Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (Special Mention) (9) Ground Warfare

A pair of AMX-30 main battle tanks and a truck of the French 6th Light Armored Division pause outside Al-Salman during Operation Desert Storm.

 

(9) GROUND WARFARE

 

Yes, all warfare except naval and air warfare is ground or land warfare – and even those two overlap with ground warfare in things such as amphibious or airborne warfare.

This special mention is for ground or land warfare by terrain and weather conditions, which both are, and are not, surprisingly diverse.

Not surprisingly diverse – as observed by John Keegan in an interlude chapter on the limitations of war-making in his history of warfare, war on land tends to have the same default terrain and weather conditions, avoiding difficulties of both.

Surprisingly diverse – because you can’t always pick your battles or where you fight them, such that there are some distinctive or specialized types of warfare within ground of land warfare in general.

Perhaps not quite enough for a top ten of ground warfare, but at least enough for six distinctive types of warfare (although I think arguments can be made for airborne and amphibious warfare as types of groundwarfare, at least in part, with island warfare within the latter, as well as wet-weather wrfare as its own distinct type of ground warfare):

  • (1) Urban warfare as featured in my top ten entry of siege and urban warfare
  • (2) Desert warfare – which I suspect might be the next most common after siege and urban warfare (at least on a large scale), because of the Middle East (going all the way back to the ancient Near East)
  • (3) Jungle warfare
  • (4) Mountain warfare, often overlapping with…
  • (5) Cold-weather, winter or arctic warfare, including ski warfare.
  • (6) Subterranean warfare – or in other words, my next special mention entry…

 

RATING: A-TIER (TOP TIER)

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (Special Mention) (7) Maneuver & Attrition

Print of painting “Battle of Gettysburg” showing Pickett’s Charge, by Thure de Thulstrup, restored by Adam Cuerden, Library of Congress (public domain image)

 

 

(7) MANEUVER & ATTRITION

 

Maneuver warfare is how we’d like wars to be, attrition warfare is how they are.

I’m joking and serious. Most works of military strategy, certainly that in classic texts such as the Art of War, boil down to aspirations to maneuver warfare, avoiding the pain and above all costs of attrition. The rule of cool in military history is on the side of maneuver, while attrition is distinctly unglamorous.

And yet maneuver warfare is the exception to the rule of attrition warfare. Yes, some military commanders and forces achieve it, but mostly it’s just an aspiration above attrition – an aspiration that is only occasionally or temporarily achieved, albeit more common in pre-modern history in which wars could be won by a key battle or battles.

Many of the circumstances of war or battles constrain the possibility of maneuver for the reality of attrition – terrain or fortification being prime examples, but the primary example is modern industrialization. As H.P. Willmott observed in his history of the Second World War, an industrial opponent is necessarily defeated only by attrition in depth – ironically, as at the same time industrialization provided the means for mechanized warfare as even more capability for maneuver.

Speaking of the Second World War, the world wars demonstrate both maneuver as the rule of cool in military history and attrition as its reality. Often, the demarcation between the two world wars in military history is that the Second World War is seen as the cool war of maneuver, while the First World War is the boring war of attrition. In reality, the Second World War was as much a war of attrition as the First or even more so, only somewhat more mobile (on occasion). For all their initial flashy success through maneuver, the Germans (and Japanese) ultimately (and inevitably) fought and lost by attrition.

It’s only apt that maneuver and attrition follow strategy and tactics, even if warfare is more clearly demarcated as maneuver or attrition warfare than it is for my proposed dichotomy between strategic and tactical warfare

“Maneuver warfare is a military philosophy that prioritizes rapid movement, psychological dislocation, and adaptability over brute force. Rather than systematically destroying every enemy unit, it seeks to exploit systemic weaknesses and shatter an adversary’s cohesion and will to fight.”

Obviously, that’s opposed to attrition warfare – “where traditional attrition warfare aims to physically grind down the enemy through sheer firepower, maneuver warfare aims to bypass strongholds and paralyze the enemy’s command structure.”

In other words – speed, surprise, and shock.

Speed and tempo are the key elements, not just for the mobility of your forces but also to degrade the ability of the opposing commanders or forces to react – “commanders strive to operate inside the enemy’s decision cycle”, aiding the psychological impact of “shock, confusion and panic”.

Focus on vulnerability is another key element – seeking to bypass enemy strength for “critical vulnerabilities such as supply lines, communication hubs, and leadership”.

Surprise and deception are still more key elements – ” using unpredictable movements, feints, and camouflage to keep the enemy disoriented.”

“Military forces typically execute maneuver warfare through five foundational tactical operations” – envelopment, turning movements, infiltration, penetration, and frontal attack while the other operations are executed.

“Historically, maneuver warfare was stressed by small militaries, more cohesive, better trained, or more technologically advanced than attrition warfare counterparts.”

Attrition warfare on the other hand is all about the grind. It’s in the name after all.

“Attrition warfare is a military strategy in which a belligerent attempts to wear down an enemy to the point of collapse through continuous losses in personnel and material. Victory is achieved not through swift, decisive maneuvers or capturing territory, but by out-producing and out-lasting the adversary’s ability to wage war.”

The enemy’s collapse can either be physical (through loss of forces or capacity) or psychological through breakdown of will or morale).

“These wars are defined by state industrial output, the geographical depth to absorb defeats, and the logistical capacity to constantly replace heavy equipment losses over time.”

Ironically, attrition warfare is fought as much or even more by the weak as it is by the strong – “a combatant facing a significant disadvantage may deliberately adopt an attritional approach to offset the enemy’s superior firepower, mobility, or resources.”  Guerilla warfare is the archetype of attritional warfare fought by the weak against the strong.

 

RATING: S-TIER (GOD TIER)

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (Special Mention) (6) Strategy & Tactics

Map of force movements and major engagements of the Waterloo campaign June 15-18, 1815 – by Ipankonin for Wikipedia “Military Strategy” and licensed for use https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/

 

 

(6) STRATEGY & TACTICS

 

In a nutshell, tactics win battles while strategy wins wars.

Yes, that omits the operational level of war which falls between them – “that connects the details of factics with the goals of strategy” – as I prefer the sharper duality of tactics and strategy without the more nebulous operational level between them.

And yes – strategy and tactics are fundamental elements or levels of war rather than types of war as such, although I’d argue some wars are more strategic in nature while others are more tactical, barely transcending the tactical level if at all.

Hence, strategy and tactics earn their special mention entry for my types of war – indeed each of strategy and tactics could well be the subject of top tens lists of their own, or several top ten lists divided between defensive or offensive strategy and tactics. It’s apt that strategy and tactics – essentially out-thinking your enemy – follow after psychological warfare, but some may query they follow after espionage and intelligence, even as fundamental as the latter are for strategy and tactics. However, I’m going to go out on a limb with a hot take here and speculate that stategy and tactics evolved out of espionage and intelligence rather than the other way round. Prior to drilled infantry fighting in formation, my speculation is that prehistoric or the earliest historical warfare was not particularly strategic or tactical (outside of surprise through ambush or raid) but rather a matter of which combatant had the fiercest or strongest warriors – or probably most of all, the most warriors.

Strategy is not so much concerned with individual battles – indeed Sun Tzu famously propounded strategy or the art of war as winning without fighting – but understanding the nature of war, and above all, your purpose in waging it.

“Military tactics encompasses the art of organizing and employing fighting forces on or near the battlefield…the application of four battlefield functions which are closely related – kinetic or firepower, mobility, protection or security, and shock action.”

 

RATING: 5 STARS*****

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (Special Mention) (5) Espionage & Intelligence

U-2 aerial recomnaissance image of Soviet missile bases under construction in Cuba shown to President Kennedy on 16 October 1962 shortly before the Cuban Missile Crisis – John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum (public domain image)

 

 

(5) ESPIONAGE & INTELLIGENCE

 

Knowledge is power – and war.

Espionage and counterespionage, intelligence and counterintelligence, agents and assets, spies and spycraft, black ops and covert ops, codebreaking and cryptanalysis, deception and disinformation, reconnaissance and surveillance, sabotage and subversion, stealth and subterfuge, honeypot and wetwork.

HUMINT or human intelligence as the thing we usually think about as espionage or intelligence, SIGINT or signals intelligence as the thing that usually is espionage or intelligence, and also all the abbreviated forms of intelligence – COMINT, GEOINT, FININT, IMINT, MASINT, OSINT.

Psychological warfare and terror lead naturally to the overlapping subject of espionage and intelligence, in turn incredibly prolific subjects worthy of their own top ten, or indeed several top tens.

Spies have been dubbed the second oldest profession, after pr0stitution as the oldest profession -with considerable overlap between them. Both desciptions as oldest or second oldest professions are more anecdotes than serious analysis, but certainly espionage or spies can be traced back to the Bronze Age ancient history in Egypt and Mesopotamia.

And that’s just because that’s when written records began, as one could almost certainly trace espionage or at least intelligence back to Stone Age prehistory, with the scouting or tracking that can reasonably conjectured to have accompanied prehistoric warfare.

Espionage or spies are mentioned in the two definitive ancient works of Western literature – the Bible and Homer – and very much as a fundamental part of war, as it was in that definitive work of strategy, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War.

In the Bible, the Israelites didn’t just launch into their conquest of Canaan cold. Not surprisingly given the short distance involved between Egypt and Canaan, part of that famous forty years in the wilderness was spent sending spies into Canaan – once again with that overlap with the oldest profession, as two such spies were aided by Rahab, widely read to be a harl0t.

Espionage or spies are also mentioned in the Iliad, not surprisingly given it is Western literature’s most famous siege – and of course the Trojan War was famously won by an act of deception or subterfuge, orchestrated by one of Western literature’s great deceptive characters, Odysseus (who is essentially characterized by deception and subterfuge throughout the Odyssey as well).

The Art of War identified spies as a fundamental part of war or military strategy – “The Art of War identifies five types of spies that are essential for gathering intelligence and achieving victory: local spies (citizen informants within the enemy’s territory), inward spies (recruited double agents within the enemy ranks), converted spies (recruited defectors converted to serve your side), doomed spies (expendable fabricators used to spread disinformation; acts as decoy for counter-intelligence), and surviving spies (spies that provide accurate intelligence after gathering information from the enemy).”

Espionage and intelligence have been and continued to be as fundamental to war as military force, indeed inextricably intertwined with the disposition and use of military force. Deploying force without adequate espionage or intelligence of enemy forces is effectively going in blind, such that going in naked would be preferable and perhaps less tempting fate for ambush or defeat. It would be interesting to identify how many military failures are ultimately intelligence failures – my own belief is that it would be a substantial proportion or part.

Even so, some might argue that espionage and intelligence are not of themselves types of war or substitutes for military force in war. To which I would respond firstly that these are special mentions but secondly and more fundamentally, that espionage and intelligence have assumed a role of such importance in warfare that they can be regarded as a type of warfare – espionage or spy warfare, intelligence warfare, deception warfare and so on.

A large part of the world wars – arguably a predominant part for signals intelligence, codebreaking, and cryptanalysis – could be called intelligence warfare, with the Cold War even more so, as a war in which espionage or intelligence indeed substituted for or pre-empted military force to large extent.

 

RATING: 5 STARS*****

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (Special Mention) (4) Terror

La Terroriste, a 1910 poster depicting a female member of the Combat Organization of the Polish Socialist Party throwing a bomb at a Russian official’s car – public domain image provided to Wikimedia Commons by the Polish Central Archives of Historical Records and used in Wikipedia “Terrorism” – that headless body goes a bit hardcore

 

 

(4) TERR0R

 

Psychological and religious warfare lead naturally to terr0r or terr0rism as a type or at least a means of warfare.

Terr0r or terr0rism is obviously a subset of psychological warfare as a means of targeting an adversary’s morale or collective psyche, particularly of their civilian population or political state through violence against them or other non-combatants.

And modern terr0rism is most often associated with religious warfare – one religion in particular although more than one religion has resorted to it. In fairness, religious extremism has been identified by at least one source to have overtaken nationalist separatism to “become the main driver of terr0rist attacks around the world”, although that remains the subject of debate.

While modern terr0rism is usually traced to “19th revolutionary politics”, an “ancient lineage” of pre-modern religious terr0rism has been proposed – with three particular examples of religiously motivated groups, the Thugs or Thuggees in India (made famous by the second Indiana Jones film), the Order of Assassins in medieval Islam (who sadly lack the same movie treatment), and the Jewish Sicarii Zealots in Roman Judaea.

Terr0r in its broadest sense has always been one of the means, probably the most straightforward means if you have the stomach for it as most pre-modern societies did, to deploy psychological force in a war against an opponent in the form of intimidation or manipulation by fear and shock – whether combatants or non-combatants (or both). And by always, I mean from the prehistoric origins of war itself, if the evidence of prehistoric brutality is to be believed or the inference from historical or contemporary observations from tribal warfare is correctly inferred.

One of the best examples of the use of terr0r in war is not surprisingly by the Mongols, who routinely threatened besieged cities with annihilation if they resisted rather than surrendered – and acted on those threats.

On the other hand, terr0rism is a narrower form of the more general terr0r deployed against opponents in war from prehistory onwards – usually defined as terr0r through violence against non-combatants or civilians and typically identified as a development of modern history.

Terr0rism is “the use of violence against non-combatants to achieve political or ideological aims…primarily to refer to intentional violence during peacetime or in the context of war against non-combatants”.

However, “there are various definitions of terr0rism, with no universal agreement about it. Different definitions of terr0rism emphasized its randomness, its aim to instill fear, and its broader impact beyond its immediate victims”.

Apparently, the terms “terr0rist” and “terr0rism” originated during the French Revolution – perhaps not surprisingly given the political terr0r or notorious reign of terr0r in that revolution. Indeed, modern terr0rism originated in the political ideologies that arose from and after that Revolution, combined with the weapons produced by industrial technology that lent themselves to the assassinations or attacks that characterized 19th century terr0rism – notably the pistol and dynamite.

However, both the terms of terr0rist and terr0rism as well as archetypal form of modern terr0rism “became widely used internationally and gained worldwide attention” from the 1970s onwards.

“Various organizations and countries have used terr0rism to achieve their objectives. These include left-wing and right-wing political organizations, nationalist groups, religious groups, revolutionaries, and ruling governments”. That last is represented by ” state terr0rism, with its institutionalized instrumentation of terr0r tactics through massacres, genocides, forced disappearances, carpet bombings, and torture” and is “is a deadlier form of terr0rism than non-state terr0rism”.

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (Special Mention) (3) Religious Warfare

Baldwin of Boulogne entering Edessa in 1098 – painting by Joseph-Nicolas Robert-Fleury, 1840 (public domain image)

 

 

(3) RELIGIOUS WARFARE

 

Holy war, jihad and crusade.

Similarly to psychological warfare, all warfare is religious warfare.

Well, not really, although I do see religious warfare as being wider than the term is usually applied – essentially as a subset of the psychological warfare that is ubiquitous throughout warfare. Granted, that subset is more about motivating or mobilizing your own fighting power by increasing cohesion, discipline, morale, resilience or resistance – essentially religion as a force multiplier, although it can extend to eliminating or reducing your enemy’s religion for the same effect in reverse.

As such, it arguably has similar origins in prehistory as psychological warfare in general – perhaps not in wars of religion as we understand them but in beliefs of supernatural assistance or protection in combat.

Religious warfare is usually applied to the sectarian wars fought between or within the world’s largest – and distinctively monotheistic – religions, Christianity and Islam, even if those wars overlap with secular causes.

Note that distinctive monotheism – while religious warfare has been identified or at least argued for other religious traditions, both contemporary and historical, it is commonly seen to have particular force for monotheism, notably in Christianity and Islam but also traced back to the traditions of ancient warfare seen in the Bible.

However, religious warfare is an incredibly complex and contentious subject, worthy of its own top ten (or several) – “The degree to which a war may be considered religious depends on many underlying questions, such as the definition of religion, the definition of ‘war’, and the applicability of religion to war as opposed to other possible factors.”

That extends to the observation I’ve frequently seen that all modern wars are wars of religion – to the extent that they are based on political ideologies that resemble religions – although I think it has an element of truth, particularly when applied to the ideological war of WW2.

The more usual observation by historians or those from similar academic disciplines is that only a small minority of wars are religious wars, although I think that is viewing religious warfare in a narrower sense than I do as a subset of psychological warfare.

 

RATING: 5 STARS*****

S-TIER (GOD TIER – WHAT ELSE?)

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (Special Mention) (2) Psychological Warfare

Photographic portrait of Sigmund Freud by Max Halberstadt in 1921 and signed by Freud – probably the most iconic image of Freud (public domain image)

 

 

(2) PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

 

Psywar, psyops, military information support operations, political warfare, hearts and minds, shock and awe, show of force, propaganda, disinformation

All warfare is psychological warfare.

No, seriously.

Yes, I know the term psychological warfare is usually to connote means of targeting an adversary’s morale or collective psyche – whether of their military, civilian population, or political state (or any part or combination of those) – apart from (or adjacent to) the use of military force.

However, war has always used psychological ‘force’  (and ‘space’ or ‘time’) – such as bluff, deception and intimidation for fear and shock – as much as physical force in combat from its very origin in prehistoric or primal warfare (to the extent we can infer it from observations of more contemporary tribal warfare) or even animal intra-species conflict.

After all, it’s best to reduce your enemy’s fighting power by reducing their cohesion, discipline, morale, resilience or resistance (or alternatively increase your own) – and better yet to avoid as much fighting (or as many casualties) as possible by causing them to break altogether into desertion, flight, retreat, rout or surrender (or alternatively mobilize your own forces against such things). In short, defeating the will of your enemy.

There’s Hannibal or the Mongols using deception or subtertuge to give the impression of forces as present or to inflate the apparent size of their forces. There’s the Mongols – quite the practitioners of psychological warfare – using the carrot of leniency and the stick of annihilation to encourage surrender. There’s the use of sirens on German Stuka aircraft in WW2 for their psychological effect (as well as other uses).

Of course, it’s not always about ‘negative’ impact, reducing or breaking your enemy. It can also be about ‘positive impact’, such as enlisting them to you – although that tends to involve the more usual usage of psychological warfare against their civilian populations or political states apart from or adjacent to the use of military force.

“Psychological warfare involves the planned use of propaganda, fear, and manipulation to influence the emotions, attitudes, and behavior of an opposition group, without relying on physical force. Its primary goal is to break an enemy’s will to fight, undermine morale, and cause confusion.”

Tactics of psychological warfare – particularly in the usual sense of not involving military force – include propaganda, disinformation or deception, demoralization and intimidation.

“The term is used to denote any action which is practiced mainly by psychological methods with the aim of evoking a planned psychological reaction in other people” – “various techniques aimed at influencing a target audience’s value system, belief system, emotions, motives, reasoning, or behavior.”

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (Special Mention) (1) Prehistoric & Primal Warfare

Cave painting of a battle between archers, Morella la Vella, Spain – public domain image used in Wikipedia “Prehistoric Warfare”

 

 

(1) PREHISTORIC & PRIMAL WARFARE

 

Hobbes vs Rousseau – the Hobbesian state of nature or “the war of all against all” (bellum omnium contra omnes) as against Rousseau’s more noble savage state of nature.

Sadly this special mention is not for some Great Prehistoric War fought between mammoth cavalry and evil Atlantean overlords in the style of the film 10,000 BC – or a tyrannosaur-riding Neanderthal fighting off everything in the style of the Primal animated TV series, although that series seems closer to Hobbes’ state of nature.

It’s for the sheer timescale of prehistoric war compared to historic war, corresponding to the scale of prehistory in general compared to history – 98% or so of the entire span of humanity on this planet so far, all but the last 5,000 years or so out of 300,000 years. And prehistory only gets longer if you throw in our hominin ancestor species as humanity, which potentially lengthens that span to 3,000,000 years.

There’s also that prehistory didn’t just disappear with the advent of recorded history – or rather didn’t consistently disappear across time and place, instead enduring in places more remote from recorded history until the modern period. And prehistoric war hasn’t even ended now, hence the better description would be primal war – as a type of war, exemplified by ambush and raid, to which humanity regularly returns, atavistically time and time again.

Most fundamentally, there’s Hobbes vs Rousseau – the philosophical significance of prehistoric war in understanding the origins of war itself.

Of course, the origins of war in prehistory is the subject of theory or outright speculation, as by its nature prehistory involves those human societies without recorded history – typically Neolithic or Paleolithic, but potentially also more recent societies without written historical records.

It’s where prehistory meets philosophy, hence the opening dialectic of Hobbes versus Rousseau – the ongoing debate over human nature and violence or war. “The existence — and even the definition — of war in humanity’s hypothetical state of nature has been a controversial topic in the history of ideas”.

Philosopher Thomas Hobbes famously proposed that the original “state of nature” of humanity (or human nature) was inherently violent – the war of all against all in which “the life of man” is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”. Against that, philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau also famously proposed a more idealistic and idyllic state of nature as more free and peaceful – subsequently styled as that of the “noble savage” – made unequal and violent by “civilized” society.

That debate over human nature continues, not least in speculation or theories of prehistoric war, “spanning contemporary anthropology, archaeology, ethnography, history, political science, psychology, primatology, and philosophy in such divergent books as Azar Gat’s War in Human Civilization and Raymond C. Kelly’s Warless Societies and the Origin of War.”

Essentially, it boils down to those who argue for prehistoric war and violence, potentially at even higher rates than those in recorded history, and those who argue for more peaceful prehistory.

To put it that simply, however, removes all context or nuance from a debate that is much more balanced or varied, reflecting a more complex situation – that prehistory was both more violent than asserted by proponents of prehistoric pacifism and also more pacific than asserted by prehistoric warmongers.

Most concede that violence or war in human prehistory was highly variable between different societies at different times in different places or circumstances. Some societies were notoriously warlike, such as the Maori of New Zealand, the Yanomami (dubbed “the Fierce People”) of the Amazon or the inter-tribal warfare in Papua New Guinea.

On the one hand, archaeological studies of human remains from prehistory have suggested a higher rate for violent injury and death substantially above those in recorded history. One interesting feature is that a recurring motive for inter-tribal warfare is raiding for nubile women – as with the Yanomami, suggesting that the legendary motive for the Trojan War may not be so far removed from the historic or prehistoric truth.

On the other hand, depictions of human violence or war is comparatively rare until relatively recently in prehistoric art. Proponents of prehistoric pacificism persuasively suggest that low population density among prehistoric tribal hunter-gatherers – and the potential costly nature of violence between them – both allowed for and pushed towards avoiding conflict, typically by migration.

Another issue is that even if or where Paleolithic societies were violent, the scale of that violence was necessarily limited or disorganized – in the nature of feuds and raids or ambushes and skirmishes. Some argue for what is termed endemic warfare – in which “war is often ritualized with a number of taboos and practices that limit the number of casualties and the duration of the conflict”. Of course, endemic warfare could readily escalate into actual warfare without such limits.

Others have also asserted various historic or prehistoric event horizons that saw the escalation of war. One such is the development of missile weapons such as bows or slings allowing for less risk than melee combat. Another more commonly argued one is the horizon between the Paleolithic and Neolithic – with the increased sedentism from agriculture in the Neolithic seeing a corresponding increase in the intensity of scale in war.

One obvious model for theories of prehistoric war is more recent or contemporary tribal warfare. And one could argue that tribal war remains the predominant model for war in general – that most wars in history are tribal wars at heart.

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (Special Mention) (Preamble)

Mushroom cloud above Nagasaki after atomic bombing on August 9, 1945. Taken from the north west – photograph by Charles Levy, US National Archives and Records Administration, public domain image

 

 

I’ve ranked my Top 10 Wars of history, but it doesn’t end there – nor does it end with my Top 10 Types of War, because there is almost an infinite variety of types by or into which one can classify wars.

There’s certainly enough for my usual twenty special mentions per top ten, including my usual weird and wild special mentions towards the end.

Top Tens – History: Top 10 Types of War (Complete Top 10)

Second Floor, Northwest Gallery. Mural of War by Gari Melchers. Library of Congress Thomas Jefferson Building, Washington, D.C – photographed by Carol Highsmith (public domain image)

 

 

TOP 10 TYPES OF WAR

 

I always found wars a fascinating subject of history as a hobby of mine, from the comfortable armchair of hindsight and the fortunate perspective of being well removed from any firsthand experience of them.

Hence, I’ve ranked my Top 10 Wars of history, but it doesn’t end there. No, indeed there’s my Top 10 Types of War in history, as the broad types of war arguably outrank individual wars in historical importance – or at least rank as high as a tool for the study of individual wars, albeit many wars fall into or consist of more than one type of war.

Just some notes – there is almost an infinite variety of types by or into which one can classify wars. One could even compile a top ten for types of types of war, classifying types within broader themes – political, strategic, technological, and so on. I have a mix of types from different broad themes, although I tend to focus on types by strategic doctrine or technological nature of weaponry.

This is also one of my more unusual top ten lists where I don’t count down from tenth to first place but instead simply count out in the reverse direction, from first to tenth place. What’s more, I’ve ranked them mostly in chronological order rather than historical importance, although there’s a general overlap between the two, as longer history tends to coincide with their greater impact, albeit not always.

Interestingly, six of my top ten types of war are ancient or even earlier, so much so that they might be regarded as transcending mere types of war to being archetypes of it. On the other hand, four are distinctively modern – and by modern, I mean twentieth century and onwards – but have effectively reshaped war in their own image.

 

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

Awesome artwork “Roicroi, the last tercio” by Augusto Ferrer-Dalmau, portraying infantry of a Spanish tercio at the 1643 Battle of Rocroi, in Wikipedia “Infantry” under license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en

 

 

(1) INFANTRY WARFARE

 

Warfare in history commenced as infantry warfare, which has endured as the foundation of war and the predominant means of waging it.

That’s not to say that prehistoric war wasn’t also infantry war. In the broadest usage of infantry war as fighting on foot, all prehistoric war was infantry war (except to the extent of anyone ramming canoes or rafts into each other) – but for the most part, prehistoric war lacked the characteristic drill or regimen of infantry war, fighting as warriors rather than soldiers.

And that’s the essential nature of infantry war – fighting on foot and in formation, coordinated with each other rather solo-ing off into single combat, as soldiers with drill and regimen, typically with standardized weapons and equipment.

As such, the origins of infantry war are the origins of war itself in recorded history, since the first ancient empires fought with regular infantry, albeit often as an elite supplemented by conscript masses or militia as irregular infantry – something that has surprisingly endured as a practice since then to the modern period.

The ancient archetype of regular infantry remains the Greek phalanx, and even more so, the Roman legion.

While the archetypal infantry travels on foot – marches, that is, in a style and pace that has remained remarkably consistent throughout history – the defining trait of infantry is that they fight on foot, not necessarily that they get to the fight on foot.

Hence, there has been a variety of infantry distinguished by getting to the fight by other means than marching to it – most notably mechanized infantry or mobile infantry in the modern period but also mounted infantry, naval infantry, airborne infantry, and air assault infantry.

“Before the adoption of the chariot to create the first mobile fighting forces c. 2000 BC, all armies were pure infantry. Even after, with a few exceptions like the Mongol Empire, infantry has been the largest component of most armies in history.”

Infantry also remains the most basic or fundamental unit of war – the proverbial boots on the ground – for achieving strategic objectives, particularly when those objectives are measured in territory.

As such, infantry has not waned in war, albeit it has evolved with technology. Gunpowder saw infantry shift to line infantry tactics, shooting volleys at each other – until modern firepower overwhelmed even that, forcing infantry for its own survival to use “dispersed, maneuver-based, and heavily supported infantry units” as well as combined arms and the paramount importance of cover on the battlefield.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

Charge of the French 4th Hussars at the battle of Friedland, 14 June 1807 – painting by Edouard Detaille in 1891 (public domain image)

 

 

(2) CAVALRY WARFARE

 

“Cavalryman, horseman, trooper, cataphract, knight, drabant, hussar, uhlan, mamluk, curaisser, lancer, dragoon, samurai or horse archer”.

Where infantry was the fundamental unit of war in history, cavalry was the fundamental means of mobile war – “providing armies with superior speed, mobility, and shock impact” as well as things for which mobility is used such as “scouting, screening, flanking and pursuing enemies” or “breaking enemy lines”.

Cavalry warfare involved soldiers or warriors fighting mounted on horseback – ranging from ancient horse archers to armored knights and modern light cavalry”. Obviously, the fundamental ingredient for cavalry is the domestication of the horse, or more precisely the domestication of the horse followed by breeding horses of sufficient size for warriors mounted on them.

Prior to being of sufficient size to be used for cavalry proper, the smaller domesticated horses were able to be used to draw chariots as the first mobile forces in about 2000 BC. Chariots played much the same role as cavalry but were obsolescent by cavalry once horses were of sufficient size. Hence the designation of cavalry is not usually given to “any military forces that used other animals or platforms for mounts, such as chariots” – or those occasional other animals used in war, camels or elephants. Interestingly, the last use of chariots was by the Britons at the time of the Roman conquest of Britain.

Also interestingly, that won’t be the last we see of obsolescence when it comes to cavalry war, but from its origin through to the twentieth century, cavalry has tended to eclipse infantry for decisive importance or impact – as the dominant force for winning battles rather than waging wars.

Of course, that is an oversimplification of the strategic balance between infantry and cavalry in war, as it has seesawed between them, complicated by the usual numeric predominance of infantry in armies and the higher cost of cavalry.

Certainly, the dominance of cavalry is reflected in the recurring military proficiency or superiority of the mounted nomadic warriors of the Eurasian steppes – as observed by military historians such as Azar Gat and John Keegan, as well as the colorful phrases of the “steppe effect” by Walter Scheidel and the “Golden Age of the Barbarians” by James C. Scott.

There was also the medieval dominance of cavalry, originating in the late Roman period, where “mounted forces became the dominant, often aristocratic, arm of European armies throughout the age of feudalism”.

“Cavalry had the advantage of improved mobility, and a soldier fighting from horseback also had the advantages of greater height, speed, and inertial mass over an opponent on foot. Another element of horse mounted warfare is the psychological impact a mounted soldier can inflict on an opponent.”

However, it is weird to think of cavalry forces originating without the subsequent aids to riding – spurs, saddles, and above all stirrups, which facilitated heavy cavalry and the use of lances.

One might also add a certain romanticism that has attached to cavalry throughout history, albeit not necessarily as a matter of strategic or tactical advantage.

Sadly for such romanticism, infantry has had the last laugh, as unlike infantry but like chariots, cavalry has become obsolescent from the twentieth century to, well, another entry in this top ten – which has assumed the same role and often even the same title as cavalry with greater mobility and less vulnerability, as have airborne or air assault units such as in the famous fictional depiction of the helicopter air assault 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment in Apocalypse Now.

Whereas infantry could evolve, cavalry could not, at least on a large scale – the same deadly firepower of modern history that forced the evolution of infantry was fatal to cavalry.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

The 1805 Battle of Trafalgar painted by Louis-Phillipe Crepin (“Le Redoutable a Trafalgar”) in 1806 – public domain image used in Wikipedia “Naval Warfare”

 

 

(3) NAVAL WARFARE

 

War on water!

No – not like when Roman Emperor Caligula literally declared war on the sea (in the form of the god Neptune or Poseidon), but war fought on water, albeit overlapping with war fought on land in amphibious operations and naval landings.

“Naval warfare involves military operations on, under, and over the sea” – “combat in and on the sea, the ocean, or any other battlespace involving a major body of water such as a large lake or wide river”.

As surprisingly capable humans are as swimmers for terrestrial mammals (particularly primates), naval warfare obviously involves the various vessels humans have devised for transport on water. Of course, it doesn’t just involve vessels but vessels of sufficient size, resilience, and above all means for combat with other vessels. Hence naval warfare originated from the Bronze Age onwards, with the first recorded sea battle as the Battle of the Delta between the Egyptians and the Sea Peoples in about 1175 BC, although the very name of the latter suggests some sort of naval warfare before that.

Prehistoric humans probably fought each other from canoes or even rafts but that seems more a form of naval proto-warfare. However, the former persisted in recorded history with the use of war canoes, usually as a form of amphibious warfare – an important subset of naval warfare – although “canoe versus canoe engagements…were also significant”.

Naval warfare rose to a surprising importance and prominence in ancient history that are often overlooked for the more famous warfare on land. That importance seems even more surprising as naval warfare was predominantly fought either by boarding enemy ships or ramming them – methods which seem crude by the standards of modern naval warfare but persisted for a surprisingly long time until (and to some extent even after) the advent of gunpowder allowed for shipborne artillery as the standard means of naval combat.

Homer’s Iliad may have had the siege of Troy as its focus but famously features the so-called Catalogue of Ships, in its second book no less, albeit for the transport of Greek forces to Troy rather than naval combat with Trojan ships.

Thereafter, naval warfare looms large in ancient history – from the Persians and Greeks (particularly the Athenians) through to the Romans, whose Pax Romana was as much a matter of Mare Nostrum as it was of the legions.

Galleys were the primary means of ancient naval warfare and persisted as the dominant vessels for war until the early modern period in that primary arena of naval warfare, the Mediterranean. Galleys were superseded by the vessels of the Age of Sail, which also saw naval warfare expand with maritime transportation from mostly hugging the coasts in seas to the open ocean – although it is striking how often naval battles continued to be fought in coastal waters.

On that point, while we typically think of naval warfare as battles fought on the sea or ocean, there’s also naval warfare fought on lakes and rivers – reflecting that “even in the interior of large landmasses, transportation before the advent of extensive railways was largely dependent on rivers, lakes, canals, and other navigable waterways”. Hence the modern distinction between brown-water navies for riverine or littoral bodies of water and blue-water navies (or green-water navies) for open oceans or seas.

From the Age of Sail to the Age of Steam and Steel – with naval warfare in the latter evolving to steam power for ships and coaling stations for bases or ports. The latter also saw “ironclad” ships – first used in naval combat in the American Civil War – reflecting the improved chemistry and metallurgy which not only provided the means for armor to ships but also the guns and shells “capable of demolishing a wooden ship at a single blow” for which the armor was required.

Interestingly, naval supremacy underlaid modern superpower in a similar manner to the Pax Romana, only more so – with the Pax Britannica of the 19th century (with the Indian Ocean being dubbed a “British lake” in a similar manner to the Mare Nostrum), succeeded by the Pax Americana in the 20th century.

Modern naval warfare has seen a proliferation of forms through technology – notably naval aviation and aircraft carriers or submarine warfare which came to the fore in the Second World War (effectively superseding battleships) but also more recently missiles and aerial or naval drones.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

Guerrilla warfare during the Peninsular War, by Roque Gameiro, depicting a Portuguese guerrilla ambush against French forces (in the war that gave us the term guerilla) in “Pictures of the History of Portugal”, 2017 (public domain image used in Wikipedia “Guerilla Warfare”)

 

 

(4) GUERILLA WARFARE

 

Although the term originates from the Peninsular War in Spain against Napoleon’s France, guerilla war predates the Peninsular War all the way back to prehistory. Indeed, it was conventional war that was the more recent outlier, originating only in the Bronze Age and recorded history, while guerilla war was the baseline or default setting of war before that – and since, with Sun Tzu’s Art of War essentially a handbook in guerilla war strategy.

Nor was guerilla war strategy isolated to China. The Romans are probably more famous for fighting against guerilla war in revolts against their empire, in the process demonstrating why guerilla war was not so prevalent against ancient states with their resort to removing entire population, but they also famously resorted to guerilla war tactics when they had to against Hannibal in the Second Punic War.

“Guerrilla warfare is a form of unconventional, asymmetrical conflict where small, mobile groups of irregular forces (rebels, partisans) use hit-and-run tactics, sabotage, and ambushes to fight larger, traditional military forces. Originating from the Spanish for “little war,” it focuses on harassment, psychological warfare, and exploiting local knowledge to weaken a superior enemy over time.”

As such, guerilla war often tends to combine more than one type of war – infantry war may predominate in guerilla war, but the mobility of cavalry often leads to guerilla war or at least similar tactics. Arguably, even naval forces have resorted to a style similar to guerilla warfare – most notably for privateers, merchant raiders, or submarine attacks on shipping.

Guerilla war strategy aims to avoid “”direct, conventional battles, focusing instead on reducing enemy morale, seizing supplies, and dragging out conflicts to exhaust the opponent’s political will” – relying heavily on “support from the local population for food, shelter, intelligence, and recruits” or “familiar, difficult terrain like jungles, mountains, or crowded urban areas”.

That literal usage of little war from Spanish has lent itself to one of the most common modern descriptors of guerilla war as “small wars”, although that has often been synonymous with “dirty wars” in description and practice, for all sides of such conflicts.

Guerilla war often seems the most distinctive and prolific type of war in modern warfare, from the Vietnam War onwards – as the destructive power of modern technology seems more favorable to guerilla war, and even more so, modern political ideologies enlisting populations for or against guerillas.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

The siege of Rancagua during the Chilean War of Independence, painting by Pedro Subercaseaux (public domain image used in Wikipedia “Siege”)

 

 

 

(5) SIEGE & URBAN WARFARE

 

With fortifications – a historical development significant enough for its own interlude in John Keegan’s A History of Warfare – came siege warfare.

Or perhaps more precisely, prehistorical development, given that both cities or at least human settlements of sufficient size and fortifications emerged in the Neolithic and Bronze Age – indeed, one of the key features for archaeology. There may have been prototypes of fortifications or fortified positions using natural features or chokepoints in the Paleolithic, but not the resources for standing or field armies to hold or take them on the same scale.

“Siege warfare is a form of constant, low-intensity conflict focused on capturing a fortified position (castle, city, or fort) by surrounding it to block supplies (investment) and using active assaults to breach defenses. Common methods include starving defenders, utilizing artillery, tunnelling under walls, or scaling them.”

Sun Tzu in The Art of War admonished besieging cities as the “worst policy”, given the cost in time, resources and forces exceeds even that of the usual costly attrition to be avoided for war in general.

However, siege warfare is surprisingly prolific in history, notably in later medieval history where “sieges were more common than pitched battles”. It’s also surprisingly prolific in fictional depictions of war, in part due to the dramatic nature of last stands.

The rosy-fingered dawn of Western literature, Homer’s Iliad, is ultimately about the siege of Troy – which may or may not have some Bronze Age historicity. Similarly, both the literary and cinematic versions of Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings feature key battles, such as those for Helm’s Deep and Minas Tirith, that are sieges.

Without winning a siege by assault or attrition, that left options of negotiating surrender by diplomacy, “the use of deception or treachery to bypass defenses” or the blunter options that could affect either the besieged or besiegers – “starvation, thirst or disease”.

Siege warfare is usually seen as ending with gunpowder but that’s not strictly or initially the case, as something of an arms race developed between fortifications and artillery in early modern history. It was with the advent of greater firepower from the nineteenth century and particularly of mobile warfare from the twentieth century, that “the significance of classical siege declined” and “a single fortified stronghold is no longer as decisive as it once was”.

Ironically however, while the “classical siege” may have declined from modern firepower and mobile warfare, the same force of industrialization that underlay both led to battles or wars of attrition that resembled sieges. States had the means to maintain and supply forces in the field that could then effectively besiege each other or their defensive positions on an unprecedented scale and span.

The trench warfare on the Western Front of the First World War resembled a form of siege warfare. The Second World War might seem to have displaced that through combined arms and maneuver, but it is striking how many battles of that war were or resembled sieges – Stalingrad and Monte Cassino to name just two of them, apart from the famous siege of Leningrad.

The battles or sieges of the Second World War also demonstrate that while city walls may have stopped being a feature in siege warfare, cities themselves did not – with urban warfare resembling a form of siege warfare, only now of attrition of defensive positions within the city itself. Since the Second World War, urban warfare has also often combined elements of guerilla warfare with siege warfare.

The attritional nature of modern industrial warfare has extended beyond individual battles or even any direct combat to resemble sieges on a grand scale – such as the submarine warfare of the Second World War, with the Germans effectively besieging Britain and the Americans besieging Japan, or for that matter the Cold War in Europe, resembling two armies besieging each other.

 

RATING:

S-TIER (GOD TIER)

 

 

A 155 mm artillery shell fired by a United States 11th Marine Regiment M-198 howitzer during training – public domain image in Wikipedia “Artillery”

 

 

(6) ARTILLERY WARFARE

 

“The god of war” according to Stalin – generally providing the majority of the total firepower for modern armies as well as causing the majority of combat deaths in the Napoleonic Wars and world wars.

“Artillery consists of ranged weapons that launch munitions far beyond the range and power of infantry firearms” – “since the introduction of gunpowder and cannon, artillery has largely meant cannon, and in contemporary usage, usually refers to shell-firing guns, howitzers, and mortars…and rocket artillery”.

Hence, artillery is a large part, if not the primary part, of the firepower that transformed infantry warfare and made cavalry warfare obsolete in modern history – although with some caveat that infantry firepower has also been transformed in ways that matches or eclipses historic artillery, such as RPGs or rocket-propelled grenades.

As we have seen, it has also transformed naval warfare, by becoming the predominant means of that warfare as opposed to the boarding or ramming of ships that preceded it – as well as coastal artillery to defend against ships.

And it is only apt that artillery warfare is the next entry after siege and urban warfare – “early artillery development focused on the ability to breach defensive walls and fortifications during siege and led to heavy, fairly immobile siege engines”.

“Although not called by that name, siege engines performing the role recognizable as artillery have been employed in warfare since antiquity. The first known catapult was developed in Syracuse in 399 BC. Until the introduction of  gunpowder into western warfare, artillery was dependent upon mechanical energy, which not only severely limited the kinetic energy of the projectiles, but also required the construction of very large engines to accumulate sufficient energy. A 1st-century BC Roman catapult launching 6.55 kg (14.4 lb) stones achieved a kinetic energy of 16 kilojoules, compared to a mid-19th-century 12-pounder gun, which fired a 4.1 kg (9.0 lb) round, with a kinetic energy of 240 kilojoules, or a 20th-century US battleship that fired a 1,225 kg (2,701 lb) projectile from its main battery with an energy level surpassing 350 megajoules.”

With lighter and more mobile artillery through technological improvement there came feild artillery – usually horse-drawn prior to the steam and internal combustion engines that saw railway guns, the largest artillery ever conceived, and the artillery, both offensive and defensive, of the next two entries.

Such is the modern importance of artillery that it is typically its own arm of service within modern armies – as well as navies and air forces for coastal and anti-aircraft artillery respectively, although organization and practice varies.

Technological improvement of artillery not only involves the delivery systems or “engines” as well the projectiles or munitions fired or launched by them, but also target acquisition and techniques or “fire control”.

 

RATING:

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

Promotional art for the Armored Warfare video game

 

 

(7) MECHANIZED & ARMORED WAR

 

Where the steam engine transformed naval warfare, the internal combustion engine transformed warfare on land – as well as the balance between land and sea in warfare.

Let me elaborate.

Sure, the steam engine, used for trains and railways, also transformed warfare on land but more in logistics and mobilization than actual combat.

However, to transform combat on land – and replace cavalry for mobile warfare – it took the advent of the internal combustion engine for vehicles used in war from the twentieth century onwards.

What is often overlooked is that the advent of the internal combustion engine in war also reversed the balance between a seaborne invading force and the land-based defending force. Prior to the internal combustion engine, a seaborne force had the advantage of greater mobility and speed bringing troops and supplies to a beachhead over the land-based force defending it. After the internal combustion engine, the land-based force had that advantage.

Mechanized warfare, often interchangeably used with armored warfare given how much both are represented tanks, “is the operational use of armored fighting vehicles—such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, and self-propelled artillery—combined with motorized infantry to achieve rapid movement, high firepower, and protection on the battlefield. It represents a shift from infantry-centric fighting to machine-driven combat, originating in WWI”.

While the tank is definitive of mechanized warfare (and obviously of armored warfare), it is not the war-breaking weapon in isolation as it is often seen to be in popular imagination. Indeed, tanks in isolation without support are dangerously vulnerable to counterattack, particularly with the advent of artillery and infantry anti-tank weaponry in the Second World War. I’ve read that tanks aren’t even the best weapon to use against other tanks.

Instead, tanks are used as part of combined arms strategy or tactics – “much of the application of armoured warfare depends on the use of tanks and related vehicles used by other supporting arms such as infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, and other combat vehicles, as well as mounted combat engineers and other support units”.

The use of tanks has been inflated in popular imagination by their identification as the instrument of German blitzkrieg in the Second World War. Setting aside that blitzkrieg itself was a propaganda term applied to traditional German maneuver warfare (Bewegungskrieg), tanks were obviously important but as a component of combined arms – H.P. Willmott argued that the use of radio (to coordinate combined arms) was the more decisive component. Even then, the success of German “blitzkrieg” reflected a brief window where the balance swung in favor of mobile offensive firepower over defence, but the balance swang back towards defensive firepower during the Second World War – hence the strength of German defence in the latter part of the war and the relatively greater force the Allies required to overcome it.

 

RATING:

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

An air-to-air right side view of an 81st Tactical Fighter Squadron F-4E Phantom II aircraft releasing 18 Mark-82 500-pound bombs over the Bardenas Reales Gunnery Range. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. David Nolan) – public domain image in Wikipedia “Aerial Warfare”

 

 

(8) AERIAL WARFARE

 

War in air!

It’s commonly observed that only 66 years separated the American Wright Brothers’ flights in 1903, recognized to be “the first sustained and controlled heavier than air powered flight”, and the moon landing in 1969.

However, less than a decade separated those flights from the first use of aircraft in war, the Italo-Turkish War in 1911, although their more famous and prolific use was in the First World War, firstly for aerial reconnaissance but then for aerial combat, air support and bombing.

Such was the development of military airpower in only two decades after the First World War that it became of decisive importance in the Second World War, particularly for achieving air superiority or supremacy – arguably to the extent of war-breaking importance, as the critical margin of victory or defeat, but not war-winning of itself.

Military airpower has only increased since then – with jets, missiles, more powerful or precise munitions, electronic or stealth technology, and drones or unmanned aerial vehicles – but the jury is still out whether airpower alone can win wars, at least in the absence of another entry in this top ten. Still, it can come damn close, perhaps even win on occasion by itself or with minimal use of ground forces.

“Aerial warfare includes bombers attacking enemy installations or a concentration of enemy troops or strategic targets; fighter aircraft battling for control of airspace; attack aircraft engaging in close air support against ground targets; naval aviation flying against sea and nearby land targets; gliders, helicopters and other aircraft to carry airborne forces such as paratroopers; aerial refueling tankers to extend operation time or range; and military transport aircraft to move cargo and personnel.”

That is hardly exhaustive of military airpower. Kites and balloons, manned and unmanned, were used in warfare even prior to heavier than air powered flight, primarily for reconnaissance, and continue to have applications since. Lighter-than-air airships have also been used in warfare, with the high point (heh) of their use for bombing cities in the First World War although they had and continue to have more limited applications.

Returning to heavier than air powered aircraft, they have also been used and continued to be used for communications, command and control as well as early warning, surveillance, and intelligence. There’s also the use of aircraft for evacuation and rescue – as well as the medical transport, such as the titular Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals of the TV series with its iconic helicopter ambulance opening scene.

On the other side, “surface forces are likely to respond to enemy air activity with anti-aircraft warfare”.

 

RATING:

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

 

An MQ-1 Predator, armed with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, piloted by Lt. Col. Scott Miller on a combat mission over southern Afghanistan. (U.S. Air Force Photo / Lt. Col. Leslie Pratt) – public domain image in Wikipedia “General Atomics MQ-1 Predator”

 

 

(9) DRONE WARFARE

 

Drones, drone strikes and drone swarms.

“Drone warfare is a form of warfare that involves the deployment of military robots and unmanned systems. The unmanned systems may be remoted controlled by a pilot or have varying levels of autonomy during their mission, enhancing offensive and defensive capabilities while reducing the need for personnel.”

‘Nuff said, except that drone warfare is not only emerging as the type of warfare that defines the conflicts of the twenty-first century, but also a game-changing one that increasingly defines their battlespace.

And I say battlespace to invoke the multiple domains of drone warfare – “types of unmanned systems and platforms include unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) or weaponized commercial unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), unmanned surface vehicles (USV) or unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), and unmanned ground vehicles (UGV)”.

“Military applications of drones range from reconnaissance tasks, kamikaze missions, logistical support, bomb disposal, training and medical evacuation to electronic warfare, anti-war, anti-armor, and anti-personnel roles…Drones are primarily utilized to conduct intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions, facilitating direct attacks on targets”.

Drone warfare was defined by US drone strikes in the War on Terror but has “evolved and proliferated quickly in the 2010s and 2020s”. Even so, I wouldn’t have ranked it in my top ten before the Russo-Ukrainian War, which saw it rise to game-changing prominence that’s here to stay.

“The Russo-Ukrainian war is widely recognised as the world’s first drone war due to the large scale and high intensity of drone attacks, and the role of this experience in evolving the tactics of modern conventional warfare…The Russo-Ukrainian war demonstrated how drones have disrupted traditional military doctrines in a manner similar to how gunpowder revolutionized warfare, making them a decisive factor in all future conflicts.”

Such is the role of drones in that war that “Ukraine became the first country to create a military branch exclusively dedicated to drone warfare – the Unmanned Systems Forces”, with Russia following suit and I anticipate more to follow beyond that war and its combatants.

 

RATING:

A-TIER (TOP TIER)

 

 

Operation Buster-Jungle Dog in exercise Desert Rock I at the Nevada Test Site, 1 November 1951 – the first US nuclear field exercise conducted on land with troops only 6 miles from the blast, public domain image in Wikipedia “Nuclear Warfare”

 

 

(10) NUCLEAR WARFARE

 

“It’s Defcon One…get me Big Mac, fries to go!”

Few forms of warfare have loomed as large as nuclear warfare but at the same time to have never existed in actual warfare except as threat or hypothetical prospect with one exception – fortunately, “the first and only use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict was the United States atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki”.

While nuclear weapons haven’t been used in warfare apart from that exception, that hasn’t stopped a select few nations with the means to acquire or develop them, primarily the United States and the Soviet Union or Russia, from detonating them “on over 2,000 occasions for various testing purposes” or deploying them on a large scale in readiness for use.

The prospect or threat of nuclear warfare has effectively operated as a limit on other forms of warfare, at least directly between states with nuclear weapons, to avoid escalating to nuclear warfare with each other, given the sheer destructive potential of mutually assured destruction at best and the possibility of human extinction at worst – “nuclear winter, nuclear famine, and societal collapse”, oh my!

And that pretty much sums up nuclear warfare, except for how dangerously close we’ve come to the tripwire for it.

“Countries have increased their readiness to carry out strategic and tactical nuclear attacks in response to intensifying conflicts, including the Korean War, First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises, Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam War, Sino-Soviet border conflict, Yom Kippur War, Gulf War, and Russo-Ukrainian War”.

“The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, between the nuclear superpowers of the U.S. and Soviet Union, is often considered the closest call with a nuclear exchange” – one of two occasions, along with the Yom Kippur War, that the United States was at Defcon Two, the stage before actual deployment in Defcon One.

The other famous measurement of the risk of nuclear war is the Doomsday Clock.

Throw in the extraordinary extent to which states have planned for “limited” nuclear war or had tactical nuclear weapons deployed for use on the battlefield – missiles, munitions, torpedoes and depth charges on the battlefields – as well as the risk of deployment from accident or false alarms, and one sometimes wonders how we ever made it this far without nuking ourselves.

 

RATING:

X-TIER (WILD TIER)