U.S. supply convoy in Afghanistan photographed by Spc. Donald J. McMullen (public domain image – Wikipedia “Military Logistics”)

(8) LOGISTICS & SUPPLY

“Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics”.

A quotation variously attributed to different military commanders, usually WW2 US Army General Omar Bradley although the definitive verifiable record of such a statement was by US Marine Corps General Robert Barrow in 1980. In fairness, the US Marine Corps lives by logistics.

However, the truth of it remains – all wars, except for the most prehistoric warfare, are wars of logistics and supply. And the only reason the most prehistoric warfare is an exception, despite prehistoric warriors needing food and water like everyone else, is that the whole nature of prehistoric warfare is that it did not keep warriors in the field for any appreciable length of time, hence they were essentially self-supplying, carrying or providing for themselves what little they needed for short periods of time.

“An army marches on its stomach”

Logistics and supply are the lifeblood of military forces in the field (or at sea or in the air) – the proverbial stomach on which armies march, including at the literal or most basic level of being fed, or the proverbial tail of “tooth-to-tail ratio” as requirements of supply and support for combat forces. Needless to say, the tail tends to be longer than the tooth, particularly for modern military forces, but vividly represented by the wagon trains that followed after pre-modern armies, often longer than the army itself. Sun Tzu’s The Art of War is arguably most notable for the way it bemoans the running costs of armies.

That is not to say that logistics and supply or supply lines win wars of themselves, but they can certainly lose them – as can counter-logistics to deprive enemy forces of supplies or supply lines, such as the scorched earth strategy famed for that purpose.

“Logistics is an enabler of military operations, not an end in itself. Poor logistics can result in defeat, but even the best logistics cannot guarantee victory. Conversely, the best possible logistics is not always required: fit for purpose can suffice.”

There are three basic means of supply – obtaining supplies in the field, carrying supplies with the army, and shipping supplies from the rear. While the first two are essentially self-supplying to some degree, they still often involved prodigious costs and organization, particularly as only so much of what an army needs can be reliably obtained in the field. The Roman Empire’s most impressive military achievements were perhaps not so much in combat but in its systematic logistics and supply, as represented by its road.

“Obtaining supplies in the field and carrying supplies with the army remained the primary means of supply until the 19th century…Starting with the Industrial Revolution, new technological, technical and administrative advances permitted supplies to be transported at speeds and over distances never before possible. At the same time, increased demands for ammunition, and the heavier weight of shells and bombs made it more difficult for armies to carry their requirements, and they soon became dependent on regular replenishment of ammunition from depots. Mechanisation, with motor vehicles replacing animals, created a demand for fuel and spare parts, neither of which could be obtained locally. This led to a “logistical revolution” which began in the 20th century and drastically improved the capabilities of modern armies while making them highly dependent on this method.”

RATING: S-TIER (GOD TIER)