Print of painting “Battle of Gettysburg” showing Pickett’s Charge, by Thure de Thulstrup, restored by Adam Cuerden, Library of Congress (public domain image)

(7) MANEUVER & ATTRITION

Maneuver warfare is how we’d like wars to be, attrition warfare is how they are.

I’m joking and serious. Most works of military strategy, certainly that in classic texts such as the Art of War, boil down to aspirations to maneuver warfare, avoiding the pain and above all costs of attrition. The rule of cool in military history is on the side of maneuver, while attrition is distinctly unglamorous.

And yet maneuver warfare is the exception to the rule of attrition warfare. Yes, some military commanders and forces achieve it, but mostly it’s just an aspiration above attrition – an aspiration that is only occasionally or temporarily achieved, albeit more common in pre-modern history in which wars could be won by a key battle or battles.

Many of the circumstances of war or battles constrain the possibility of maneuver for the reality of attrition – terrain or fortification being prime examples, but the primary example is modern industrialization. As H.P. Willmott observed in his history of the Second World War, an industrial opponent is necessarily defeated only by attrition in depth – ironically, as at the same time industrialization provided the means for mechanized warfare as even more capability for maneuver.

Speaking of the Second World War, the world wars demonstrate both maneuver as the rule of cool in military history and attrition as its reality. Often, the demarcation between the two world wars in military history is that the Second World War is seen as the cool war of maneuver, while the First World War is the boring war of attrition. In reality, the Second World War was as much a war of attrition as the First or even more so, only somewhat more mobile (on occasion). For all their initial flashy success through maneuver, the Germans (and Japanese) ultimately (and inevitably) fought and lost by attrition.

It’s only apt that maneuver and attrition follow strategy and tactics, even if warfare is more clearly demarcated as maneuver or attrition warfare than it is for my proposed dichotomy between strategic and tactical warfare

“Maneuver warfare is a military philosophy that prioritizes rapid movement, psychological dislocation, and adaptability over brute force. Rather than systematically destroying every enemy unit, it seeks to exploit systemic weaknesses and shatter an adversary’s cohesion and will to fight.”

Obviously, that’s opposed to attrition warfare – “where traditional attrition warfare aims to physically grind down the enemy through sheer firepower, maneuver warfare aims to bypass strongholds and paralyze the enemy’s command structure.”

In other words – speed, surprise, and shock.

Speed and tempo are the key elements, not just for the mobility of your forces but also to degrade the ability of the opposing commanders or forces to react – “commanders strive to operate inside the enemy’s decision cycle”, aiding the psychological impact of “shock, confusion and panic”.

Focus on vulnerability is another key element – seeking to bypass enemy strength for “critical vulnerabilities such as supply lines, communication hubs, and leadership”.

Surprise and deception are still more key elements – ” using unpredictable movements, feints, and camouflage to keep the enemy disoriented.”

“Military forces typically execute maneuver warfare through five foundational tactical operations” – envelopment, turning movements, infiltration, penetration, and frontal attack while the other operations are executed.

“Historically, maneuver warfare was stressed by small militaries, more cohesive, better trained, or more technologically advanced than attrition warfare counterparts.”

Attrition warfare on the other hand is all about the grind. It’s in the name after all.

“Attrition warfare is a military strategy in which a belligerent attempts to wear down an enemy to the point of collapse through continuous losses in personnel and material. Victory is achieved not through swift, decisive maneuvers or capturing territory, but by out-producing and out-lasting the adversary’s ability to wage war.”

The enemy’s collapse can either be physical (through loss of forces or capacity) or psychological through breakdown of will or morale).

“These wars are defined by state industrial output, the geographical depth to absorb defeats, and the logistical capacity to constantly replace heavy equipment losses over time.”

Ironically, attrition warfare is fought as much or even more by the weak as it is by the strong – “a combatant facing a significant disadvantage may deliberately adopt an attritional approach to offset the enemy’s superior firepower, mobility, or resources.”  Guerilla warfare is the archetype of attritional warfare fought by the weak against the strong.

RATING: S-TIER (GOD TIER)