other words, playing the balance of power and making money through trading with both sides, which probably would have seen it entering the war, if at all, on the winning Allied side later in the war and without turning itself into a battlefield except perhaps at the Alps.

Ironically, the British Cabinet also considered whether Britain’s situation would be better if Italy remained neutral or entered the war on Germany’s side. They concluded the former – narrowly – but they may have underestimated how much Italy would drag Germany down

I’d like to think that Italy was playing the long game against Germany, professing to support Germany’s war while secretly working against it by deliberate incompetence – much like Admiral Canaris and his Abwehr in Germany – but sadly I can’t quite pull off the mental gymnastics and it was just too self-destructive for Italy even if it was true.

 

F-TIER (FAIL TIER)

 

(8) JAPAN

 

This can’t be a surprise. If this was ranking combatants by fighting or military proficiency, Japan would rank higher. In terms of the art of war or waging war as opposed to fighting, Japan was hopelessly outclassed by the Allies – and indeed outranked by every major combatant except one.

Japan literally defined strategy only in the short term, with the concept of the decisive battle, particularly as held by its navy – that is, that war would be won by fighting and winning a single knockout below. First, Pearl Harbor, then Midway, and then, well, never as it forever receded back to the horizon and Japan ever more desperately sought to conserve their fleet – until it was a kamikaze last-ditch defense to somehow knock out the Americans in the invasion of Japan itself.

Japan’s long-term strategy was incoherent, to the extent that it had any at all beyond wishful thinking that the United States would simply give up or relied upon Japan’s allegedly superior martial qualities to overcome the overwhelming material superiority of the United States.

“There was no plan at all to invade America, knock her out of the war or destroy her capacity to wage it. In short, there was no strategic war-winning plan at all. Instead, there was an optimistic assumption that, at some stage, America (and Britain) would negotiate a compromise peace.”

In one of my favorite anecdotes from popular historian Paul Johnson, “on 3 January 1942, H!tler admitted to the Japanese ambassador, General Hiroshi Oshima, that he did not yet know ‘how America could be defeated'” – “That made two of them: the Japanese did not know either.”

Worse, not only did Japan have no long-term strategy, but it also effectively had two bodies for planning any strategy, almost as much in competition with each other as with their external adversaries, in the worst high command arrangements of any combatant – its army and navy.

Even at the most basic tactical level, Japan “had almost completely neglected submarine warfare, both defensive and offensive” – which meant that it had no means for ensuring supplies for its forces scattered across the Pacific “or, conversely, of inhibiting the Allies from moving their own supplies”, such that “in the long run, Japan could not prevent America from developing a war-winning strategy.”

That was a fatal flaw for an island nation almost entirely reliant on maritime trade or supply lines, going to war in a naval contest that was essentially a competition of industrial production against an opponent of overwhelmingly superior economic and industrial capacity.

In what you may detect to be a running theme among the Axis, Japan’s biggest mistake was going to war at all when it should have done everything possible as an alternative to avoid it – “Japan’s decision to go to war made no sense. It was hara-kiri”.

And that went all the way back to every decision to go to war – or to ally itself with the Axis – after the First World War. The occupation of Manchuria in 1931 simply opened up the potential for wider war with the larger nations bordering it, China and the Soviet Union, as indeed occurred. The wider war with China exceeded Japan’s ability to defeat it or achieve anything other than a stalemate – and the need for resources, particularly oil, to continue waging that war forced Japan to the widest war of all in the Pacific against the United States, that was entirely beyond its means for anything but defeat.

 

(9) GERMANY

 

The lowest of low tier – no prizes for guessing Germany as the major combatant ranked lowest for the art of war in WW2.

Japan might otherwise have ranked lower as its strategy was more incoherent, but Germany loses out if only because they pulled this crap twice. As historian H.P. Willmott paraphrased Oscar Wilde, to lose one world war may be regarded as misfortune, to lose both looks like carelessness.

As for Japan, if this was ranking combatants by fighting or military proficiency, Germany would rank higher – some would argue highest. As Willmott opined, Germany’s military genius lay in fighting, not in war. When it came to understanding war and waging it, Germany was hopelessly outclassed by the Allies – a situation shared by Germany’s ally Japan. All Germany managed to achieve in two world wars was its encirclement and attrition by enemies with superior resources.

As H.P. Willmott opined on his “theme of Germany’s defeat as a result of her inability to understand war” – The failure to understand the limits, both of military force in the conduct of war and of German national  power within the international community characterized Germany’s actions in two world wars, almost as if the very success of the one German leader who had understood both – Bismarck – blinded successive generations of Germans to these realities because they saw only his military victories”.

Their biggest mistake in the art of war? You guessed it – going to war in the first place, although as Willmott observed that went all the way back through successive German leaders screwing things up after Bismarck (which could be the subject of its own list).

 

X-TIER (WILD TIER)

 

(10) AUSTRALIA

 

I’m rounding out ten entries for my WW2 combatant art of war rankings with Australia in wild tier, because we all know if I was to rank it anywhere else, it would be in god tier top spot for both military proficiency and art of war.

For military proficiency, Australia was the first to defeat both Germany and Japan on land – with Australia’s Ninth Division stopping Rommel’s Afrika Korps at Tobruk in 1941 and Australian forces stopping the Japanese at Milne Bay in 1942 (as well as along the Kokoda Trail).

And art of war for a small nation (in population) like Australia is essentially a matter of allies – so swapping out Britain for the US as ally in the war against Japan, the only real threat of battle on or invasion of its own home territory that Australia faced in war, is prime art of war.

Rightly so too – Australia has never forgiven Churchill for screwing it over in both world wars, “starting with his habit of borrowing the country’s navy and army whenever world war broke out”. Gallipoli, anyone?

But at least Gallipoli didn’t risk the invasion of Australia itself, as opposed to WW2 where Churchill first sought to retain Australia’s troops in the Middle East, then to divert them to Burma when Australia recalled them to defend itself against Japan.

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (Complete Top 10)

Second Floor, Northwest Gallery. Mural of War by Gari Melchers. Library of Congress Thomas Jefferson Building, Washington, D.C – photographed by Carol Highsmith (public domain image)

 

 

TOP 10 TYPES OF WAR

 

I always found wars a fascinating subject of history as a hobby of mine, from the comfortable armchair of hindsight and the fortunate perspective of being well removed from any firsthand experience of them.

Hence, I’ve ranked my Top 10 Wars of history, but it doesn’t end there. No, indeed there’s my Top 10 Types of War in history, as the broad types of war arguably outrank individual wars in historical importance – or at least rank as high as a tool for the study of individual wars, albeit many wars fall into or consist of more than one type of war.

Just some notes – there is almost an infinite variety of types by or into which one can classify wars. One could even compile a top ten for types of types of war, classifying types within broader themes – political, strategic, technological, and so on. I have a mix of types from different broad themes, although I tend to focus on types by strategic doctrine or technological nature of weaponry.

This is also one of my more unusual top ten lists where I don’t count down from tenth to first place but instead simply count out in the reverse direction, from first to tenth place. What’s more, I’ve ranked them mostly in chronological order rather than historical importance, although there’s a general overlap between the two, as longer history tends to coincide with their greater impact, albeit not always.

Interestingly, six of my top ten types of war are ancient or even earlier, so much so that they might be regarded as transcending mere types of war to being archetypes of it. On the other hand, four are distinctively modern – and by modern, I mean twentieth century and onwards – but have effectively reshaped war in their own image.

 

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

Awesome artwork “Roicroi, the last tercio” by Augusto Ferrer-Dalmau, portraying infantry of a Spanish tercio at the 1643 Battle of Rocroi, in Wikipedia “Infantry” under license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en

 

 

(1) INFANTRY WARFARE

 

Warfare in history commenced as infantry warfare, which has endured as the foundation of war and the predominant means of waging it.

That’s not to say that prehistoric war wasn’t also infantry war. In the broadest usage of infantry war as fighting on foot, all prehistoric war was infantry war (except to the extent of anyone ramming canoes or rafts into each other) – but for the most part, prehistoric war lacked the characteristic drill or regimen of infantry war, fighting as warriors rather than soldiers.

And that’s the essential nature of infantry war – fighting on foot and in formation, coordinated with each other rather solo-ing off into single combat, as soldiers with drill and regimen, typically with standardized weapons and equipment.

As such, the origins of infantry war are the origins of war itself in recorded history, since the first ancient empires fought with regular infantry, albeit often as an elite supplemented by conscript masses or militia as irregular infantry – something that has surprisingly endured as a practice since then to the modern period.

The ancient archetype of regular infantry remains the Greek phalanx, and even more so, the Roman legion.

While the archetypal infantry travels on foot – marches, that is, in a style and pace that has remained remarkably consistent throughout history – the defining trait of infantry is that they fight on foot, not necessarily that they get to the fight on foot.

Hence, there has been a variety of infantry distinguished by getting to the fight by other means than marching to it – most notably mechanized infantry or mobile infantry in the modern period but also mounted infantry, naval infantry, airborne infantry, and air assault infantry.

“Before the adoption of the chariot to create the first mobile fighting forces c. 2000 BC, all armies were pure infantry. Even after, with a few exceptions like the Mongol Empire, infantry has been the largest component of most armies in history.”

Infantry also remains the most basic or fundamental unit of war – the proverbial boots on the ground – for achieving strategic objectives, particularly when those objectives are measured in territory.

As such, infantry has not waned in war, albeit it has evolved with technology. Gunpowder saw infantry shift to line infantry tactics, shooting volleys at each other – until modern firepower overwhelmed even that, forcing infantry for its own survival to use “dispersed, maneuver-based, and heavily supported infantry units” as well as combined arms and the paramount importance of cover on the battlefield.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

Charge of the French 4th Hussars at the battle of Friedland, 14 June 1807 – painting by Edouard Detaille in 1891 (public domain image)

 

 

(2) CAVALRY WARFARE

 

“Cavalryman, horseman, trooper, cataphract, knight, drabant, hussar, uhlan, mamluk, curaisser, lancer, dragoon, samurai or horse archer”.

Where infantry was the fundamental unit of war in history, cavalry was the fundamental means of mobile war – “providing armies with superior speed, mobility, and shock impact” as well as things for which mobility is used such as “scouting, screening, flanking and pursuing enemies” or “breaking enemy lines”.

Cavalry warfare involved soldiers or warriors fighting mounted on horseback – ranging from ancient horse archers to armored knights and modern light cavalry”. Obviously, the fundamental ingredient for cavalry is the domestication of the horse, or more precisely the domestication of the horse followed by breeding horses of sufficient size for warriors mounted on them.

Prior to being of sufficient size to be used for cavalry proper, the smaller domesticated horses were able to be used to draw chariots as the first mobile forces in about 2000 BC. Chariots played much the same role as cavalry but were obsolescent by cavalry once horses were of sufficient size. Hence the designation of cavalry is not usually given to “any military forces that used other animals or platforms for mounts, such as chariots” – or those occasional other animals used in war, camels or elephants. Interestingly, the last use of chariots was by the Britons at the time of the Roman conquest of Britain.

Also interestingly, that won’t be the last we see of obsolescence when it comes to cavalry war, but from its origin through to the twentieth century, cavalry has tended to eclipse infantry for decisive importance or impact – as the dominant force for winning battles rather than waging wars.

Of course, that is an oversimplification of the strategic balance between infantry and cavalry in war, as it has seesawed between them, complicated by the usual numeric predominance of infantry in armies and the higher cost of cavalry.

Certainly, the dominance of cavalry is reflected in the recurring military proficiency or superiority of the mounted nomadic warriors of the Eurasian steppes – as observed by military historians such as Azar Gat and John Keegan, as well as the colorful phrases of the “steppe effect” by Walter Scheidel and the “Golden Age of the Barbarians” by James C. Scott.

There was also the medieval dominance of cavalry, originating in the late Roman period, where “mounted forces became the dominant, often aristocratic, arm of European armies throughout the age of feudalism”.

“Cavalry had the advantage of improved mobility, and a soldier fighting from horseback also had the advantages of greater height, speed, and inertial mass over an opponent on foot. Another element of horse mounted warfare is the psychological impact a mounted soldier can inflict on an opponent.”

However, it is weird to think of cavalry forces originating without the subsequent aids to riding – spurs, saddles, and above all stirrups, which facilitated heavy cavalry and the use of lances.

One might also add a certain romanticism that has attached to cavalry throughout history, albeit not necessarily as a matter of strategic or tactical advantage.

Sadly for such romanticism, infantry has had the last laugh, as unlike infantry but like chariots, cavalry has become obsolescent from the twentieth century to, well, another entry in this top ten – which has assumed the same role and often even the same title as cavalry with greater mobility and less vulnerability, as have airborne or air assault units such as in the famous fictional depiction of the helicopter air assault 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment in Apocalypse Now.

Whereas infantry could evolve, cavalry could not, at least on a large scale – the same deadly firepower of modern history that forced the evolution of infantry was fatal to cavalry.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

The 1805 Battle of Trafalgar painted by Louis-Phillipe Crepin (“Le Redoutable a Trafalgar”) in 1806 – public domain image used in Wikipedia “Naval Warfare”

 

 

(3) NAVAL WARFARE

 

War on water!

No – not like when Roman Emperor Caligula literally declared war on the sea (in the form of the god Neptune or Poseidon), but war fought on water, albeit overlapping with war fought on land in amphibious operations and naval landings.

“Naval warfare involves military operations on, under, and over the sea” – “combat in and on the sea, the ocean, or any other battlespace involving a major body of water such as a large lake or wide river”.

As surprisingly capable humans are as swimmers for terrestrial mammals (particularly primates), naval warfare obviously involves the various vessels humans have devised for transport on water. Of course, it doesn’t just involve vessels but vessels of sufficient size, resilience, and above all means for combat with other vessels. Hence naval warfare originated from the Bronze Age onwards, with the first recorded sea battle as the Battle of the Delta between the Egyptians and the Sea Peoples in about 1175 BC, although the very name of the latter suggests some sort of naval warfare before that.

Prehistoric humans probably fought each other from canoes or even rafts but that seems more a form of naval proto-warfare. However, the former persisted in recorded history with the use of war canoes, usually as a form of amphibious warfare – an important subset of naval warfare – although “canoe versus canoe engagements…were also significant”.

Naval warfare rose to a surprising importance and prominence in ancient history that are often overlooked for the more famous warfare on land. That importance seems even more surprising as naval warfare was predominantly fought either by boarding enemy ships or ramming them – methods which seem crude by the standards of modern naval warfare but persisted for a surprisingly long time until (and to some extent even after) the advent of gunpowder allowed for shipborne artillery as the standard means of naval combat.

Homer’s Iliad may have had the siege of Troy as its focus but famously features the so-called Catalogue of Ships, in its second book no less, albeit for the transport of Greek forces to Troy rather than naval combat with Trojan ships.

Thereafter, naval warfare looms large in ancient history – from the Persians and Greeks (particularly the Athenians) through to the Romans, whose Pax Romana was as much a matter of Mare Nostrum as it was of the legions.

Galleys were the primary means of ancient naval warfare and persisted as the dominant vessels for war until the early modern period in that primary arena of naval warfare, the Mediterranean. Galleys were superseded by the vessels of the Age of Sail, which also saw naval warfare expand with maritime transportation from mostly hugging the coasts in seas to the open ocean – although it is striking how often naval battles continued to be fought in coastal waters.

On that point, while we typically think of naval warfare as battles fought on the sea or ocean, there’s also naval warfare fought on lakes and rivers – reflecting that “even in the interior of large landmasses, transportation before the advent of extensive railways was largely dependent on rivers, lakes, canals, and other navigable waterways”. Hence the modern distinction between brown-water navies for riverine or littoral bodies of water and blue-water navies (or green-water navies) for open oceans or seas.

From the Age of Sail to the Age of Steam and Steel – with naval warfare in the latter evolving to steam power for ships and coaling stations for bases or ports. The latter also saw “ironclad” ships – first used in naval combat in the American Civil War – reflecting the improved chemistry and metallurgy which not only provided the means for armor to ships but also the guns and shells “capable of demolishing a wooden ship at a single blow” for which the armor was required.

Interestingly, naval supremacy underlaid modern superpower in a similar manner to the Pax Romana, only more so – with the Pax Britannica of the 19th century (with the Indian Ocean being dubbed a “British lake” in a similar manner to the Mare Nostrum), succeeded by the Pax Americana in the 20th century.

Modern naval warfare has seen a proliferation of forms through technology – notably naval aviation and aircraft carriers or submarine warfare which came to the fore in the Second World War (effectively superseding battleships) but also more recently missiles and aerial or naval drones.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

Guerrilla warfare during the Peninsular War, by Roque Gameiro, depicting a Portuguese guerrilla ambush against French forces (in the war that gave us the term guerilla) in “Pictures of the History of Portugal”, 2017 (public domain image used in Wikipedia “Guerilla Warfare”)

 

 

(4) GUERILLA WARFARE

 

Although the term originates from the Peninsular War in Spain against Napoleon’s France, guerilla war predates the Peninsular War all the way back to prehistory. Indeed, it was conventional war that was the more recent outlier, originating only in the Bronze Age and recorded history, while guerilla war was the baseline or default setting of war before that – and since, with Sun Tzu’s Art of War essentially a handbook in guerilla war strategy.

Nor was guerilla war strategy isolated to China. The Romans are probably more famous for fighting against guerilla war in revolts against their empire, in the process demonstrating why guerilla war was not so prevalent against ancient states with their resort to removing entire population, but they also famously resorted to guerilla war tactics when they had to against Hannibal in the Second Punic War.

“Guerrilla warfare is a form of unconventional, asymmetrical conflict where small, mobile groups of irregular forces (rebels, partisans) use hit-and-run tactics, sabotage, and ambushes to fight larger, traditional military forces. Originating from the Spanish for “little war,” it focuses on harassment, psychological warfare, and exploiting local knowledge to weaken a superior enemy over time.”

As such, guerilla war often tends to combine more than one type of war – infantry war may predominate in guerilla war, but the mobility of cavalry often leads to guerilla war or at least similar tactics. Arguably, even naval forces have resorted to a style similar to guerilla warfare – most notably for privateers, merchant raiders, or submarine attacks on shipping.

Guerilla war strategy aims to avoid “”direct, conventional battles, focusing instead on reducing enemy morale, seizing supplies, and dragging out conflicts to exhaust the opponent’s political will” – relying heavily on “support from the local population for food, shelter, intelligence, and recruits” or “familiar, difficult terrain like jungles, mountains, or crowded urban areas”.

That literal usage of little war from Spanish has lent itself to one of the most common modern descriptors of guerilla war as “small wars”, although that has often been synonymous with “dirty wars” in description and practice, for all sides of such conflicts.

Guerilla war often seems the most distinctive and prolific type of war in modern warfare, from the Vietnam War onwards – as the destructive power of modern technology seems more favorable to guerilla war, and even more so, modern political ideologies enlisting populations for or against guerillas.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

The siege of Rancagua during the Chilean War of Independence, painting by Pedro Subercaseaux (public domain image used in Wikipedia “Siege”)

 

 

 

(5) SIEGE & URBAN WARFARE

 

With fortifications – a historical development significant enough for its own interlude in John Keegan’s A History of Warfare – came siege warfare.

Or perhaps more precisely, prehistorical development, given that both cities or at least human settlements of sufficient size and fortifications emerged in the Neolithic and Bronze Age – indeed, one of the key features for archaeology. There may have been prototypes of fortifications or fortified positions using natural features or chokepoints in the Paleolithic, but not the resources for standing or field armies to hold or take them on the same scale.

“Siege warfare is a form of constant, low-intensity conflict focused on capturing a fortified position (castle, city, or fort) by surrounding it to block supplies (investment) and using active assaults to breach defenses. Common methods include starving defenders, utilizing artillery, tunnelling under walls, or scaling them.”

Sun Tzu in The Art of War admonished besieging cities as the “worst policy”, given the cost in time, resources and forces exceeds even that of the usual costly attrition to be avoided for war in general.

However, siege warfare is surprisingly prolific in history, notably in later medieval history where “sieges were more common than pitched battles”. It’s also surprisingly prolific in fictional depictions of war, in part due to the dramatic nature of last stands.

The rosy-fingered dawn of Western literature, Homer’s Iliad, is ultimately about the siege of Troy – which may or may not have some Bronze Age historicity. Similarly, both the literary and cinematic versions of Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings feature key battles, such as those for Helm’s Deep and Minas Tirith, that are sieges.

Without winning a siege by assault or attrition, that left options of negotiating surrender by diplomacy, “the use of deception or treachery to bypass defenses” or the blunter options that could affect either the besieged or besiegers – “starvation, thirst or disease”.

Siege warfare is usually seen as ending with gunpowder but that’s not strictly or initially the case, as something of an arms race developed between fortifications and artillery in early modern history. It was with the advent of greater firepower from the nineteenth century and particularly of mobile warfare from the twentieth century, that “the significance of classical siege declined” and “a single fortified stronghold is no longer as decisive as it once was”.

Ironically however, while the “classical siege” may have declined from modern firepower and mobile warfare, the same force of industrialization that underlay both led to battles or wars of attrition that resembled sieges. States had the means to maintain and supply forces in the field that could then effectively besiege each other or their defensive positions on an unprecedented scale and span.

The trench warfare on the Western Front of the First World War resembled a form of siege warfare. The Second World War might seem to have displaced that through combined arms and maneuver, but it is striking how many battles of that war were or resembled sieges – Stalingrad and Monte Cassino to name just two of them, apart from the famous siege of Leningrad.

The battles or sieges of the Second World War also demonstrate that while city walls may have stopped being a feature in siege warfare, cities themselves did not – with urban warfare resembling a form of siege warfare, only now of attrition of defensive positions within the city itself. Since the Second World War, urban warfare has also often combined elements of guerilla warfare with siege warfare.

The attritional nature of modern industrial warfare has extended beyond individual battles or even any direct combat to resemble sieges on a grand scale – such as the submarine warfare of the Second World War, with the Germans effectively besieging Britain and the Americans besieging Japan, or for that matter the Cold War in Europe, resembling two armies besieging each other.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

A 155 mm artillery shell fired by a United States 11th Marine Regiment M-198 howitzer during training – public domain image in Wikipedia “Artillery”

 

 

(6) ARTILLERY WARFARE

 

“The god of war” according to Stalin – generally providing the majority of the total firepower for modern armies as well as causing the majority of combat deaths in the Napoleonic Wars and world wars.

“Artillery consists of ranged weapons that launch munitions far beyond the range and power of infantry firearms” – “since the introduction of gunpowder and cannon, artillery has largely meant cannon, and in contemporary usage, usually refers to shell-firing guns, howitzers, and mortars…and rocket artillery”.

Hence, artillery is a large part, if not the primary part, of the firepower that transformed infantry warfare and made cavalry warfare obsolete in modern history – although with some caveat that infantry firepower has also been transformed in ways that matches or eclipses historic artillery, such as RPGs or rocket-propelled grenades.

As we have seen, it has also transformed naval warfare, by becoming the predominant means of that warfare as opposed to the boarding or ramming of ships that preceded it – as well as coastal artillery to defend against ships.

And it is only apt that artillery warfare is the next entry after siege and urban warfare – “early artillery development focused on the ability to breach defensive walls and fortifications during siege and led to heavy, fairly immobile siege engines”.

“Although not called by that name, siege engines performing the role recognizable as artillery have been employed in warfare since antiquity. The first known catapult was developed in Syracuse in 399 BC. Until the introduction of  gunpowder into western warfare, artillery was dependent upon mechanical energy, which not only severely limited the kinetic energy of the projectiles, but also required the construction of very large engines to accumulate sufficient energy. A 1st-century BC Roman catapult launching 6.55 kg (14.4 lb) stones achieved a kinetic energy of 16 kilojoules, compared to a mid-19th-century 12-pounder gun, which fired a 4.1 kg (9.0 lb) round, with a kinetic energy of 240 kilojoules, or a 20th-century US battleship that fired a 1,225 kg (2,701 lb) projectile from its main battery with an energy level surpassing 350 megajoules.”

With lighter and more mobile artillery through technological improvement there came feild artillery – usually horse-drawn prior to the steam and internal combustion engines that saw railway guns, the largest artillery ever conceived, and the artillery, both offensive and defensive, of the next two entries.

Such is the modern importance of artillery that it is typically its own arm of service within modern armies – as well as navies and air forces for coastal and anti-aircraft artillery respectively, although organization and practice varies.

Technological improvement of artillery not only involves the delivery systems or “engines” as well the projectiles or munitions fired or launched by them, but also target acquisition and techniques or “fire control”.

 

RATING:

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

Promotional art for the Armored Warfare video game

 

 

(7) MECHANIZED & ARMORED WAR

 

Where the steam engine transformed naval warfare, the internal combustion engine transformed warfare on land – as well as the balance between land and sea in warfare.

Let me elaborate.

Sure, the steam engine, used for trains and railways, also transformed warfare on land but more in logistics and mobilization than actual combat.

However, to transform combat on land – and replace cavalry for mobile warfare – it took the advent of the internal combustion engine for vehicles used in war from the twentieth century onwards.

What is often overlooked is that the advent of the internal combustion engine in war also reversed the balance between a seaborne invading force and the land-based defending force. Prior to the internal combustion engine, a seaborne force had the advantage of greater mobility and speed bringing troops and supplies to a beachhead over the land-based force defending it. After the internal combustion engine, the land-based force had that advantage.

Mechanized warfare, often interchangeably used with armored warfare given how much both are represented tanks, “is the operational use of armored fighting vehicles—such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled artillery—combined with motorized infantry to achieve rapid movement, high firepower, and protection on the battlefield. It represents a shift from infantry-centric fighting to machine-driven combat, originating in WWI”.

While the tank is definitive of mechanized warfare (and obviously of armored warfare), it is not the war-breaking weapon in isolation as it is often seen to be in popular imagination. Indeed, tanks in isolation without support are dangerously vulnerable to counterattack, particularly with the advent of artillery and infantry anti-tank weaponry in the Second World War. I’ve read that tanks aren’t even the best weapon to use against other tanks.

Instead, tanks are used as part of combined arms strategy or tactics – “much of the application of armoured warfare depends on the use of tanks and related vehicles used by other supporting arms such as infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, and other combat vehicles, as well as mounted combat engineers and other support units”.

The use of tanks has been inflated in popular imagination by their identification as the instrument of German blitzkrieg in the Second World War. Setting aside that blitzkrieg itself was a propaganda term applied to traditional German maneuver warfare (Bewegungskrieg), tanks were obviously important but as a component of combined arms – H.P. Willmott argued that the use of radio (to coordinate combined arms) was the more decisive component. Even then, the success of German “blitzkrieg” reflected a brief window where the balance swung in favor of mobile offensive firepower over defence, but the balance swang back towards defensive firepower during the Second World War – hence the strength of German defence in the latter part of the war and the relatively greater force the Allies required to overcome it.

 

RATING:

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

An air-to-air right side view of an 81st Tactical Fighter Squadron F-4E Phantom II aircraft releasing 18 Mark-82 500-pound bombs over the Bardenas Reales Gunnery Range. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. David Nolan) – public domain image in Wikipedia “Aerial Warfare”

 

 

(8) AERIAL WARFARE

 

War in air!

It’s commonly observed that only 66 years separated the American Wright Brothers’ flights in 1903, recognized to be “the first sustained and controlled heavier than air powered flight”, and the moon landing in 1969.

However, less than a decade separated those flights from the first use of aircraft in war, the Italo-Turkish War in 1911, although their more famous and prolific use was in the First World War, firstly for aerial reconnaissance but then for aerial combat, air support and bombing.

Such was the development of military airpower in only two decades after the First World War that it became of decisive importance in the Second World War, particularly for achieving air superiority or supremacy – arguably to the extent of war-breaking importance, as the critical margin of victory or defeat, but not war-winning of itself.

Military airpower has only increased since then – with jets, missiles, more powerful or precise munitions, electronic or stealth technology, and drones or unmanned aerial vehicles – but the jury is still out whether airpower alone can win wars, at least in the absence of another entry in this top ten. Still, it can come damn close, perhaps even win on occasion by itself or with minimal use of ground forces.

“Aerial warfare includes bombers attacking enemy installations or a concentration of enemy troops or strategic targets; fighter aircraft battling for control of airspace; attack aircraft engaging in close air support against ground targets; naval aviation flying against sea and nearby land targets; gliders, helicopters and other aircraft to carry airborne forces such as paratroopers; aerial refueling tankers to extend operation time or range; and military transport aircraft to move cargo and personnel.”

That is hardly exhaustive of military airpower. Kites and balloons, manned and unmanned, were used in warfare even prior to heavier than air powered flight, primarily for reconnaissance, and continue to have applications since. Lighter-than-air airships have also been used in warfare, with the high point (heh) of their use for bombing cities in the First World War although they had and continue to have more limited applications.

Returning to heavier than air powered aircraft, they have also been used and continued to be used for communications, command and control as well as early warning, surveillance, and intelligence. There’s also the use of aircraft for evacuation and rescue – as well as the medical transport, such as the titular Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals of the TV series with its iconic helicopter ambulance opening scene.

On the other side, “surface forces are likely to respond to enemy air activity with anti-aircraft warfare”.

 

RATING:

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

 

An MQ-1 Predator, armed with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, piloted by Lt. Col. Scott Miller on a combat mission over southern Afghanistan. (U.S. Air Force Photo / Lt. Col. Leslie Pratt) – public domain image in Wikipedia “General Atomics MQ-1 Predator”

 

 

(9) DRONE WARFARE

 

Drones, drone strikes and drone swarms.

“Drone warfare is a form of warfare that involves the deployment of military robots and unmanned systems. The unmanned systems may be remoted controlled by a pilot or have varying levels of autonomy during their mission, enhancing offensive and defensive capabilities while reducing the need for personnel.”

‘Nuff said, except that drone warfare is not only emerging as the type of warfare that defines the conflicts of the twenty-first century, but also a game-changing one that increasingly defines their battlespace.

And I say battlespace to invoke the multiple domains of drone warfare – “types of unmanned systems and platforms include unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) or weaponized commercial unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), unmanned surface vehicles (USV) or unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), and unmanned ground vehicles (UGV)”.

“Military applications of drones range from reconnaissance tasks, kamikaze missions, logistical support, bomb disposal, training and medical evacuation to electronic warfare, anti-war, anti-armor, and anti-personnel roles…Drones are primarily utilized to conduct intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions, facilitating direct attacks on targets”.

Drone warfare was defined by US drone strikes in the War on Terror but has “evolved and proliferated quickly in the 2010s and 2020s”. Even so, I wouldn’t have ranked it in my top ten before the Russo-Ukrainian War, which saw it rise to game-changing prominence that’s here to stay.

“The Russo-Ukrainian war is widely recognised as the world’s first drone war due to the large scale and high intensity of drone attacks, and the role of this experience in evolving the tactics of modern conventional warfare…The Russo-Ukrainian war demonstrated how drones have disrupted traditional military doctrines in a manner similar to how gunpowder revolutionized warfare, making them a decisive factor in all future conflicts.”

Such is the role of drones in that war that “Ukraine became the first country to create a military branch exclusively dedicated to drone warfare – the Unmanned Systems Forces”, with Russia following suit and I anticipate more to follow beyond that war and its combatants.

 

RATING:

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

 

Operation Buster-Jungle Dog in exercise Desert Rock I at the Nevada Test Site, 1 November 1951 – the first US nuclear field exercise conducted on land with troops only 6 miles from the blast, public domain image in Wikipedia “Nuclear Warfare”

 

 

(10) NUCLEAR WARFARE

 

“It’s Defcon One…get me Big Mac, fries to go!”

Few forms of warfare have loomed as large as nuclear warfare but at the same time to have never existed in actual warfare except as threat or hypothetical prospect with one exception – fortunately, “the first and only use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict was the United States atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki”.

While nuclear weapons haven’t been used in warfare apart from that exception, that hasn’t stopped a select few nations with the means to acquire or develop them, primarily the United States and the Soviet Union or Russia, from detonating them “on over 2,000 occasions for various testing purposes” or deploying them on a large scale in readiness for use.

The prospect or threat of nuclear warfare has effectively operated as a limit on other forms of warfare, at least directly between states with nuclear weapons, to avoid escalating to nuclear warfare with each other, given the sheer destructive potential of mutually assured destruction at best and the possibility of human extinction at worst – “nuclear winter, nuclear famine, and societal collapse”, oh my!

And that pretty much sums up nuclear warfare, except for how dangerously close we’ve come to the tripwire for it.

“Countries have increased their readiness to carry out strategic and tactical nuclear attacks in response to intensifying conflicts, including the Korean War, First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises, Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam War, Sino-Soviet border conflict, Yom Kippur War, Gulf War, and Russo-Ukrainian War”.

“The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, between the nuclear superpowers of the U.S. and Soviet Union, is often considered the closest call with a nuclear exchange” – one of two occasions, along with the Yom Kippur War, that the United States was at Defcon Two, the stage before actual deployment in Defcon One.

The other famous measurement of the risk of nuclear war is the Doomsday Clock.

Throw in the extraordinary extent to which states have planned for “limited” nuclear war or had tactical nuclear weapons deployed for use on the battlefield – missiles, munitions, torpedoes and depth charges on the battlefields – as well as the risk of deployment from accident or false alarms, and one sometimes wonders how we ever made it this far without nuking ourselves.

 

RATING:

X-TIER (WILD TIER)

 

 

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (Complete & Revised: Part 2)

A 155 mm artillery shell fired by a United States 11th Marine Regiment M-198 howitzer during training – public domain image in Wikipedia “Artillery”

 

 

(6) ARTILLERY WARFARE

 

“The god of war” according to Stalin – generally providing the majority of the total firepower for modern armies as well as causing the majority of combat deaths in the Napoleonic Wars and world wars.

“Artillery consists of ranged weapons that launch munitions far beyond the range and power of infantry firearms” – “since the introduction of gunpowder and cannon, artillery has largely meant cannon, and in contemporary usage, usually refers to shell-firing guns, howitzers, and mortars…and rocket artillery”.

Hence, artillery is a large part, if not the primary part, of the firepower that transformed infantry warfare and made cavalry warfare obsolete in modern history – although with some caveat that infantry firepower has also been transformed in ways that matches or eclipses historic artillery, such as RPGs or rocket-propelled grenades.

As we have seen, it has also transformed naval warfare, by becoming the predominant means of that warfare as opposed to the boarding or ramming of ships that preceded it – as well as coastal artillery to defend against ships.

And it is only apt that artillery warfare is the next entry after siege and urban warfare – “early artillery development focused on the ability to breach defensive walls and fortifications during siege and led to heavy, fairly immobile siege engines”.

“Although not called by that name, siege engines performing the role recognizable as artillery have been employed in warfare since antiquity. The first known catapult was developed in Syracuse in 399 BC. Until the introduction of  gunpowder into western warfare, artillery was dependent upon mechanical energy, which not only severely limited the kinetic energy of the projectiles, but also required the construction of very large engines to accumulate sufficient energy. A 1st-century BC Roman catapult launching 6.55 kg (14.4 lb) stones achieved a kinetic energy of 16 kilojoules, compared to a mid-19th-century 12-pounder gun, which fired a 4.1 kg (9.0 lb) round, with a kinetic energy of 240 kilojoules, or a 20th-century US battleship that fired a 1,225 kg (2,701 lb) projectile from its main battery with an energy level surpassing 350 megajoules.”

With lighter and more mobile artillery through technological improvement there came feild artillery – usually horse-drawn prior to the steam and internal combustion engines that saw railway guns, the largest artillery ever conceived, and the artillery, both offensive and defensive, of the next two entries.

Such is the modern importance of artillery that it is typically its own arm of service within modern armies – as well as navies and air forces for coastal and anti-aircraft artillery respectively, although organization and practice varies.

Technological improvement of artillery not only involves the delivery systems or “engines” as well the projectiles or munitions fired or launched by them, but also target acquisition and techniques or “fire control”.

 

RATING:

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

Promotional art for the Armored Warfare video game

 

 

(7) MECHANIZED & ARMORED WAR

 

Where the steam engine transformed naval warfare, the internal combustion engine transformed warfare on land – as well as the balance between land and sea in warfare.

Let me elaborate.

Sure, the steam engine, used for trains and railways, also transformed warfare on land but more in logistics and mobilization than actual combat.

However, to transform combat on land – and replace cavalry for mobile warfare – it took the advent of the internal combustion engine for vehicles used in war from the twentieth century onwards.

What is often overlooked is that the advent of the internal combustion engine in war also reversed the balance between a seaborne invading force and the land-based defending force. Prior to the internal combustion engine, a seaborne force had the advantage of greater mobility and speed bringing troops and supplies to a beachhead over the land-based force defending it. After the internal combustion engine, the land-based force had that advantage.

Mechanized warfare, often interchangeably used with armored warfare given how much both are represented tanks, “is the operational use of armored fighting vehicles—such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled artillery—combined with motorized infantry to achieve rapid movement, high firepower, and protection on the battlefield. It represents a shift from infantry-centric fighting to machine-driven combat, originating in WWI”.

While the tank is definitive of mechanized warfare (and obviously of armored warfare), it is not the war-breaking weapon in isolation as it is often seen to be in popular imagination. Indeed, tanks in isolation without support are dangerously vulnerable to counterattack, particularly with the advent of artillery and infantry anti-tank weaponry in the Second World War. I’ve read that tanks aren’t even the best weapon to use against other tanks.

Instead, tanks are used as part of combined arms strategy or tactics – “much of the application of armoured warfare depends on the use of tanks and related vehicles used by other supporting arms such as infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, and other combat vehicles, as well as mounted combat engineers and other support units”.

The use of tanks has been inflated in popular imagination by their identification as the instrument of German blitzkrieg in the Second World War. Setting aside that blitzkrieg itself was a propaganda term applied to traditional German maneuver warfare (Bewegungskrieg), tanks were obviously important but as a component of combined arms – H.P. Willmott argued that the use of radio (to coordinate combined arms) was the more decisive component. Even then, the success of German “blitzkrieg” reflected a brief window where the balance swung in favor of mobile offensive firepower over defence, but the balance swang back towards defensive firepower during the Second World War – hence the strength of German defence in the latter part of the war and the relatively greater force the Allies required to overcome it.

 

RATING:

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

An air-to-air right side view of an 81st Tactical Fighter Squadron F-4E Phantom II aircraft releasing 18 Mark-82 500-pound bombs over the Bardenas Reales Gunnery Range. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. David Nolan) – public domain image in Wikipedia “Aerial Warfare”

 

 

(8) AERIAL WARFARE

 

War in air!

It’s commonly observed that only 66 years separated the American Wright Brothers’ flights in 1903, recognized to be “the first sustained and controlled heavier than air powered flight”, and the moon landing in 1969.

However, less than a decade separated those flights from the first use of aircraft in war, the Italo-Turkish War in 1911, although their more famous and prolific use was in the First World War, firstly for aerial reconnaissance but then for aerial combat, air support and bombing.

Such was the development of military airpower in only two decades after the First World War that it became of decisive importance in the Second World War, particularly for achieving air superiority or supremacy – arguably to the extent of war-breaking importance, as the critical margin of victory or defeat, but not war-winning of itself.

Military airpower has only increased since then – with jets, missiles, more powerful or precise munitions, electronic or stealth technology, and drones or unmanned aerial vehicles – but the jury is still out whether airpower alone can win wars, at least in the absence of another entry in this top ten. Still, it can come damn close, perhaps even win on occasion by itself or with minimal use of ground forces.

“Aerial warfare includes bombers attacking enemy installations or a concentration of enemy troops or strategic targets; fighter aircraft battling for control of airspace; attack aircraft engaging in close air support against ground targets; naval aviation flying against sea and nearby land targets; gliders, helicopters and other aircraft to carry airborne forces such as paratroopers; aerial refueling tankers to extend operation time or range; and military transport aircraft to move cargo and personnel.”

That is hardly exhaustive of military airpower. Kites and balloons, manned and unmanned, were used in warfare even prior to heavier than air powered flight, primarily for reconnaissance, and continue to have applications since. Lighter-than-air airships have also been used in warfare, with the high point (heh) of their use for bombing cities in the First World War although they had and continue to have more limited applications.

Returning to heavier than air powered aircraft, they have also been used and continued to be used for communications, command and control as well as early warning, surveillance, and intelligence. There’s also the use of aircraft for evacuation and rescue – as well as the medical transport, such as the titular Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals of the TV series with its iconic helicopter ambulance opening scene.

On the other side, “surface forces are likely to respond to enemy air activity with anti-aircraft warfare”.

 

RATING:

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

 

An MQ-1 Predator, armed with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, piloted by Lt. Col. Scott Miller on a combat mission over southern Afghanistan. (U.S. Air Force Photo / Lt. Col. Leslie Pratt) – public domain image in Wikipedia “General Atomics MQ-1 Predator”

 

 

(9) DRONE WARFARE

 

Drones, drone strikes and drone swarms.

“Drone warfare is a form of warfare that involves the deployment of military robots and unmanned systems. The unmanned systems may be remoted controlled by a pilot or have varying levels of autonomy during their mission, enhancing offensive and defensive capabilities while reducing the need for personnel.”

‘Nuff said, except that drone warfare is not only emerging as the type of warfare that defines the conflicts of the twenty-first century, but also a game-changing one that increasingly defines their battlespace.

And I say battlespace to invoke the multiple domains of drone warfare – “types of unmanned systems and platforms include unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) or weaponized commercial unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), unmanned surface vehicles (USV) or unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), and unmanned ground vehicles (UGV)”.

“Military applications of drones range from reconnaissance tasks, kamikaze missions, logistical support, bomb disposal, training and medical evacuation to electronic warfare, anti-war, anti-armor, and anti-personnel roles…Drones are primarily utilized to conduct intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions, facilitating direct attacks on targets”.

Drone warfare was defined by US drone strikes in the War on Terror but has “evolved and proliferated quickly in the 2010s and 2020s”. Even so, I wouldn’t have ranked it in my top ten before the Russo-Ukrainian War, which saw it rise to game-changing prominence that’s here to stay.

“The Russo-Ukrainian war is widely recognised as the world’s first drone war due to the large scale and high intensity of drone attacks, and the role of this experience in evolving the tactics of modern conventional warfare…The Russo-Ukrainian war demonstrated how drones have disrupted traditional military doctrines in a manner similar to how gunpowder revolutionized warfare, making them a decisive factor in all future conflicts.”

Such is the role of drones in that war that “Ukraine became the first country to create a military branch exclusively dedicated to drone warfare – the Unmanned Systems Forces”, with Russia following suit and I anticipate more to follow beyond that war and its combatants.

 

RATING:

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

 

Operation Buster-Jungle Dog in exercise Desert Rock I at the Nevada Test Site, 1 November 1951 – the first US nuclear field exercise conducted on land with troops only 6 miles from the blast, public domain image in Wikipedia “Nuclear Warfare”

 

 

(10) NUCLEAR WARFARE

 

“It’s Defcon One…get me Big Mac, fries to go!”

Few forms of warfare have loomed as large as nuclear warfare but at the same time to have never existed in actual warfare except as threat or hypothetical prospect with one exception – fortunately, “the first and only use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict was the United States atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki”.

While nuclear weapons haven’t been used in warfare apart from that exception, that hasn’t stopped a select few nations with the means to acquire or develop them, primarily the United States and the Soviet Union or Russia, from detonating them “on over 2,000 occasions for various testing purposes” or deploying them on a large scale in readiness for use.

The prospect or threat of nuclear warfare has effectively operated as a limit on other forms of warfare, at least directly between states with nuclear weapons, to avoid escalating to nuclear warfare with each other, given the sheer destructive potential of mutually assured destruction at best and the possibility of human extinction at worst – “nuclear winter, nuclear famine, and societal collapse”, oh my!

And that pretty much sums up nuclear warfare, except for how dangerously close we’ve come to the tripwire for it.

“Countries have increased their readiness to carry out strategic and tactical nuclear attacks in response to intensifying conflicts, including the Korean War, First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises, Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam War, Sino-Soviet border conflict, Yom Kippur War, Gulf War, and Russo-Ukrainian War”.

“The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, between the nuclear superpowers of the U.S. and Soviet Union, is often considered the closest call with a nuclear exchange” – one of two occasions, along with the Yom Kippur War, that the United States was at Defcon Two, the stage before actual deployment in Defcon One.

The other famous measurement of the risk of nuclear war is the Doomsday Clock.

Throw in the extraordinary extent to which states have planned for “limited” nuclear war or had tactical nuclear weapons deployed for use on the battlefield – missiles, munitions, torpedoes and depth charges on the battlefields – as well as the risk of deployment from accident or false alarms, and one sometimes wonders how we ever made it this far without nuking ourselves.

 

RATING:

X-TIER (WILD TIER)

 

 

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (Revised: New Entry) (6) Artillery Warfare

A 155 mm artillery shell fired by a United States 11th Marine Regiment M-198 howitzer during training – public domain image in Wikipedia “Artillery”

 

 

(6) ARTILLERY WARFARE

 

“The god of war” according to Stalin – generally providing the majority of the total firepower for modern armies as well as causing the majority of combat deaths in the Napoleonic Wars and world wars.

“Artillery consists of ranged weapons that launch munitions far beyond the range and power of infantry firearms” – “since the introduction of gunpowder and cannon, artillery has largely meant cannon, and in contemporary usage, usually refers to shell-firing guns, howitzers, and mortars…and rocket artillery”.

Hence, artillery is a large part, if not the primary part, of the firepower that transformed infantry warfare and made cavalry warfare obsolete in modern history – although with some caveat that infantry firepower has also been transformed in ways that matches or eclipses historic artillery, such as RPGs or rocket-propelled grenades.

As we have seen, it has also transformed naval warfare, by becoming the predominant means of that warfare as opposed to the boarding or ramming of ships that preceded it – as well as coastal artillery to defend against ships.

And it is only apt that artillery warfare is the next entry after siege and urban warfare – “early artillery development focused on the ability to breach defensive walls and fortifications during siege and led to heavy, fairly immobile siege engines”.

“Although not called by that name, siege engines performing the role recognizable as artillery have been employed in warfare since antiquity. The first known catapult was developed in Syracuse in 399 BC. Until the introduction of  gunpowder into western warfare, artillery was dependent upon mechanical energy, which not only severely limited the kinetic energy of the projectiles, but also required the construction of very large engines to accumulate sufficient energy. A 1st-century BC Roman catapult launching 6.55 kg (14.4 lb) stones achieved a kinetic energy of 16 kilojoules, compared to a mid-19th-century 12-pounder gun, which fired a 4.1 kg (9.0 lb) round, with a kinetic energy of 240 kilojoules, or a 20th-century US battleship that fired a 1,225 kg (2,701 lb) projectile from its main battery with an energy level surpassing 350 megajoules.”

With lighter and more mobile artillery through technological improvement there came feild artillery – usually horse-drawn prior to the steam and internal combustion engines that saw railway guns, the largest artillery ever conceived, and the artillery, both offensive and defensive, of the next two entries.

Such is the modern importance of artillery that it is typically its own arm of service within modern armies – as well as navies and air forces for coastal and anti-aircraft artillery respectively, although organization and practice varies.

Technological improvement of artillery not only involves the delivery systems or “engines” as well the projectiles or munitions fired or launched by them, but also target acquisition and techniques or “fire control”.

 

RATING:

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (Complete & Revised: Part 1)

Second Floor, Northwest Gallery. Mural of War by Gari Melchers. Library of Congress Thomas Jefferson Building, Washington, D.C – photographed by Carol Highsmith (public domain image)

 

 

TOP 10 TYPES OF WAR

 

I always found wars a fascinating subject of history as a hobby of mine, from the comfortable armchair of hindsight and the fortunate perspective of being well removed from any firsthand experience of them.

Hence, I’ve ranked my Top 10 Wars of history, but it doesn’t end there. No, indeed there’s my Top 10 Types of War in history, as the broad types of war arguably outrank individual wars in historical importance – or at least rank as high as a tool for the study of individual wars, albeit many wars fall into or consist of more than one type of war.

Just some notes – there is almost an infinite variety of types by or into which one can classify wars. One could even compile a top ten for types of types of war, classifying types within broader themes – political, strategic, technological, and so on. I have a mix of types from different broad themes, although I tend to focus on types by strategic doctrine or technological nature of weaponry.

This is also one of my more unusual top ten lists where I don’t count down from tenth to first place but instead simply count out in the reverse direction, from first to tenth place. What’s more, I’ve ranked them mostly in chronological order rather than historical importance, although there’s a general overlap between the two, as longer history tends to coincide with their greater impact, albeit not always.

Interestingly, six of my top ten types of war are ancient or even earlier, so much so that they might be regarded as transcending mere types of war to being archetypes of it. On the other hand, four are distinctively modern – and by modern, I mean twentieth century and onwards – but have effectively reshaped war in their own image.

 

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

Awesome artwork “Roicroi, the last tercio” by Augusto Ferrer-Dalmau, portraying infantry of a Spanish tercio at the 1643 Battle of Rocroi, in Wikipedia “Infantry” under license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en

 

 

(1) INFANTRY WARFARE

 

Warfare in history commenced as infantry warfare, which has endured as the foundation of war and the predominant means of waging it.

That’s not to say that prehistoric war wasn’t also infantry war. In the broadest usage of infantry war as fighting on foot, all prehistoric war was infantry war (except to the extent of anyone ramming canoes or rafts into each other) – but for the most part, prehistoric war lacked the characteristic drill or regimen of infantry war, fighting as warriors rather than soldiers.

And that’s the essential nature of infantry war – fighting on foot and in formation, coordinated with each other rather solo-ing off into single combat, as soldiers with drill and regimen, typically with standardized weapons and equipment.

As such, the origins of infantry war are the origins of war itself in recorded history, since the first ancient empires fought with regular infantry, albeit often as an elite supplemented by conscript masses or militia as irregular infantry – something that has surprisingly endured as a practice since then to the modern period.

The ancient archetype of regular infantry remains the Greek phalanx, and even more so, the Roman legion.

While the archetypal infantry travels on foot – marches, that is, in a style and pace that has remained remarkably consistent throughout history – the defining trait of infantry is that they fight on foot, not necessarily that they get to the fight on foot.

Hence, there has been a variety of infantry distinguished by getting to the fight by other means than marching to it – most notably mechanized infantry or mobile infantry in the modern period but also mounted infantry, naval infantry, airborne infantry, and air assault infantry.

“Before the adoption of the chariot to create the first mobile fighting forces c. 2000 BC, all armies were pure infantry. Even after, with a few exceptions like the Mongol Empire, infantry has been the largest component of most armies in history.”

Infantry also remains the most basic or fundamental unit of war – the proverbial boots on the ground – for achieving strategic objectives, particularly when those objectives are measured in territory.

As such, infantry has not waned in war, albeit it has evolved with technology. Gunpowder saw infantry shift to line infantry tactics, shooting volleys at each other – until modern firepower overwhelmed even that, forcing infantry for its own survival to use “dispersed, maneuver-based, and heavily supported infantry units” as well as combined arms and the paramount importance of cover on the battlefield.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

Charge of the French 4th Hussars at the battle of Friedland, 14 June 1807 – painting by Edouard Detaille in 1891 (public domain image)

 

 

(2) CAVALRY WARFARE

 

“Cavalryman, horseman, trooper, cataphract, knight, drabant, hussar, uhlan, mamluk, curaisser, lancer, dragoon, samurai or horse archer”.

Where infantry was the fundamental unit of war in history, cavalry was the fundamental means of mobile war – “providing armies with superior speed, mobility, and shock impact” as well as things for which mobility is used such as “scouting, screening, flanking and pursuing enemies” or “breaking enemy lines”.

Cavalry warfare involved soldiers or warriors fighting mounted on horseback – ranging from ancient horse archers to armored knights and modern light cavalry”. Obviously, the fundamental ingredient for cavalry is the domestication of the horse, or more precisely the domestication of the horse followed by breeding horses of sufficient size for warriors mounted on them.

Prior to being of sufficient size to be used for cavalry proper, the smaller domesticated horses were able to be used to draw chariots as the first mobile forces in about 2000 BC. Chariots played much the same role as cavalry but were obsolescent by cavalry once horses were of sufficient size. Hence the designation of cavalry is not usually given to “any military forces that used other animals or platforms for mounts, such as chariots” – or those occasional other animals used in war, camels or elephants. Interestingly, the last use of chariots was by the Britons at the time of the Roman conquest of Britain.

Also interestingly, that won’t be the last we see of obsolescence when it comes to cavalry war, but from its origin through to the twentieth century, cavalry has tended to eclipse infantry for decisive importance or impact – as the dominant force for winning battles rather than waging wars.

Of course, that is an oversimplification of the strategic balance between infantry and cavalry in war, as it has seesawed between them, complicated by the usual numeric predominance of infantry in armies and the higher cost of cavalry.

Certainly, the dominance of cavalry is reflected in the recurring military proficiency or superiority of the mounted nomadic warriors of the Eurasian steppes – as observed by military historians such as Azar Gat and John Keegan, as well as the colorful phrases of the “steppe effect” by Walter Scheidel and the “Golden Age of the Barbarians” by James C. Scott.

There was also the medieval dominance of cavalry, originating in the late Roman period, where “mounted forces became the dominant, often aristocratic, arm of European armies throughout the age of feudalism”.

“Cavalry had the advantage of improved mobility, and a soldier fighting from horseback also had the advantages of greater height, speed, and inertial mass over an opponent on foot. Another element of horse mounted warfare is the psychological impact a mounted soldier can inflict on an opponent.”

However, it is weird to think of cavalry forces originating without the subsequent aids to riding – spurs, saddles, and above all stirrups, which facilitated heavy cavalry and the use of lances.

One might also add a certain romanticism that has attached to cavalry throughout history, albeit not necessarily as a matter of strategic or tactical advantage.

Sadly for such romanticism, infantry has had the last laugh, as unlike infantry but like chariots, cavalry has become obsolescent from the twentieth century to, well, another entry in this top ten – which has assumed the same role and often even the same title as cavalry with greater mobility and less vulnerability, as have airborne or air assault units such as in the famous fictional depiction of the helicopter air assault 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment in Apocalypse Now.

Whereas infantry could evolve, cavalry could not, at least on a large scale – the same deadly firepower of modern history that forced the evolution of infantry was fatal to cavalry.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

The 1805 Battle of Trafalgar painted by Louis-Phillipe Crepin (“Le Redoutable a Trafalgar”) in 1806 – public domain image used in Wikipedia “Naval Warfare”

 

 

(3) NAVAL WARFARE

 

War on water!

No – not like when Roman Emperor Caligula literally declared war on the sea (in the form of the god Neptune or Poseidon), but war fought on water, albeit overlapping with war fought on land in amphibious operations and naval landings.

“Naval warfare involves military operations on, under, and over the sea” – “combat in and on the sea, the ocean, or any other battlespace involving a major body of water such as a large lake or wide river”.

As surprisingly capable humans are as swimmers for terrestrial mammals (particularly primates), naval warfare obviously involves the various vessels humans have devised for transport on water. Of course, it doesn’t just involve vessels but vessels of sufficient size, resilience, and above all means for combat with other vessels. Hence naval warfare originated from the Bronze Age onwards, with the first recorded sea battle as the Battle of the Delta between the Egyptians and the Sea Peoples in about 1175 BC, although the very name of the latter suggests some sort of naval warfare before that.

Prehistoric humans probably fought each other from canoes or even rafts but that seems more a form of naval proto-warfare. However, the former persisted in recorded history with the use of war canoes, usually as a form of amphibious warfare – an important subset of naval warfare – although “canoe versus canoe engagements…were also significant”.

Naval warfare rose to a surprising importance and prominence in ancient history that are often overlooked for the more famous warfare on land. That importance seems even more surprising as naval warfare was predominantly fought either by boarding enemy ships or ramming them – methods which seem crude by the standards of modern naval warfare but persisted for a surprisingly long time until (and to some extent even after) the advent of gunpowder allowed for shipborne artillery as the standard means of naval combat.

Homer’s Iliad may have had the siege of Troy as its focus but famously features the so-called Catalogue of Ships, in its second book no less, albeit for the transport of Greek forces to Troy rather than naval combat with Trojan ships.

Thereafter, naval warfare looms large in ancient history – from the Persians and Greeks (particularly the Athenians) through to the Romans, whose Pax Romana was as much a matter of Mare Nostrum as it was of the legions.

Galleys were the primary means of ancient naval warfare and persisted as the dominant vessels for war until the early modern period in that primary arena of naval warfare, the Mediterranean. Galleys were superseded by the vessels of the Age of Sail, which also saw naval warfare expand with maritime transportation from mostly hugging the coasts in seas to the open ocean – although it is striking how often naval battles continued to be fought in coastal waters.

On that point, while we typically think of naval warfare as battles fought on the sea or ocean, there’s also naval warfare fought on lakes and rivers – reflecting that “even in the interior of large landmasses, transportation before the advent of extensive railways was largely dependent on rivers, lakes, canals, and other navigable waterways”. Hence the modern distinction between brown-water navies for riverine or littoral bodies of water and blue-water navies (or green-water navies) for open oceans or seas.

From the Age of Sail to the Age of Steam and Steel – with naval warfare in the latter evolving to steam power for ships and coaling stations for bases or ports. The latter also saw “ironclad” ships – first used in naval combat in the American Civil War – reflecting the improved chemistry and metallurgy which not only provided the means for armor to ships but also the guns and shells “capable of demolishing a wooden ship at a single blow” for which the armor was required.

Interestingly, naval supremacy underlaid modern superpower in a similar manner to the Pax Romana, only more so – with the Pax Britannica of the 19th century (with the Indian Ocean being dubbed a “British lake” in a similar manner to the Mare Nostrum), succeeded by the Pax Americana in the 20th century.

Modern naval warfare has seen a proliferation of forms through technology – notably naval aviation and aircraft carriers or submarine warfare which came to the fore in the Second World War (effectively superseding battleships) but also more recently missiles and aerial or naval drones.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

Guerrilla warfare during the Peninsular War, by Roque Gameiro, depicting a Portuguese guerrilla ambush against French forces (in the war that gave us the term guerilla) in “Pictures of the History of Portugal”, 2017 (public domain image used in Wikipedia “Guerilla Warfare”)

 

 

(4) GUERILLA WARFARE

 

Although the term originates from the Peninsular War in Spain against Napoleon’s France, guerilla war predates the Peninsular War all the way back to prehistory. Indeed, it was conventional war that was the more recent outlier, originating only in the Bronze Age and recorded history, while guerilla war was the baseline or default setting of war before that – and since, with Sun Tzu’s Art of War essentially a handbook in guerilla war strategy.

Nor was guerilla war strategy isolated to China. The Romans are probably more famous for fighting against guerilla war in revolts against their empire, in the process demonstrating why guerilla war was not so prevalent against ancient states with their resort to removing entire population, but they also famously resorted to guerilla war tactics when they had to against Hannibal in the Second Punic War.

“Guerrilla warfare is a form of unconventional, asymmetrical conflict where small, mobile groups of irregular forces (rebels, partisans) use hit-and-run tactics, sabotage, and ambushes to fight larger, traditional military forces. Originating from the Spanish for “little war,” it focuses on harassment, psychological warfare, and exploiting local knowledge to weaken a superior enemy over time.”

As such, guerilla war often tends to combine more than one type of war – infantry war may predominate in guerilla war, but the mobility of cavalry often leads to guerilla war or at least similar tactics. Arguably, even naval forces have resorted to a style similar to guerilla warfare – most notably for privateers, merchant raiders, or submarine attacks on shipping.

Guerilla war strategy aims to avoid “”direct, conventional battles, focusing instead on reducing enemy morale, seizing supplies, and dragging out conflicts to exhaust the opponent’s political will” – relying heavily on “support from the local population for food, shelter, intelligence, and recruits” or “familiar, difficult terrain like jungles, mountains, or crowded urban areas”.

That literal usage of little war from Spanish has lent itself to one of the most common modern descriptors of guerilla war as “small wars”, although that has often been synonymous with “dirty wars” in description and practice, for all sides of such conflicts.

Guerilla war often seems the most distinctive and prolific type of war in modern warfare, from the Vietnam War onwards – as the destructive power of modern technology seems more favorable to guerilla war, and even more so, modern political ideologies enlisting populations for or against guerillas.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

The siege of Rancagua during the Chilean War of Independence, painting by Pedro Subercaseaux (public domain image used in Wikipedia “Siege”)

 

 

 

(5) SIEGE & URBAN WARFARE

 

With fortifications – a historical development significant enough for its own interlude in John Keegan’s A History of Warfare – came siege warfare.

Or perhaps more precisely, prehistorical development, given that both cities or at least human settlements of sufficient size and fortifications emerged in the Neolithic and Bronze Age – indeed, one of the key features for archaeology. There may have been prototypes of fortifications or fortified positions using natural features or chokepoints in the Paleolithic, but not the resources for standing or field armies to hold or take them on the same scale.

“Siege warfare is a form of constant, low-intensity conflict focused on capturing a fortified position (castle, city, or fort) by surrounding it to block supplies (investment) and using active assaults to breach defenses. Common methods include starving defenders, utilizing artillery, tunnelling under walls, or scaling them.”

Sun Tzu in The Art of War admonished besieging cities as the “worst policy”, given the cost in time, resources and forces exceeds even that of the usual costly attrition to be avoided for war in general.

However, siege warfare is surprisingly prolific in history, notably in later medieval history where “sieges were more common than pitched battles”. It’s also surprisingly prolific in fictional depictions of war, in part due to the dramatic nature of last stands.

The rosy-fingered dawn of Western literature, Homer’s Iliad, is ultimately about the siege of Troy – which may or may not have some Bronze Age historicity. Similarly, both the literary and cinematic versions of Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings feature key battles, such as those for Helm’s Deep and Minas Tirith, that are sieges.

Without winning a siege by assault or attrition, that left options of negotiating surrender by diplomacy, “the use of deception or treachery to bypass defenses” or the blunter options that could affect either the besieged or besiegers – “starvation, thirst or disease”.

Siege warfare is usually seen as ending with gunpowder but that’s not strictly or initially the case, as something of an arms race developed between fortifications and artillery in early modern history. It was with the advent of greater firepower from the nineteenth century and particularly of mobile warfare from the twentieth century, that “the significance of classical siege declined” and “a single fortified stronghold is no longer as decisive as it once was”.

Ironically however, while the “classical siege” may have declined from modern firepower and mobile warfare, the same force of industrialization that underlay both led to battles or wars of attrition that resembled sieges. States had the means to maintain and supply forces in the field that could then effectively besiege each other or their defensive positions on an unprecedented scale and span.

The trench warfare on the Western Front of the First World War resembled a form of siege warfare. The Second World War might seem to have displaced that through combined arms and maneuver, but it is striking how many battles of that war were or resembled sieges – Stalingrad and Monte Cassino to name just two of them, apart from the famous siege of Leningrad.

The battles or sieges of the Second World War also demonstrate that while city walls may have stopped being a feature in siege warfare, cities themselves did not – with urban warfare resembling a form of siege warfare, only now of attrition of defensive positions within the city itself. Since the Second World War, urban warfare has also often combined elements of guerilla warfare with siege warfare.

The attritional nature of modern industrial warfare has extended beyond individual battles or even any direct combat to resemble sieges on a grand scale – such as the submarine warfare of the Second World War, with the Germans effectively besieging Britain and the Americans besieging Japan, or for that matter the Cold War in Europe, resembling two armies besieging each other.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (10) Drone Warfare

An MQ-1 Predator, armed with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, piloted by Lt. Col. Scott Miller on a combat mission over southern Afghanistan. (U.S. Air Force Photo / Lt. Col. Leslie Pratt) – public domain image in Wikipedia “General Atomics MQ-1 Predator”

 

 

(10) DRONE WARFARE

 

Drones, drone strikes and drone swarms.

“Drone warfare is a form of warfare that involves the deployment of military robots and unmanned systems. The unmanned systems may be remoted controlled by a pilot or have varying levels of autonomy during their mission, enhancing offensive and defensive capabilities while reducing the need for personnel.”

‘Nuff said, except that drone warfare is not only emerging as the type of warfare that defines the conflicts of the twenty-first century, but also a game-changing one that increasingly defines their battlespace.

And I say battlespace to invoke the multiple domains of drone warfare – “types of unmanned systems and platforms include unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) or weaponized commercial unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), unmanned surface vehicles (USV) or unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), and unmanned ground vehicles (UGV)”.

“Military applications of drones range from reconnaissance tasks, kamikaze missions, logistical support, bomb disposal, training and medical evacuation to electronic warfare, anti-war, anti-armor, and anti-personnel roles…Drones are primarily utilized to conduct intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions, facilitating direct attacks on targets”.

Drone warfare was defined by US drone strikes in the War on Terror but has “evolved and proliferated quickly in the 2010s and 2020s”. Even so, I wouldn’t have ranked it in my top ten before the Russo-Ukrainian War, which saw it rise to game-changing prominence that’s here to stay.

“The Russo-Ukrainian war is widely recognised as the world’s first drone war due to the large scale and high intensity of drone attacks, and the role of this experience in evolving the tactics of modern conventional warfare…The Russo-Ukrainian war demonstrated how drones have disrupted traditional military doctrines in a manner similar to how gunpowder revolutionized warfare, making them a decisive factor in all future conflicts.”

Such is the role of drones in that war that “Ukraine became the first country to create a military branch exclusively dedicated to drone warfare – the Unmanned Systems Forces”, with Russia following suit and I anticipate more to follow beyond that war and its combatants.